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THE   PROBLEMS  OF   PHILOSOPHY 


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THE   PROBLEMS   OF 
PHILOSOPHY 


BY 
HARALD    HOFFDING 

TRANSLATED   BY 

GALEN    M.   FISHER 

WITH  A  PREFACE    BY 

WILLIAM    JAMES 


THE   MACMILLAN   COMPANY 

LONDON:   MACMILLAN  &  CO.,  Ltd. 
1906 

All  rights  reserved 


Copyright,  1905, 
By  the  MACMILLAN  COMPANY. 


Set  up  and  electrotyped.     Published  October,  1905. 
Reprinted  October,  1906. 


8.  Gushing  »k  Co.  —  lierwick  &  Smith  Co. 
Norwood,  Mass.,  U.S.A. 


PREFACE 

Professor  Hoffding  of  Copenhagen  is 
one  of  the  wisest,  as  well  as  one  of  the  most 
learned  of  living  philosophers.  His  "Psy- 
chology," his  "Ethics,"  and  his  "History 
of  Modern  Philosophy"  have  made  his 
name  known  and  respected  among  English 
readers,  though  his  admirable  "Philosophy 
of  Rehgion"  still  calls  for  a  translator. 
The  following  httle  work  is,  so  to  speak, 
his  philosophical  testament.  In  it  he  sums 
up  in  an  extraordinarily  compact  and  pithy 
form  the  result  of  his  Hfelong  reflections 
on  the  deepest  alternatives  of  philosophical 
opinion.  The  work,  to  my  mind,  is  so 
pregnant  and  its  conclusions  so  sensible  — 
or  at  least  so  in  accordance  with  what  I 
regard  as  sensible  —  that  I  have  had  it 
translated  as  a  contribution  to  the  educa- 
tion of  our  English-reading  students. 


vi  Preface 

Rationalism  in  philosophy  proceeds  from 
the  whole  to  its  parts,  and  maintains  that 
the  connection  between  facts  must  at  bottom 
be  intimate  and  not  external:  the  universe 
is  a  Unit,  and  the  parts  of  Being  must  be 
interlocked  continuously.  Empiricism,  on 
the  other  hand,  goes  from  parts  to  whole, 
and  is  willing  to  allow  that  in  the  end  some 
parts  may  be  merely  added  to  others,  and 
that  what  the  word  'and'  stands  for  may 
be  a  part  of  real  Being  as  well  as  of  speech. 
For  radical  rationahsm,  ReaHty  in  itself  is 
eternally  complete,  and  the  confusions  of 
experience  are  our  illusion.  For  radical 
empiricism,  confusion  may  be  a  category 
of  the  Real  itself,  and  "ever  not  quite"  a 
permanent  result  of  our  attempts  at  think- 
ing it  out  straighter.  Professors  of  Phi- 
losophy are  almost  always  rationalists ;  and 
the  student,  passing  from  the  street  into 
their  lecture-rooms,  usually  finds  a  world 
presented  to  him,  so  abstract,  pure,  and 
logical,  and  perfect,  that  it  is  hard  for 
him  to  see  in  it  any  resemblance  of  char- 


Preface  vii 

acter  to  the  struggling  and  disjointed  sum 
of  muddy  facts  which  he  has  left  behind 
him,  outside. 

Now  the  pecuHarity  of  Professor  Hoff- 
ding  is  that  whereas  he  has  the  manner 
of  a  rationaHstic  professor  of  Philosophy, 
being  as  abstract  and  technical  in  his  style 
of  exposition  as  any  one  can  wish,  his 
results,  nevertheless,  keep  in  touch  with 
the  temperament  of  concrete  reahty,  and 
he  allows  that  'ever  not  quite'  may  be  the 
last  word  of  our  attempts  at  understand- 
ing hfe  rationally. 

The  word  'rationally'  here  denotes  cer- 
tain definite  connections  which  Professor 
Hoffding  also  sums  up  under  the  name  of 
'continuities.'  He  opposes  to  them  the 
notion  of  the  'irrational,'  as  that  residuum 
of  crude  or  'alogical'  fact,  'jnere'  fact, 
that  may  remain  over  when  our  attempts 
to  establish  logical  continuity  among  things 
have  reached  their  Hmit.  The  conjunction 
'  and '  would  be  the  only  bond  here  between 
the  continuous   and  the  irrational  portion 


viii  Preface 

of  Reality.  Professor  Hoffding  is  in  short 
an  empiricist  and  pluralist,  although  he 
prefers  to  call  himself  a  'critical  Monist.' 
He  means  by  the  word  'critical,'  here,  to 
indicate  that  the  continuity  and  unity  of 
Reahty  are  at  no  time  complete,  but  may 
be  yet  in  process  of  completion.  Our 
thought,  which  is  itself  a  part  of  Reality,  is 
surely  incomplete;  but  in  endeavoring  to 
make  itself  ever  more  continuous  and  to 
see  the  world  as  ever  more  rational,  it  works 
in  the  direction  of  more  continuity;  and 
the  whole  of  Creation  may  analogously  be 
in  travail  to  get  itself  into  an  ever  more 
continuous  and  rational  form. 

Empiricist  matter  presented  in  a  ration- 
alist's manner  —  this  to  my  mind  gives 
their  distinction  to  the  pages  that  follow. 
They  form  a  muUum  in  parvo  so  well  cal- 
culated to  impress  and  influence  the  usual 
rationalistic-minded  student  of  philosophy, 
that  I  put  them  forth  in  English  for  his 
benefit. 

It  takes,  I  confess,  some  little  knowledge 


Preface  ix 

of  philosophic  literature  to  appreciate  the 
far-reaching  significance  of  some  of  our 
author's  paragraphs,  and  to  distribute  em- 
phasis properly  among  them.  They  are 
too  brief  and  abstract  for  the  unguided 
beginner.  For  his  benefit  let  me  barely 
indicate  some  of  the  book's  positions  which 
seem  to  me  particularly  noteworthy. 

I  have  spoken  of  the  notion  that  since 
the  world  is  incomplete  anyhow,  so  far  as 
our  thought  goes,  it  may  also  in  other  ways 
be  only  approaching  perfection.  Perfec- 
tion, in  other  words,  may  not  be  eternal; 
rather  are  things  working  toward  it  as 
an  ideal;  and  God  himself  may  be  one 
of  the  co-workers.  Time,  on  this  view, 
must  be  real,  and  cannot.  Professor  Hoff- 
ding  says,  be  banished,  as  ultra-rationalists 
pretend,  from  absolute  reality. 

With  this  general  position  goes  what  our 
author  calls  the  'dynamic'  notion  of  Truth, 
as  opposed  to  the  'static'  notion.  I  should 
interpret  this  as  equivalent  to  saying  that 
'knowledge'  is  a  relation  of  our  thinking 


X  Preface 

activities  to  reality,  and  that  those  activi- 
ties are  '  truest '  v^hich  work  best  —  the 
term  'work'  being  taken  in  the  widest 
possible  number  of  senses.  Thought  is 
thus  an  instrument  of  adaptation  to,  and 
eventually  of  modification  of,  its  objects. 
Its  duty  may,  but  need  not  always,  be 
merely  to  copy  the  latter.  In  all  this, 
Professor  Hoffding  aHgns  himself  with  the 
'economical'  school  of  scientific  logicians, 
and  (if  I  mistake  not)  with  the  recent 
'humanistic'  and  ' pragmatistic '  literature 
of  our  own  language. 

Professor  Hoffding's  'critical'  (as  op- 
posed to  absolute)  Monism  means  that 
although  you  cannot  exhaustively  account 
for  any  item  of  fact  by  referring  to  the  whole 
of  which  it  is  a  member,  yet  so  much  of 
what  we  call  a  fact  consists  of  its  relations 
to  other  facts,  that  we  are  equally  unable 
to  see  any  fact  as  wholly  independent. 
The  part  in  itself  remains  for  us  an  ab- 
straction, and  from  a  whole  which  itself  is 
for  us  a  mere  ideal.      Neither  is  given   in 


Preface  xi 

experience,  nor  can  either  be  adequately 
supplied  by  our  reason;  so  that,  both 
above  and  below,  thought  fails  to  con- 
tinue, and  terminates  against  an  'irra- 
tional' This  in  the  end  may  mean  that 
Being  is  really  incomplete,  in  any  sense  in 
which  our  logic  apprehends  completeness. 

No  one  better  than  Professor  Hoffding 
in  these  pages  has  shown  how  all  our  at- 
tempted definitions  of  the  Whole  of  things, 
are  made  by  conceiving  it  as  analogous  in 
constitution  to  some  one  of  its  parts  which 
we  treat  as  a  type-phenomenon.  No  one 
has  traced  better  the  logical  limitations  of 
this  sort  of  speculation.  We  never  can 
absolutely  prove  its  vaHdity.  We  can  only 
paint  our  more  or  less  plausible  pictures; 
and  philosophy  thus  must  always  be  some- 
thing of  an  art  as  well  as  of  a  science. 

The  fundamental  type-phenomenon  is 
the  fact  that  we  can,  to  some  degree  at  any 
rate,  make  things  mentally  intelligible.  Be- 
ing and  our  mental  forms  are  thus  not 
incongruent.      And    as   our   mental   forms 


xii  Preface 

act  in  us  as  unifying  forces,  so  we  must 
suppose  that  the  energy  in  Being  that 
tends  toward  unity  in  the  thought-part  of 
Being,  tends,  by  analogy,  toward  unity  else- 
where also.  This  puts  Professor  Hoffding 
in  a  general  attitude  of  harmony  with  ideal- 
istic ways  of  thinking.  But  he  still  insists 
that  Being  can  never  be  expressed  in  thought 
without  some  blind  remainder. 

In  Ethics  the  same  antinomy  or  conflict 
between  part  and  whole  occurs  which  we 
find  in  the  other  problems.  The  single  act 
or  agent  must  have  independent  value,  yet 
must  also  be  a  means  toward  farther 
values.  Neither  from  any  whole  or  any 
parts  concretely  given  can  we  deduce  a 
continuous  ethical  system.  Such  a  system 
is  still  a  vacant  abstraction;  and  both  in 
Being  and  in  concrete  thinking  the  kingdom 
of  goods  must  be  regarded  as  still  engaged 
in  the  making. 

Our  author's  conception  of  religion  is 
one  of  his  best  strokes,  in  my  opinion.  He 
defines  it  as  a  behef  in  the  ultimate  'con- 


Preface  xiii 

servation  of  values,'  or  rather  of  what  has 
value.  This  seems  to  me  to  cover  more 
facts  in  the  concrete  history  of  human 
rehgions  than  any  definition  with  which  I 
am  acquainted.  Yet  one  easily  sees  how 
experience  may  change  our  ideas  of  what 
the  most  genuinely  ideal  values  are;  so  the 
*  philosophy '  of  reHgion,  less  than  any  other 
philosophy  perhaps,  is  entitled  to  become 
dogmatic.  The  behef  in  the  conservation 
of  values  has  itself  a  value,  for  it  can  give 
an  energy  to  hfe.  Being  so  vital  a  function, 
it  will  always  be  sure  to  find  some  form  for 
itself  functionally  equivalent  to  the  rehgions 
of  the  past,  whether  that  form  be  called  by 
the  name  of  religion,  or  be  called  by  some 
other  name. 

An  unfinished  world  then,  with  all  Crea- 
tion, along  with  our  thought,  strugghng  into 
more  continuous  and  better  shape  —  such 
is  our  author's  general  view  of  the  matter 
of  Philosophy.  I  have  doubtless  empha- 
sized the  points  that  appealed  most  to  my 
own  personal  interests.    Others  —  and  there 


xiv  Preface 

are  many  which  are  fundamental  —  I  must 
leave  the  reader  to  find  out.  I  need  only 
add  that  I  have  carefully  revised  the  trans- 
lation, and  that  (though  it  may  not  be 
elegant)  it  is,  I  beheve,  faithful  to  the 
author's  meaning  throughout. 

WILLIAM  JAMES. 
Harvard  University. 


CONTENTS 


PAGB 

Introduction i 

CHAPTER  I 

The  Problem  of  Consciousness 


CHAPTER  II 
The  Problem  of  Knowledge 

1.  The  kinds  of  knowledge   . 

2.  The  principles  of  knowledge 

3.  Quality  and  quantity 

4.  Causality,  elementary  and  ideal 

5.  Subject  and  object     .        .        . 

CHAPTER   in 
The  Problem  of  Being 


I 


II 


1.  The  concept  of  personality  and  analytic  psy- 

chology       ....... 

2.  Discontinuity  in  the  psychical  sphere         .         .       25 

3.  Psychology  and  physiology         ,         ...       46 

4.  Will  and  energy         ......       54 


60 

67 

85 

95 
107 


Problem  and  method  .         .         .         .         .1x6 

2.  Metaphysic  as  an  art  .         .         .         .         .126 

3.  First  type-phenomenon  (unity  or  plurality?)      .     130 

4.  Second  type-phenomenon  (spirit  or  matter?)    .      138 

5.  Third  type-phenomenon  (rest  or  development?)      144 

XV 


xvi  Contents 

CHAPTER   IV 
The  Problem  of  Values 

PAGE 

I.   Introduction 153 


A.    The  Ethical  Problem 

(a)  Ethical  work      .... 

2.  The  principle  of  continuity  in  ethics 
{b)  The  rationality  of  ethical  valuations 

3.  The  conflict  of  ideal  values 

4.  The  diversity  of  individual  conditions 


158 
158 
165 
165 
171 


B.    The  Religiotis  Problem 

5.  The  principle  of  continuity  in  the  philosophy  of 

religion 173 

6.  The  psychological  position  of  religion        .         .176 

7.  Historical  forms  of  religion       ....     181 

Notes 187 


THE   PROBLEMS  OF   PHILOSOPHY 


PHILOSOPHICAL 
PROBLEMS 

INTRODUCTION 

PHILOSOPHICAL  ideas,  as  the 
history  of  philosophy  shows, 
may  have  a  double  significance. 
They  may  attempt  to  pro- 
pound, to  discuss,  or  to  solve  certain  prob- 
lems; and  they  may  represent  symptoms 
of  certain  tendencies  of  the  intellectual  Hfe 
of  man.  Between  these  two  phases  of 
philosophy  a  constant  interaction  takes 
place;  for  the  fact  that  a  problem  is 
propounded  and  treated  in  a  certain  way, 
may  be  considered  as  a  symptom  of  a 
pecuhar  intellectual  movement ;  and,  on  the 
other  hand,  the  sting  of  problems  excites 
intellectual  movements  which  otherwise 
would    not    arise.     In    this    interaction    we 

B  I 


2  Philosophical  Problems 

discover  an  intimate  connection  between 
personal  life  and  scientific  inquiry.  This 
connection  prevails  to  a  greater  or  less 
degree  in  all  branches  of  science;  but  from 
the  nature  of  the  case  it  is  brought  out 
especially  as  we  approach  the  border-hnes 
of  human  knowledge.  It  appears  more 
clearly  in  mental  than  in  natural  science, 
and  most  clearly  in  philosophy,  whose 
problems  are  essentially  border-problems. 

There  is  a  current  opinion  that  personal- 
ity and  scientific  research  are  antagonistic. 
Hence,  on  the  one  hand,  the  student  would 
fain  doff  his  personality  when  he  thinks 
scientifically;  and,  on  the  other,  he  lives  as 
if  scientific  methods  and  results  had  no 
significance  for  the  freer  side  of  his  per- 
sonal development.  I  myself,  in  my  youth, 
swore  allegiance  to  such  a  view,  under  the 
overpowering  influence  of  S.  Kierkegaard. 
If  I  have  finally  broken  its  hold  on  me,  I 
venture  to  say  that  that  is  because  I  have 
become  better  acquainted  with  both  science 
and  the  personal  life. 


Introduction  3 

The  desire  to  investigate  things  is  a  special 
form  of  the  striving  after  consistency  w'\\h 
one's  self  under  all  one's  manifold  and  chang- 
ing experiences.     This    effort   manifests  it- 
self in  formal  as  well  as  in  real  science,  — 
in   the   impulse  to  form  series  of  concepts 
in   which   one   member   develops   itself  by 
inner   necessity    out    of   the    preceding,    as 
well  as  in  the  effort  to  combine  our  actual 
experiences  into  the  closest  and  richest  forms 
of    continuity.      Personality    consists    pre- 
eminently in  the  inner  unity  and  connection 
of  all  our  ideas,  feelings,  and  strivings.     It 
does  not  abdicate  its  life  when  it   devotes 
itself  to  research.    It  begets,  on  the  contrary, 
in  science,  as  in  art,  an  objective  image  of 
itself.     Only  thus  can  we  understand  the 
inner    character    which     the     passion    for 
knowledge  assumes,  that  amor  intellectualis 
felt   by   the  seeker  as  he  works  up  to  the 
pinnacle  from   which    the   particulars    dis- 
close   themselves    as    parts    of    one    great 
whole.     That  holy  fire,  which,  in  spite   of 
all  smothering   and    repression   ever   anew 


4  Philosophical  Problems 

sets  thought  ablaze,  finds  in  this  its  only 
explanation. 

But  personality  in  turn  needs  refining  by 
the  scientific  process,  since  it  must  bend  to 
the  objective  connections  of  thought,  the 
fixed  order  of  things  within  which  every 
individual  being  has  its  appointed  place. 
Freedom  is  won  through  hard  obedience  to 
the  truth.  It  is  the  noble  prerogative  of 
personality  that  it  can  discover  the  great 
laws  that  condition  its  own  conservation, 
that  rightly  determine  its  desires,  and  fix  the 
conditions  for  their  reahzation.  There  is  a 
science  of  the  personal  life  as  of  everything 
else;  hke  all  other  sciences  it  is,  no  doubt, 
incomplete,  but  in  every  earnest  investiga- 
tion into  the  form  and  demands  of  the  per- 
sonal life,  it  is  presupposed.  Among  present 
day  philosophers,  Charles  Renouvier  lays  the 
greatest  stress  on  the  antithesis  between  the 
demands  of  thought  and  personality.*  Yet 
even  he  calls  for  a  rational  conception  of 
personality,  and  cannot  reject  all  the  analo- 
gies between  the  two. 


Introduction  5 

Such  an  analogy  is  thrown  into  clear  re- 
lief when  one  tries  to  formulate  the  chief 
problems  with  which  philosophical  in- 
quiry is  concerned.  These  problems  arise 
from  the  side  of  personaHty  as  well  as  from 
the  side  of  science. 

In  my  "History  of  Modern  Philosophy" 
I  have  tried  to  show,  in  a  purely  historical 
way,  that  there  are  four  such  chief  prob- 
lems, namely:  I.  The  problem  of  the 
nature  of  consciousness  (the  psychological 
problem);  II.  The  problem  of  the  vahd- 
ity  of  knowledge  (the  logical  problem) ; 
III.  The  problem  of  the  nature  of  being 
(the  cosmological  problem) ;  and  IV.  The 
problem  of  value  (the  moral  and  religious 
problem  ^).  In  this  treatise  my  task  is  to 
point  out  the  inner  connection  between  these 
problems.  At  bottom,  they  are  one  and 
the  same  problem,  appearing  in  different 
forms  and  applications. 

The  motives  which  may  induce  philo- 
sophical inquiry  are  very  various.  Often 
the  motive  is  ethico-religious ;  consequently, 


6  Philosophical  Problems 

practical  and  personal.  If  so,  one  would 
begin  with  the  fourth  problem.  It  soon 
becomes  plain,  however,  that  its  considera- 
tion demands  insight  into  the  nature  of 
consciousness,  into  the  conditions  of  knowl- 
edge, and  into  the  constitution  of  that  ex- 
istence which  the  ethical  personality  shares 
with  other  things.  If,  on  the  other  hand, 
an  interest  in  observation  impels  one,  one 
will  begin  with  the  psychological  problem,  as 
has  happened  in  the  empiricist  philosophy 
under  its  various  forms.  But  if  what  we 
seek  is  rather  to  distinguish  between  what 
we  can  know  and  what  we  cannot  know, 
we  shall  begin  with  the  problem  of  knowl- 
edge, the  path  travelled  by  the  critical 
philosophy.  If,  finally,  one  has  full  confi- 
dence in  the  possibihty  of  thought  and  seeks 
a  rounded  world-view,  one  will  follow  the 
lead  of  the  dogmatic  and  speculative  schools 
and  begin  with  the  problem  of  Being. 
It  naturally  has  not  a  httle  bearing  on  the 
form  and  kind  of  treatment,  which  problem 
one  begins  with;    for  one  problem  is  easily 


Introduction  7 

overshadowed  by  another.  In  a  study 
of  comparative  problems,  to  which  in  these 
pages  I  make  a  contribution,  it  is  impor- 
tant to  give  each  problem  due  recognition. 
Accordingly,  it  is  my  purpose  —  in  harmony 
with  the  above  indicated  analogy  between 
personality  and  science  —  to  begin  with  the 
psychological  problem,  and  then  proceed  to 
the  examination  of  the  nature  of  scientific 
knowledge,  and  to  the  problem  of  knowl- 
edge in  general.  If  one  puts  the  problem  of 
Being  third  in  the  series,  the  transition  to  it 
comes  quite  naturally,  either  from  personal- 
ity, which  is  one  part  of  all  being,  or  from 
science,  whose  function  it  is  to  lead  us  to 
a  view  of  the  existing  world.  The  three 
problems  thus  far  named  would  be  set  for 
us  if  man  were  only  a  purely  intellectual, 
cognitive  being.  The  fourth  problem 
arises  on  account  of  the  relation  in  which 
man,  as  a  feeling  and  willing  creature, 
stands  to  Being.  Thus  are  the  chief  prob- 
lems of  thought  hnked  with  the  theoretical 
and  practical  interests  of  man. 


8  Philosophical  Problems 

More  important  than  the  question  as  to 
the  order  of  the  problems,  is  the  question 
whether  or  not  they  can  be  reduced  to  one 
underlying  problem.  Such  a  possibihty 
seems  to  me  to  lie  in  the  significance  which 
the  relation  between  continuity  and  discon- 
tinuity bears  to  each  one  of  these  problems. 
This  relationship  involves  the  deepest  inter- 
ests of  personality  as  well  as  of  science.  In 
both  realms  there  is,  as  already  noted,  a 
striving  after  unity  and  connectedness,  and, 
in  so  far,  the  discontinuous  appears  as  an  in- 
surmountable obstacle.  On  the  other  hand, 
it  is  discontinuity  (distinction  of  time,  of 
degree,  of  place,  difference  of  quality,  of 
individuality)  which  more  than  anything 
else  brings  new  content,  releases  locked 
powers,  and  opens  up  the  greatest  tasks  in 
the  realm  of  life  no  less  than  in  the  realm 
of  science.  Thus  it  would  appear  that 
neither  of  the  two  elements  is  the  only 
accredited  one.  It  will  be  of  unquestion- 
able interest  to  follow  out  their  relations  to 
each  other  under  the  four  points  of  view 
furnished  by  our  four  chief  problems. 


Introduction  9 

In  the  philosophy  of  the  nineteenth  cen- 
tury the  significance  of  the  problem  of  con- 
tinuity was  thrown  into  prominence  by  the 
fact  that  the  various  schools  fought  over  it 
in  turn.  In  the  first  half  of  the  century, 
philosophical  idealism  after  its  fashion  as- 
serted the  continuity  of  being  and  looked 
down  on  experimental  science  on  account 
of  its  fragmentary  character.  Meanwhile, 
Positivism  (as  Comte  and  Stuart  Mill  ex- 
pounded it)  emphasized  the  discontinuity 
of  different  groups  of  phenomena.  Now, 
toward  the  end  of  the  century,  realism, 
supported  by  the  evolutionary  hypothesis, 
champions  continuity,  while  the  idealistic 
school  is  inclined  to  emphasize  the  un- 
avoidable discontinuity  of  our  cognition.' 
So  the  schools  change  places  in  the  great 
arena  on  which  the  battle  of  truth  must  be 
fought  out.  Whenever  a  point  of  view  ceases 
to  yield  significant  results,  the  inquiry  in- 
voluntarily seeks  out  a  new  one,  and  thus 
from  ever-changing  points  of  view  thought 
advances     to     clearness.       The      different 


10  Philosophical  Problems 

schools  replace  one  another,  like  run- 
ners at  the  ancient  torch  festival,  but  the 
torch  remains  ever  the  same.  And  if  none 
of  the  schools  hitherto  active  has  fully  laid 
bare  the  central  core  of  all  these  philosophi- 
cal problems,  there  is  all  the  more  reason 
for  us  to  work  in  order  that  greater  clear- 
ness may  be  shed. 


CHAPTER  I 
THE  PROBLEM  OF  CONSCIOUSNESS 


iF  we  begin  the  discussion  of 
philosophical  problems  with  the 
examination  of  the  concept  of 
personahty,  we  enter  into  psy- 
chology, and  have  to  determine  first  of  all 
the  relation  of  psychology  to  philosophy. 
We  can  here  certainly  pass  by  the  notion 
maintained  by  Herbart  and  Lotze,  that 
psychology,  on  account  of  the  outlook  over 
the  problem  of  being  to  which  it  leads, 
is  dependent  on  metaphysics  or  cosmology. 
On  all  sides  there  is  a  strenuous  efifort  to- 
day to  establish  the  independence  of  psy- 
chology. But  even  where  this  efifort  is 
most  pronounced,  opinions  as  to  the  place 
of  psychology  are  diverse. 

II 


12  Philosophical  Problems 

Some  think  that  psychology  is  identical 
with  philosophy  in  general,  and  that  episte- 
mology,  metaphysics,  aesthetics,  and  ethics 
are  its  different  parts.  Fries  and  Beneke 
took  this  view,  and  at  the  present  time  Th. 
Lipps  maintains  it.^  But  it  is  an  untenable 
position,  partly  because  the  personal  Hfe  is 
only  one  of  the  subjects  which  the  philos- 
opher can  pursue,  and  partly  also  because 
psychology,  in  common  with  all  other 
sciences,  presupposes  the  general  forms 
and  principles  of  knowledge.  The  problem 
of  consciousness  necessarily  points  beyond 
itself  to  the  problem  of  being  and  the  prob- 
lem of  knowledge.  In  spite  of  all  its  inde- 
pendence, psychology  is  only  one  branch 
of  the  tree  of  knowledge.  Psychology  can 
therefore  not  include  the  whole  of  philosophy, 
but  can  only  remain  one  of  its  parts.  It  is, 
however,  entirely  proper  to  begin  with 
psychology,  since  it  describes  the  place  and 
the  presuppositions  from  which  we  take 
our  bearings  in  being. 

But,  after  all,  does  psychology  belong  to 


The  Problem  of  Consciousness        13 

philosophy?  Is  it  not  a  special  science, 
which  has  no  more  to  do  with  philosophy 
than  has  natural  science  or  history?  The 
special  methods  —  the  experimental,  the 
physiological,  and  the  historical  —  which 
the  most  recent  psychological  research  em- 
ploys, appear  to  indicate,  —  do  they  not  ?  — 
that  psychology  stands  at  the  very  point  of 
becoming  a  special  science,  and  that  it 
must,  therefore,  be  sundered  from  philos- 
ophy !  To  this  I  reply  that  in  spite  of  all 
its  special  methods,  psychology  always  pre- 
supposes the  capacity  of  self-observation. 
It  is  subjective,  descriptive,  and  analytic 
psychology  which  sets  their  several  prob- 
lems to  the  special  methods.  Here  we 
come  upon  what  psychology  as  a  special 
science  and  philosophy  have  in  common. 
Philosophy  must  lean  upon  some  general 
idea  of  the  nature  of  conscious  hfe,  in  order 
to  be  in  a  position  to  treat  her  problems  of 
knowledge,  of  being,  and  of  value.  It  is 
from  personaHty  experienced  as  knowing, 
as  estimating  worth,  and  as  constituting  a 


14  Philosophical  Problems 

part  of  all  being,  that  these  problems  emerge. 
A  conception  of  personaHty  is  thus  pre- 
supposed, which  special  methods  cannot 
yield.  These  methods  investigate  single 
manifestations  of  the  conscious  life,  and 
their  investigations  must  be  coordinated 
before  a  conception  of  personality  can 
exist. 

But  forthwith  arises  the  basic  problem  of 
the  psychological  realm:  Is  it  possible  to 
arrive  at  a  conception  of  personality  by  way 
of  experience?  Does  our  conscious  life 
form  a  totality,  a  continuum,  a  little  world 
for  itself,  or  is  it  only  an  aggregate,  a  sum 
of  elements  and  fragments?  This  is  the 
question  which  philosophical  psychology 
(or  the  philosophy  of  psychology,  if  you 
will)  throws  out.  In  handhng  it,  psychol- 
ogy avails  itself  partly  of  self-observation 
and  inner  description,  partly  of  the  results 
of  the  experimental,  physiological,  and  his- 
torical methods. 

Experience  shows  us  longer  or  shorter 
breaks  in  our  conscious  life;    there  are  un- 


The  Problem  of  Consciousness        15 

conscious  intervals  between  the  conscious 
states.  Upon  closer  examination  of  the 
single  states  of  consciousness,  we  can  dis- 
cern within  them  different  elements,  which 
are  repeated  in  other  states,  so  that  the 
single  state  no  less  than  the  collective  con- 
sciousness would  appear  to  be  a  union  of 
elements  or  fragments,  and  these  elements 
would  seem  to  be  the  underlying  reahty. 
Consciousness  would  then  be  an  aggre- 
gate or  synthesis  of  single  rays.  It  would 
not  exhibit  a  psychical  continuum  such  as 
is  presupposed  in  the  conception  of  per- 
sonahty. 

Right  here  it  should  be  noted  that  we 
can  never  determine  with  entire  certainty 
whether  or  not  the  analysis  has  really  probed 
to  the  bottommost  elements.  There  is 
always  the  possibihty  that  the  elements  before 
which  we  halt  and  out  of  which  we  are  in- 
clined to  think  consciousness  is  composed, 
are  themselves,  in  turn,  composite.  And 
thus  if  we  could  pierce  down  to  yet  simpler 
elements,  of  the  second  or  third  order,  we 


16  Philosophical  Problems 

should  discover  a  continuity  which  cannot 
be  proved  so  long  as  we  go  no  further  than 
the  elements  of  the  first  order.  Our  sensa- 
tions, which  we  have  been  inclined  to  consider 
a  kind  of  psychical  atoms,  have  been  shown 
by  recent  researches  of  various  kinds  to  bear 
traces  of  processes  of  composition  of  a  still 
more  elementary  sort  than  those  processes 
which  observation  more  directly  shows  us.^ 
This  is,  however,  only  a  preliminary  sur- 
vey, leading  to  no  decisive  results,  since  a 
champion  of  discontinuity  could  very  well 
use  it  to  show  that  all  apparent  continuity 
is  only  provisional.  But  it  is  a  fact  of  more 
decisive  significance  that  the  so-called  psy- 
chical elements  are  always  determined  by 
tiie  relations  in  which  we  find  them,  and 
that  it  is  a  pure  abstraction  to  attribute 
to  them,  apart  from  these  relations,  an  in- 
dividuality which  they  only  possess  when 
thus  related.  This  is  the  fundamental 
idea  on  which  my  own  account  of  Psy- 
chology is  built.  All  psychic  life  works  in 
naive   fashion,    and    directly   and   involun- 


The  Problem  of  Consciousness        17 

tarily  gives  birth  to  connected  phenomena 
and  events,  which  analysis  afterwards  with 
more  or  less  skill  tries  to  break  up  into 
'elements.'  For  the  truth  about  sensations 
we  can  appeal  to  Fechner's  law  and 
the  law  of  contrast,  according  to  which 
the  intensity  and  the  quality  of  each_ 
sensation  is  determined  by  the  whole  con- 
nection  in  which  it  stands.  The  connec- 
tion  cannot  be  conceived  as  the  product  of 
the  psychical  elements,  since  they  only 
exist  as  the  sensations  which  they  are  by 
virtue  of  their  connection.  If  they  were  in 
another  connection,  they  would  not  be  the 
same  sensations.  An  analogous  case  is 
the  behavior  of  ideas.  The  association  of 
ideas  finds  its  final  explanation  in  the 
fact   that  the    isolation   of   single    ideas    is 


unnatural  There  is  always  a  tendency  — 
the  hvehcr  the  consciousness,  the  stronger 
the  tendency  —  toward  a  rounding  out  or 
widening,  by  means  of  which  the  single 
ideas  enter  into  combination  with  other 
ideas  according  to  fixed  laws.  The  so-called 
c 


18  Philosophical  Problems 

association-psychology  (among  whose  ad- 
herents I  have  sometimes  been  unjustly 
numbered)  conceives  the  single  ideas  as 
independent  atoms,  which  in  a  purely  exter- 
nal, mechanical  fashion  are  brought  into 
combination.  The  fact  is  just  the  reverse: 
in  the  process  of  association  it  is  the  con- 
nected whole  which  exercises  its  power 
over  the  single  ideas.  The  ideas  never  ap- 
pear in  a  complete  isolation  such  that  their 
union  could  stand  as  a  mechanical  product. 
Here,  also,  we  see  that  analysis  always  pre- 
supposes synthesis.  This  also  appears  clearly 
in  thought,  properly  so  called,  if  we  compare 
the  formation  of  judgments  with  that  of 
concepts.  They  always  presuppose  one 
another;  since  our  judgments,  which  are 
but  combinations  of  concepts,  can  only  be 
complete  when  the  combined  concepts  are 
complete;  while  on  the  other  hand,  the 
formation  of  a  concept  presupposes  a  series 
of  judgments,  by  which  the  mutual  relations 
of  its  different  elements  Js  determined. 
Here,  again,  it  is    evident  that    the  whole 


The  Problem  of  Consciousness        19 

and  the  parts  mutually  determine  one  an- 
other.    There   are    no    thoroughly    isolated 
concepts  which  only  afterward  allow  them- 
selves to  be  bound  together  into  judgments. 
Here   crops   out   an   antinomy   which   is 
closely  connected  with  the  existence  of  con- 
sciousness, and  is  pecuHar  to  the  concept  of 
personality.     Consciousness    and    personal- 
ity  can  as  little  be  explained,  as,, the  products 
of  previously  given  elements,  as  organic  life 
can  be  explained  as  the  product  of  unor- 
ganic  elements..     On  the  other  hand,  con- 
sciousness and  personality,  just  like  organic 
life,  come  into   being  through  a  perpetual 
synthesis  of  elements  not  originally  begotten 
by  themselves.     It  is  this  antinomy  which 
makes  the  genesis  of  life  and  of  personahty 
so  great  a  riddle." 

So  far,  we  have  only  considered  the 
more  formal  connections  of  consciousness. 
But  in  every  consciousness  there  is  a  goal 
that  is  striven  towards,  a  dominant  interest 
that  makes  or  tries  to  make  everything  else 
subservient    to    itself.     This    dominant    in- 


20  Philosophical  Problems 

terest  —  call  it  the  main  purpose  if  you  will 
—  may  change  at  different  periods  of  hfe; 
but  the  tendency  for  it  to  develop  will  always 
be  present,  and  it  will  in  greater  or  less  de- 
gree stamp  its  impress  upon  all  the  ele- 
ments of  consciousness  and  give  them  their 
bent.  This  interest  in  the  main  purpose 
constitutes  the  soul  of  the  individual,  if  we 
understand  by  mind  the  more  formal  in- 
tellectual part  of  him. 

The  relationships  thus  far  examined 
demonstrate  that  the  concept  of  person- 
ality must  always  constitute  the  central 
thought  of  psychology.  When  analysis  and 
special  methods  make  their  dissections,  and 
attempt  to  isolate  single  elements  or  in- 
stants, we  should  grant  that  they  are  justi- 
fied, just  as  mathematicians  are  justified  in 
determining  an  irrational  number  by  adding 
decimal  to  decimal.  But  the  irrational  rela- 
tion of  the  whole  to  the  elements  remains. 

In  the  idealistic  camp  there  has  often 
been  an  inclination  to  consider  the  concept 
of  personality  as  settled,  and  to  operate  with 


The  Problem  of  Consciousness        21 

it  in  cosmological  speculation.  This  is  to 
overlook  the  fact,  emphasized  especially 
by  the  Positivist  school,  that  what  we  are  so 
industriously  working  for  is  just  to  build  up 
a  concept  of  personaHty,  just  to  spell  out  a 
psychological  conception  of  the  whole,  even 
as  biology  is  spelling  away  at  a  definition  of 
life.  But  just  as  biology,  in  spite  of  its 
recognition  of  the  individuality  of  the  living 
organism,  knows  no  other  method  than  to 
seek,  by  means  of  observation,  experiment, 
and  analysis,  to  understand  the  complex 
processes  through  the  simpler;  so  in  like 
manner  psychology,  however  earnestly  it 
may  assert  the  synthetic  character  of  con- 
sciousness, can  only  bring  into  play  the 
methods  common  to  all  sciences,  —  observa- 
tion, experiment,  and  analysis.  The  con- 
cept of  personality  stands  as  the  ideal 
toward  which  we  steer,  as  the  enduring 
problem  to  whose  elucidation  all  special 
methods  contribute.^ 

The    irrational   here    as    everywhere    not 
only  places  the  Umit,  but  also  sets  us  the 


22  Philosophical  Problems 

task,  the  ever  new  task.  Descriptive  psy- 
chology especially  tends  to  lay  stress  on  the 
connected  whole  in  and  with  which  the 
psychical  manifestation  appears.  It  will 
always  —  but  especially  in  respect  to  the 
higher  or  more  developed  manifestations  of 
consciousness  —  preserve  its  independence 
and  significance  as  over  against  experimental 
psychology.  In  fact,  experimental  psychol- 
ogy invariably  has  its  tasks  set  for  it  by 
descriptive  psychology.  At  the  same  time, 
descriptive  psychology  serves  as  a  correc- 
tive to  experimental  psychology  which,  by 
its  very  methods,  easily  tends  to  overisolate 
single  elements,  to  neglect  the  spontaneity 
of  the  conscious  life,  and  to  overemphasize 
the  external  symptoms  of  inner  states.^  On 
the  other  hand,  descriptive  psychology  can 
levy  tribute  from  experimental  psychology, 
turning  whatever  hght  it  may  yield  as  to  the 
more  elementary  psychological  processes,  by 
analogy,  upon  the  nature  of  the  higher 
processes,  and  thus  giving  greater  complete- 
ness and  accuracy  to  the  description. 


The  Problem  of  Consciousness        23 

Descriptive  psychology  comes  very  near 
to  being  an  art;  indeed,  it  is  verily  an  art: 
while  experimental  psychology  approximates 
to  a  science.  But  they  are  not  in  principle 
different  from  one  another.  They  are  not 
separated  by  a  chasm,  as  Miinsterberg  * 
recently  would  maintain,  making  the  one  a 
science  of  worth,  the  other  a  natural  science ; 
holding  that  the  one  deals  with  the  concept 
of  freedom,  the  other  with  the  concept  of 
causahty.  By  freedom  Miinsterberg  under- 
stands the  possibility  of  acting  according  to 
purpose.  Then  should  not  the  psychical 
event,  by  which  a  man  sets  himself  a  pur- 
pose for  whose  accomplishment  he  will  work, 
be  an  object  of  scientific  psychology?  And 
can  such  an  event  be  understood  except  by 
being  investigated  in  its  connection  with  the 
simpler  processes  which  take  place  in  the 
constitution  of  pleasure  and  pain,  joy  and 
sorrow,  or  in  the  union  and  separation  of 
ideas?  Here  there  are  a  multitude  of  ex- 
periences to  be  gone  through  with  and 
collected;  it  is  a  question  of  following  out 


24  Philosophical  Problems 

a  development  step  by  step,  of  determining 
the  different  degrees  of  consciousness,  and 
the   various   impulses    and    motives   which 
accompany  them.     We  must,   furthermore, 
distinguish  between  the  various   individual 
types  which  the  form  and  direction  of   the 
volitional   Hfe  may  show.     A   comparative 
psychology  of  individuals   can  supply  just 
the  assistance  needed  in  order  to  understand 
the   development  which  takes  place  in  the 
consciousness    of    a   particular    individual. 
An  utterly  unnatural  distinction,  therefore, 
is  set  up  if  a  sharp  antithesis  between  the 
categories  of  the  personal  and  the  psycho- 
physical is  asserted;  especially  is  this  true 
when   this    antithesis   is    made   the  corner- 
stone of  an  antithesis  between  'truth  of  life' 
and  'truth  of  science.'"    Is  it  not  just  the 
function    of    science    to    understand   Hfe  — 
even  although  a  complete  understanding  may 
always    remain    an    ideal,  —  and    does    not 
life  itself  furnish  science  with  all  her  empiri- 
cal materials?     Thus    there  is   an  abiding 
relation  of  interaction  instead  of  an  abso- 


The  Problem  of  Consciousness        25 

lute  antithesis.  And  there  are  many  con- 
necting links  and  bonds  between  the 
separation  of  the  elements  of  Being  under- 
taken by  science  and  the  complex  inter- 
play of  all  the  elements  presented  by  life, 
an  interplay  which  only  art  can  set  forth  in 
all  its  fulness. 


But  there  are  still  grave  difficulties  re- 
maining in  the  scientific  treatment  of  the 
phenomena  of  consciousness.  The  proof 
of  a  continuity  in  the  processes  under  inves- 
tigation is  necessary  to  a  true  understanding. 
We  should  reach  the  ideal  of  psychology 
not  only  if  we  could  secure  such  a  complete 
description  of  states  of  consciousness  that 
each  state  would  stand  as  a  proper  member 
of  the  whole  psychical  process,  but  also  if 
we  could  reduce  the  differences  of  the  chang- 
ing states  to  such  simple  forms  that  any 
succeeding  state  would  appear  as  the  con- 
tinuation or  as  the  transformation  of  the 
preceding  state.     The  prospect  of  reaching 


26  Philosophical  Problems 

this  ideal,  however,  is  blocked  by  the 
discontinuity  which  experience  appears  to 
interpose.  There  are  unconscious  intervals 
between  our  conscious  states  —  in  swoons, 
in  dreamless  sleep  (in  so  far  as  there  is  any), 
and  there  are  quahtative  differences  between 
the  different  states  and  elements  of  con- 
sciousness, so  that  each  state  and  each  ele- 
ment, if  we  adhere  to  a  strictly  introspective 
view,  appears  to  arise  from  nothing.  Then 
between  the  different  individual  conscious- 
nesses there  is  always  an  abrupt  and  strik- 
ing discontinuity:  one  consciousness  can 
even  less  be  derived  from  another  than  one 
state  of  consciousness  from  another. 

This  relation  of  psychical  discontinuity 
stands  out  with  pecuhar  sharpness  when  it 
is  set  over  against  the  continuity  and  the 
equivalence  which  material  manifestations 
present,  and  which  was  noted  very  early 
in  philosophy.  The  persistence  of  matter 
in  spite  of  all  its  transformations  was  a 
common  assumption  with  the  Greek  natural 
philosophers,  and  this  assumption  has  been 


The  Problem  of  Consciousness        2J 

confirmed  by  modern  chemistry.     In  sharp 
contrast  with  this  is  the  separation  of  minds 
from  each  other.     When  Descartes  applied 
the  concept  of  substance  to  the  psychical 
as  well  as  to  the  physical  realm,  he  did  it 
with  the  important  distinction  that  many 
soul- substances,  but  only  a  single  material 
substance,    were    assumed."     Thereby    he 
sharply    and    decisively    asserted    psychical 
discontinuity  in  antithesis  to  physical  con- 
tinuity.    In  the  history  of  philosophy,  it  is 
only  in   a  partly  or  wholly  mystical  sense 
that  we  find  such  an  assertion  of  the  continu- 
ity of  soul-life  that  the  single  consciousness 
may  be  conceived  as  bearing  a  relation  to 
the  universal  soul-substance  hke  the  relation 
of  single  bodies  to  the  universe  of   matter. 
So    Averroes,     Spinoza,    and    Hegel. ^^     In 
recent  years   attention  has  been  fixed  less 
on  the  discontinuity  between  the  individual 
consciousnesses   than   on   the   discontinuity 
within  each  consciousness,  and  two  lines  of 
consideration,  preeminently,  have  led  to  a 
more    critical    exposition    of    this    modern 
problem. 


28  Philosophical  Problems 

Thanks  to  the  reform  which  swept 
through  physiology  in  the  middle  of  the 
nineteenth  century,  this  science  has  attained 
to  a  fuller  consciousness  of  its  methods  and 
of  its  independence.  Consequently,  it  now 
demands  that  every  brain-state  shall  be  ex- 
plained through  the  preceding  states  of  the 
brain  and  of  the  organism,  —  that  physio- 
logical phenomena  shall  be  explained  solely 
by  physiological  causes,  or  else  by  activities 
of  the  physical  environment  continued  in 
the  organism.  According  to  strict  scientiiic 
methods,  every  material  state  within  and 
without  the  organism  finds  its  explanation 
as  soon  as  we  make  it  clear  that  each  state 
has  arisen  from  the  transformation  of 
energy  released  in  the  preceding  states. 
When  one  brain-state  succeeds  another  we 
reach  an  explanation  of  their  relation  only 
when  we  have  demonstrated  that  all  the 
energy  released  in  the  first  has  been 
transformed  into  tissue-building,  warmth, 
electricity,  motor  impulses,  etc.  It  is 
certainly  difficult  to  think  out  the  arrange- 


The  Problem  of  Consciousness        29 

ment    of    such    an    experiment;    but    the 
carrying  out    of   the  physiological   method 
would   indicate    the    solution.      Even    the 
so-called    neo-vitalism   recognizes   no  other 
method     of     investigating.      Spinoza    con- 
firms this  when  he  says  that  an  appeal  to 
the  interference  of  the  soul  in  order  to  ex- 
plain a  corporeal  state  is  an  admission  that 
we  do  not  know  its  cause.    If  an  experiment 
were  to  indicate  that  at  the  origin  of  an 
organic   state   energy   came   into   being   or 
disappeared  without  any  physical  equivalent, 
we  should  certainly  rather  believe  that  the 
experiment  was  in  error  than  congratulate 
ourselves  over  the  result.     "The  principle 
of  the  conservation  of  energy,"  says  Max- 
well,^'  "has    acquired    so    great    scientific 
weight,  .  .  .  that  no  physiologist  would  feel 
any    confidence    in    an    experiment    which 
showed  considerable  difference  between  the 
work  done  by  an  animal  and  the  balance  of 
the  account  of  energy  received  and  spent." 
A    carrying    out    of    physiological    methods 
conceived  in  this  spirit  will  give  evidence  of 


30  Philosophical  Problems 

an  ever  greater  continuity  of  the  organic 
processes  to  which  the  manifestations  of 
consciousness  show  themselves  actually  to 
be  united. 

Physiology  is  therefore  far  more  favorably 
disposed  toward  the  principle  of  continuity 
than  psychology  ever  can  be,  and  thus  it 
appears  to  be  a  point  very  well  taken  when 
Karl  Lange  demands  that  all  psychological 
definitions  be  replaced  by  physiological/* 
Psychical  manifestations  would  then  stand 
only  as  provisional  indices  or  symptoms. 

The  other  view  fits  closely  on  to  the  one 
already  cited,  but  is  a  kind  of  general  theory 
of  knowledge.  It  rests  upon  the  proposition 
that  a  complete  understanding  can  be  won 
only  where  the  relation  between  cause  and 
effect  can  be  reduced  to  a  relation  of  identity 
or  continuity,  so  that  a  quantitative  equa- 
tion between  the  phenomena  bound  up 
in  the  causal  relation  becomes  possible. 
This  is  an  assertion  of  the  ideal  concept 
of  causality  (as  contrasted  with  the  empirical 
laws  of   causation)  as  the  ground  through 


Vje  Problem  of  Consciousness        3I 

which  the  qualitatively  different  mani- 
festations are  bound  together  into  an  in- 
variable succession.  I  postpone  a  closer 
examination  of  both  these  concepts  till  we 
reach  the  problem  of  knowledge.  For 
the  present,  I  will  only  remark  that  we 
unquestionably  obtain  a  more  complete 
understanding  where  the  ideal  concept  of 
causality  can  be  carried  through,  than  where 
we  must  abide  by  empirical  laws  of  causa- 
tion— and  then  often  enough  not  see  clearly 
into  their  application.  Material  as  well  as 
mental  manifestations  display  qualitative 
distinctions;  but  in  the  material  sphere 
it  is  possible  to  conceive  these  qualitative 
distinctions  as  quantitative,  by  means  of 
the  law  of  the  conservation  of  energy  and 
of  matter,  while  nothing  similar  in  the 
psychical  sphere  is  possible.  Therefore,  it 
is  assumed  that  the  correct  psychological 
method  consists  in  substituting  the  physio- 
logical manifestations  for  the  corresponding 
psychical  ones;  that  this  is  the  only  way 
of  replacing  qualitative  determinations   by 


32  Philosophical  Problems 

quantitative,  and  so  of  carrying  out  a  strict 
causal  connection.  This  conception  of  the 
psychological  problem  is  applied  with  rigor 
by  Richard  Avenarius  in  his  acute  Kritik 
der  reinen  Erjahrung.  He  demands  as  the 
condition  of  a  complete  scientific  under- 
standing a  tracing  back  of  'the  depend- 
ent vital  series'  (by  which  he  understands 
psychical  states)  to  'the  independent  vital 
series'  (the  corresponding  physiological 
states)  through  which  alone  it  becomes  pos- 
sible to  reduce  empirical  differences  to  the 
lowest  possible  degree,  or  as  Avenarius  ex- 
presses it,  to  reach  a  'heterotic  minimum.' 
Miinsterberg  inclines  to  a  similar  view,  as 
he  has  expressed  himself  in  his  "Psychol- 
ogy and  Life."  His  thesis  is  this:  Since 
psychical  manifestations  are  not  quantita- 
tive, they  cannot  be  members  of  a  causal 
series.^^ 

In  excuse  of  those  who  thus  try  to  reduce 
psychology  to  physiology  in  order  that  a 
scientific  psychology  may  be  made  pos- 
sible, —  who,    therefore,    virtually    wish    to 


The  Problem  of  Consciousness       33 

abolish  psychology  in  order  to  make  it  into 
a  science,  —  it  is  to  be  noted  that  the 
actual  discontinuities  and  quahtative  differ- 
ences of  psychical  phenomena  will  always 
more  or  less  oppose  limits  to  the  carry- 
ing out  of  a  strictly  scientific  psychology. 
Whether  the  way  pointed  out  by  such 
writers  leads  to  the  goal,  and  whether  the 
method  recommended  does  not  contain  a 
palpable  self-contradiction  —  these  are  other 
questions. 

If  it  is  desired  to  supersede  psychological 
definitions  by  physiological,  it  is  evidently 
presupposed  that  psychological  definitions 
are  already  in  existence.  The  creation  of 
these  definitions  must  be  the  part  of  psy- 
chology; and  if  it  can  itself  make  no  clear- 
cut  definitions,  assuredly  physiology  cannot 
ascertain  for  it  what  it  should  seek  in  the 
brain  an  explanation  for.  If  what  is  to  be 
superseded  be  vague  and  uncertain,  then 
what  supersedes  it  will  likewise  be  vague 
and  uncertain.  And  we  cannot  derive 
certainty  from  the  fact  that  wc  have  actually 


34  Philosophical  Problems 

discovered  the  brain-states  which  correspond 
to  psychical  manifestations  observed  in  the 
act.  The  independence  of  psychology  must 
be  recognized  in  any  event,  since  it  prescribes 
—  like  a  kind  of  symptomatology  —  the 
work  of  physiology.  It  is  a  long  and  difficult 
task  to  find  adequate  definitions  in  any 
experimental  science;  they  only  become 
possible  when  the  science  has  actually 
reached  completeness ;  they  come  at  the  end, 
not  at  the  beginning  of  the  investigation. 
Only  too  often  have  crude  psychological 
definitions  been  considered  trustworthy  start- 
ing-points for  the  investigations  of  brain 
physiology.  So  Descartes,  and  in  recent 
times  Lotze,  considered  the  idea  of  the  '  soul' 
as  so  plain  and  self-evident  that  physiology 
and  anatomy  could  calmly  be  called  upon 
to  search  out  'the  seat  of  the  soul.'  Re- 
cently Flechsig^"  has  held  the  notion  of 
'association'  to  be  so  simple  and  clear  as 
well  as  so  independent,  that  he  has  been 
able  to  persuade  himself  that  he  has  found 
a  special  place  in  the  brain  for  the  func- 


The  Problem  of  Consciousness        35 

tions  indicated  by  this  notion.  Flechsig's 
reliance  on  the  highly  incomplete  concept 
of  association  shows  that  psychological 
experiment  never  reveals  absolutely  simple 
psychical  elements  which  are  brought  into 
combination  afterwards  by  means  of  a 
special  process.  The  association-process 
cannot  be  set  up  as  the  positive  antithesis  of 
those  processes  through  which  the  single 
psychical  elements  (sensations  and  ideas) 
originate.  Flechsig  operates  with  a  psy- 
chological abstraction,  not  with  a  true 
psychological  definition.  Against  Flechsig's 
doctrine  of  special  association-centres,  ana- 
tomical objections  have  been  raised  from 
many  directions,  which  I  cannot  pass  upon; 
but  the  psychological  inadequacy  of  his 
concept  of  association  sufficiently  shows  how 
difficult  an  undertaking  it  is  to  replace 
psychological  with  physiological  concep- 
tions." It  seems  to  me  that  an  excellent 
occasion  for  criticising  Flechsig's  theory  is 
afforded  by  the  following  considerations. 
When  there  are  psychical  elements   which 


36  Philosophical  Problems 

enter  into  no  such  association  as  may  be 
expected  under  customary  relations,  this 
condition  will  prove  on  nearer  investigation 
to  have  been  caused  by  the  fact  that  the 
respective  elements,  each  for  itself,  are 
welded  in  other  firmer  associational  rela- 
tionships from  which  they  cannot  loosen 
themselves.  In  any  case,  in  psychological 
inquiry,  the  task  always  is  to  find  the 
antecedent  associations  which,  later,  on 
their  own  account,  hinder  'natural'  asso- 
ciation. If  we  sever  the  conceptions  'ele- 
ment' and  'association'  from  one  another, 
we  foster  thereby  a  false  psychology  as  well 
as  a  false  physiology.  Long  and  patient 
investigation  is  still  necessary  for  the  creation 
of  the  definition  of  a  concept  like  'associa- 
tion ' ;  and  physiology  must  wait  a  long  time 
if  it  would  '  supplant '  a  psychological  reahty 
and  no  bare  abstraction. 

But  even  supposing  psychological  defini- 
tions were  already  complete  and  ready  to 
hand,  would  not  the  greatest  problems 
still   remain   unsolved?     How   can    physio- 


The  Problem  of  Consciousness        37 

logical  states  have  psychical  symptoms? 
How  can  quahtative  differences  correspond 
to  quantitative,  and  how  can  discontinuous 
phenomena  be  united  with  continuous  pro- 
cesses? The  fact  is  that  if  such  questions 
are  thought  to  be  snuffed  out  by  the  reduction 
of  psychology  to  physiology,  they  will  only 
blaze  up  again  hotter  and  brighter  than  be- 
fore. In  any  event  it  remains  an  unsolved 
riddle  how  quahtative  differences  and  dis- 
continuity arise.  Even  if  it  could  be  demon- 
strated that  two  ideas,  A  and  B,  heretofore 
considered  different,  were  identical,  so  that 
we  could  say  A  =  B,  we  would  not  thereby 
have  explained  how  A  and  B  could  appear 
different  in  the  first  place.  To  call  this 
distinction  'subjective'  doesn't  help  in  the 
least;  it  will  not  thereby  be  blotted  out  of 
being.  Indeed,  the  fact  that  Being  also 
has  a  subjective  side  is  just  what  makes 
psychology  possible  and  necessary.  If,  with 
Miinsterbcrg,  we  hold  that  these  subjective 
phenomena  can  be  neither  described  nor 
explained,**  it  is  not  easy  to  understand  how 


38  Philosophical  Problems 

we  get  hold  of  anything  at  all  to  place  in 
our  'causal  equation.'  It  is  of  a  piece 
with  the  man  who  sawed  off  the  very  limb 
on  which  he  himself  was  sitting. 

It  is  illogical  to  deny  a  causal  relation 
between  psychical  phenomena,  if  a  causal 
relation  is  assumed  between  the  correspond- 
ing physiological  states.  If  we  recognize  a 
standard  of  physiological  law,  we  must  also 
recognize  a  standard  of  psychological  law. 
If  the  psychical  phenomenon  a  corresponds 
to  the  brain-state  A,  and  the  psychical 
phenomenon  /3  to  the  brain-state  B,  and  if 
a  causal  relation  occurs  between  A  and  B, 
then  in  psychological  experience  there  must 
appear  a  causal  relation  between  a  and  /3 
in  the  sense  of  an  inevitable  series.  As 
demonstrated  above,  it  is,  in  fact,  only  this 
causal  relation  between  a  and  /S,  that  makes 
us  seek  a  causal  relation  between  A  and  B. 
In  Avenarius's  carrying  out  of  a  reduction 
of  psychology  (the  doctrine  of  the  'depend- 
ent vital  series')  to  physiology  (the  doctrine 
of  the  'independent  vital  series')  it  is  mani- 


The  Problem  of  Consciousness        39 

fest  at  every  step  that  he  infers  the  consti- 
tution of  his  independent  vital  series  from 
that  of  the  dependent  series.  Customa- 
rily, one  constructs  a  physiological  scheme 
chiefly  to  have  a  visual  symbol  of  what  takes 
place  in  the  psychical  processes.  Neither 
physiology  nor  psychology  has  yet  attained 
such  completeness  that  we  can  dispense  with 
such  a  schematic  symbol. 

Psychical  phenomena,  however,  do  not 
present  such  great  discontinuity  or  such  pure 
qualitative  differences  as  is  often  believed. 
Careful  observation  repeatedly  leads  to  the 
discovery  that  where  there  appeared  to  be  a 
psychical  void,  there  was  in  fact  a  psychical 
content,  although  attention  or  recollection 
did  not  lay  hold  of  it,  and  although  it  was 
forgotten  immediately  after  the  experience. 
On  the  other  hand,  with  respect  to  quali- 
tative differences,  a  more  careful  examina- 
tion reveals  also  more  numerous  and  fine 
shadings  than  those  at  which  we  had  hitherto 
halted,  —  and  which  we  had  tranquilly  ex- 
plained to  be  entirely  disparate.     The  con- 


40  Philosophical  Problems 

tinuity  of  consciousness  can  thus  be  traced 
farther  than  is  often  assumed ;  and  quahta- 
tive  difference  and  discontinuity,  if  too 
strongly  proclaimed  as  the  essential  trait  of 
consciousness,  can  become  a  peril  to  science. 
The  inner  connection  of  the  various  con- 
tents of  consciousness  is  likewise  a  fact,  and 
functions  like  memory  and  comparison  are 
no  whit  less  significant  as  characteristics  of 
consciousness  than  the  phenomena  which 
bear  the  stamp  of  discontinuity.  The  task 
of  psychology  is  therefore  to  demonstrate  as 
far  as  possible  the  connection  and  the  com- 
bination of  the  single  elements,  so  that  the 
totaHty  will  be  intelligible  through  the  part, 
and  the  part  through  its  relation  to  the 
totahty.  That  this  leads  to  an  antinomy 
which  makes  the  psychological  problem  ul- 
timately insoluble,  has  already  been  made 
plain  (p.  19).  But  there  is  work  enough  to 
do  ere  we  arrive  at  this  limit  (whose  absolute- 
ness, moreover,  cannot  be  proved).  Leibniz 
has  the  merit  of  having  doggedly  championed 
the  principle  of  continuity  in  the  psychical 


The  Problem  of  Consciousness        41 

as  well  as  in  the  physical  realm,  especially 
because  he  pointed  out  the  Httle  psychical 
elements,  —  vanishing  in  comparison  with 
the  clearly  conscious  states — which  only 
through  summation  and  combination  yield 
tangible  results  to  unpractised  self-observ^a- 
tion.  A  comparison  of  modern  with  ancient 
or  mediaeval  poetry  shows  how  vastly  larger 
a  number  of  mental  diflFerences  self-obser- 
vation has  now  recorded;  but  the  discovery 
of  this  larger  world  can  hardly  be  due  to  the 
fact  that  the  differentiation  of  the  psychical 
realm  is  greater  now  than  formerly.  The 
knowledge  and  the  understanding  of  the 
immediate  and  involuntary  in  the  life  of  the 
soul  has  wonderfully  increased.  The  psy- 
chology of  children  and  of  primitive  man  is 
inclined  to  treat  ever}^thing  that  goes  on 
in  the  soul  as  clearly  conscious,  and  as  rest- 
ing on  reflection  and  intention.  In  modern 
psychology,  the  burden  of  proof  —  in  prac- 
tice as  well  as  in  theor)''  —  has  shifted  to  the 
other  side :  now  it  rests  on  him  who  asserts 
that  an  act  has  been  performed  with  reflcc- 


42  Philosophical  Problems 

tion  and  express  determination.  The  actual 
passage  out  of  the  unconscious  into  the 
conscious ;  and  within  the  conscious,  out  of 
the  involuntary  into  the  voluntary;  takes 
place  continually;  indeed,  the  more  expert 
self-observation  and  criticism  become,  the 
more  difficult  it  becomes  to  lay  the  finger  on 
the  exact  point  v^here  the  boundary  Hes. 

Leibniz  was  inclined  to  reduce  all  psychi- 
cal differences  to  differences  in  degree  of 
clearness  and  obscurity/^  This  attempt  was 
characteristic  of  the  intellectualism  of  the 
century  of  the  Aujkldrung.  But  empirical 
psychology  can  represent  a  continuous  con- 
nection in  another  way  than  by  means  of 
such  a  reduction,  in  spite  of  the  qualitative 
differences  which  psychical  processes  exhibit 
in  their  various  stages.  In  the  different 
stages  of  consciousness  there  are  blendings 
and  combinations  which  embrace  the  sim- 
plest emotions  as  well  as  the  highest  states 
of  feeling.  Furthermore,  there  are  shiftings 
of  motive  which  bestow  immediate  worth 
on  what  at  first  had  worth  only  as  a  means, 


The  Problem  of  Consciousness        43 

or  vice  versa.  Finally,  the  conscious  life  of 
strong  personalities,  the  highest  and  noblest 
objects  of  psychology,  presents  such  a  de- 
pendence of  all  mental  impulses  on  a  single 
purpose,  a  single  leading  thought,  that  we 
here  find  a  causal  connection  not  a  whit 
less  firm  and  inward  than  any  that  appears 
in  the  physical  realm.  Every  single  thought, 
every  single  mood,  and  every  single  motive 
in  such  a  character  is  clearly  determined 
by  the  totality  to  which  it  belongs  and  to 
Vv^hose  upbuilding  it  contributes. 

There  remain  cases  enough  where  we 
cannot  demonstrate  psychical  continuity. 
But  the  question  is  whether  on  that  account 
we  have  the  right  to  deny  its  existence. 
Herewith,  turning  aside  from  the  point  as  to 
what  continuous  observation  can  ascertain, 
we  are  confronted  with  the  important  ques- 
tion whether  psychical  phenomena  can 
arise  from  material  causes,  when  once  for  all 
we  conceive  of  matter  as  natural  science  has 
hitherto  conceived  of  it.  If  the  scientific 
idea  of   matter   includes    no   provision  for 


44  Philosophical  Problems 

the  arising  of  psychical  phenomena,  we 
shall  be  fully  warranted  in  advancing  the 
notion  of  a  potential  psychical  energy,  in 
order  to  emphasize  the  fact  that  we  will 
not  at  once  surrender  the  principle  of  con- 
tinuity because  in  practice  we  cannot  apply 
it  to  a  concrete  case.  On  just  such  grounds, 
the  notion  of  potential  energy,  despite  the 
obscurity  enshrouding  it,  has  been  intro- 
duced into  physics.  Everywhere  the  notion 
implies  the  recognition  of  limits,  beyond 
which  we  nevertheless  do  not  wish  to  re- 
nounce a  connection  traced  thus  far.  The 
fact  that  psychical  elements  can  reproduce 
themselves  after  an  interval  in  which  they 
were  not  in  consciousness,  compels  the  em- 
ployment of  such  notions  as  'disposition,' 
'trace,'  'possibility,'  and  the  like,  which 
in  fact  express  exactly  what  is  meant  by 
'potential  energy.'  The  fact  that  we  are 
more  inclined  to  use  this  notion  in  the  phys- 
ical than  in  the  psychical  realm,^"  by  no 
means  excludes  the  correctness  and  necessity 
of  its  use  in  the  latter.    In  a  purely  descrip- 


The  Problem  of  Consciousness        45 

tive  account,  one  can  often  be  content  to 
indicate  the  various  psychical  phenomena 
emerging  at  certain  moments,  without  ob- 
serving their  mutual  psychical  connection. 
Psychical  phenomena  show  themselves  in 
such  a  case  as  separate  flashes,  in  strong 
contrast  to  the  continuous  connection 
which  the  corresponding  physiological 
phenomena  exhibit.  And  since  whatever 
emerges  with  the  highest  degree  of  continu- 
ity easily  impresses  us  as  more  real  than  the 
discontinuous  and  flashhke,  the  physiological 
phenomena  readily  seem  to  us  to  be  the 
very  reality,  the  real  phenomena,  and  the 
psychical  phenomena  seem  to  exist  as  an 
overflow,  a  chance  addition,  or,  as  they  have 
been  caflcd,  as  epiphenomena.  Such  an 
'epiphenomenahsm'  has  hardly  yet  been 
advanced  as  a  distinct  theory;  it  is  only  an 
empirical  confession  that  there  is  something 
enigmatical  in  the  appearance  of  psychical 
phenomena  in  comparison  with  the  closer 
continuity  in  the  series  of  material  phe- 
nomena.     It    really    gives    no  solution,   it 


46  Philosophical  Problems 

abolishes  rather  every  psychological  as 
well  as  physiological  explanation  if  it 
pretends  to  be  more  than  a  description. 
Even  as  a  description  it  easily  over- 
reaches itself,  because  it  often  comes  to 
a  halt  before  the  discontinuous  without 
investigating  whether  or  not  it  could  find 
still  more  transitions  and  conjunctive  shad- 
ings than  had  already  appeared.  The  notion 
of  potential  psychical  energy  —  just  because 
it  is  only  the  expression  for  an  unsolved 
problem  —  turns  into  an  ever-present  exhor- 
tation to  prosecute  observation  and  analysis 
in  order  to  discover  as  far  as  possible  the 
reality  in  which  the  *  potentiality  '  ultimately 
consists. 

.3 

If,  on  the  psychological  as  well  as  on 
the  physiological  side,  we  emphasize  the 
quest  of  continuity  in  the  highest  possible 
degree,  then  the  hypothesis  of  identity  be- 
comes the  real  working  hypothesis  of  both 
the  psychical  and  the  physiological  problem. 


The  Problem  of  Consciousness        47 

Like  every  other  hypothesis  that  means 
anything  practical,  this  is  only  an  expression 
for  a  method.  In  psychical  and  physiologi- 
cal phenomena  we  have  two  serial  forms  of 
states,  which  experience  shows  us  to  vary 
in  certain  reciprocal  relations,  without  its 
being  possible  to  deduce  the  existence  of 
the  one  series  from  the  existence  of  the  other 
series.  Scientifically  considered,  the  task 
now  is,  to  conceive  each  of  the  two  series  by 
itself  as  completely  and  continuously  as  pos- 
sible and  to  show  which  definite  members 
of  the  one  series  correspond  to  certain 
members  of  the  other  series.  We  can  with 
right  consider  members  of  one  series  as 
symptoms  of  members  of  the  other  series. 
Now  it  is  the  psychical,  now  again  the 
physiological  states,  which  are  most  pal- 
pable to  us,  and  of  which  we  make  our  start- 
ing-point. The  close  interrelationship  of  the 
two  series  of  states  makes  it  impossible  to 
trace  them  back  to  two  different  'beings' 
or  'things';  it  comes  entirely  natural  to 
conceive  them  as  different  manifestations  of 


48  Philosophical  Problems 

one  and  the  same  'being.'  Because  two 
properties  cannot  be  derived  from  one 
another,  one  has  no  right  to  conclude  that 
they  belong  to  two  different  things,  par- 
ticularly not  if  they  vary  in  fixed  reciprocal 
ratios.  The  consistency  of  sulphur  (hard, 
liquid,  etc.)  and  its  color  (yellow,  brown, 
etc.)  vary  in  a  fixed  reciprocal  relation  and 
yet  they  cannot  be  derived  from  one  another, 
although  one  who  knows  both  the  series  of 
variations  can  make  inferences  from  the 
one  to  the  other.  With  reference  to  sul- 
phur, we  know  the  general  cause  of  both 
series,  namely,  heat,  which  here  manifests 
itself  in  two  different  ways.  With  reference 
to  the  relation  between  the  psychical  and  the 
physiological  series,  the  corresponding  knowl- 
edge is  denied  us.  Our  experience  is  here 
incompetent  to  solve  the  problem.  This 
is  closely  connected  with  the  fact  that  our 
knowledge  of  both  the  psychical  and  the 
physical  is  empirically  limited.  Therefore, 
the  task  now  is,  to  work  forward  in  both 
realms  of  experience  so  that  one  does  not  at 


The  Problem  of  Consciousness        49 

any  point  arbitrarily  sever  the  hidden  con- 
necting thread. 

Physiological  continuity  is  both  a  conse- 
quence of  the  law  of  the  conservation  of 
energy  (and  indeed  of  the  doctrine  of 
inertia  in  its  stricter  interpretation)  and 
an  expression  of  the  independence  of  phys- 
iology as  a  science.  It  suppHes  a  fruitful 
and  indispensable  principle  of  research, 
since  it  continually  strives  after  evidence 
of  physiological  causes  and  results  of  physi- 
ological states.  As  we  saw  above,  we  have 
in  continuity  a  principle  so  essential  that, 
if  an  experiment  were  to  point  in  the  oppo- 
site direction,  the  experimenter  would  rather 
assume  an  error  in  the  experiment  than  a 
violation  of  the  principle.  The  principle 
of  continuity  —  and  with  it  the  hypothesis 
of  identity  —  would  be  refuted,  if  it  could  be 
proved  that  the  energy  contained  in  a  brain- 
state  stood  in  no  relation  of  equivalence  to 
the  preceding  and  succeeding  states  in  the 
brain,  in  the  organism,  and  in  the  physical 
environment. 

E 


50  Philosophical  Problems 

It  would  be  already  dangerous  for  the  hy- 
pothesis of  identity  if  it  could  but  be  demon- 
strated that  the  psychical  phenomena  come 
hejore  or  follow  ajter  the  physiological  states. 
In  an  attempt  to  demonstrate  this  it  would 
not  be  enough  to  show,  as  popular  obser- 
vation already  shows,  that  the  perception 
arises  later  than  the  corresponding  sense 
impression  or  earlier  than  the  physiological 
(motor,  especially  vaso-motor)  manifesta- 
tions, which  somehow  stand  in  combination 
with  it.  For,  between  the  psychical  states 
and  the  peripheral  processes  in  the  sense- 
organs  and  motor-organs,  he  the  central 
physiological  processes  which  direct  experi- 
ment cannot  so  easily  touch,  and  even  were 
such  a  direct  experiment  possible,  it  would 
not  be  decisive.  For  example,  if  the  phe- 
nomena B  follows  after  A,  still  A  and  B 
might  conceivably  be  results  of  the  same 
cause,  which  begat  first  the  result  A  and 
then  the  result  B.  Special  causes  might 
bring  it  about  that  one  vital  phenomenon 
should  change  more  rapidly  than  the  other. 


The  Problem  of  Consciousness         51 

It  would  be  a  decisive  proof  against  the 
hypothesis  of  identity  if  it  could  be  proved 
that   different   psychical   phenomena    could 
correspond  to  one  and  the  same  physiologi- 
cal state.     Some  have  thought,  for  example, 
that  the  significance  of    the  brain  for  con- 
scious life  consists  in  the  fact  that  it  coun- 
teracts   the    tendency    of    organic    life    to 
become  too  habitual  and  automatic.     The 
brain  has  a  wonderful  power  of   initiating 
new   movements,    which,    as  soon   as   they 
have   been   learned,   become   habits  whose 
further  execution  is  turned  over  to  lower  cen- 
tres.    Only  by  the  assistance  of  the  brain 
has   thought  freed    itself  from  automatism 
and  been  able  to  press  the  organism  into 
its  service  without  being  brought  under  the 
yoke  of  habit.     Different  thoughts,  however, 
might  call  into  requisition  at  chfferent  times 
the  same  'motor  scheme,'  the  same  inhibi- 
tion   of    an    automatic  tendency.     Bergson 
has  recently  advanced  this  possibility  as  a 
remonstrance  against   'strict  parallelism.'" 
The   remonstrance  raises  one    question  to 


52  Philosophical  Problems 

which  only  very  slight  attention  has  been 
paid  in  the  extensive  discussion  over  the 
psychophysical  problem.  Whether  one  as- 
sents to  the  special  theories  adduced  by  the 
French  philosopher  or  not,  this  much  ap- 
pears to  be  clear, — that  the  closer  one  comes 
to  the  problem  in  real  Hfe,  the  more  ex- 
ceedingly difhcult  it  becomes  to  find  the 
members  in  the  two  series  of  phenomena 
which  can  be  pointed  out  as  'correspond- 
ing.' Where  terms  quahtatively  differ,  one 
can  only  indirectly  determine  which  terms 
are  correspondent.  If  we  knew  how  warmth 
works  on  the  color  and  how  on  the  form  of 
a  substance,  then  we  could  determine  which 
color-  and  form-changes  mutually  'corre- 
spond.' But  unfortunately  no  such  knowl- 
edge stands  at  our  disposal  for  the  clearing 
up  of  the  psychophysical  problem:  we 
are  shut  up  to  purely  empirical  conclu- 
sions, and  these  are  here  harder  to  draw 
than  Bergson  appears  to  think.  Even  if 
one  lays  adequate  emphasis  on  the  continu- 
ity element  both  in  the  psychological  and  in 


The  Problem  of  Consciousness        53 

the  physiological  realm,  yet  it  will  prove 
difficult  to  break  the  two  series  up  into 
members  that  will  stand  out  with  such 
individuality  that  a  true  comparison  can 
be  instituted.  Whichever  hypothesis  we 
build  on,  we  must  be  prepared  to  find  that 
the  very  members  of  the  two  series  which  are 
considered  to  correspond  will  exhibit  differ- 
ences which  cannot  be  derived  from  the 
one  or  the  other  member  hy  itself  alone. 
It  might,  therefore,  be  altogether  possible 
that  'different'  psychical  phenomena  would 
correspond  to  the  'same'  physiological  state 
(or  vice  versa),  as  sometimes  one  language 
has  only  a  single  word  where  another  has 
two  words.  The  determining  factor  must  re- 
main the  actual  fact  of  connection,  and  this 
will  certainly,  both  in  the  psychological  and 
in  the  physiological  realm,  be  so  decisive, 
that  one  must  speak  of  phenomena  or  states 
as  'the  same'  with  only  a  degree  of  approx- 
imation. Still,  '  parallelism'  will  not  be  taken 
aback  by  that  objection,  if  we  make  a  suffi- 
ciently strong  claim  that  the  states  shall 
really  be  'ahke.' 


54  Philosophical  Problems 

It  is,  essentially,  as  a  working  hypothesis, 
not  as  a  positive  solution,  that  the  hypothe- 
sis of  identity  (for  which  'parallelism'  and 
similar  expressions  are  inadequate  and 
misleading  designations)  gets  its  signifi- 
cance. For  my  part,  in  any  case,  I  have 
always  championed  it  as  'an  empirical 
formula'  which  may  so  lead  us  in  our 
investigations  that  neither  the  rights  of 
physiology  nor  the  rights  of  psychology  will 
be  violated  by  a  too  early  cessation  of  our 
investigation  in  either  of  the  two  realms. 
Physiology  may  be  tempted  to  give  up  the 
search  prematurely  if  it  expects  to  run  into 
the  'soul'  at  some  point  as  the  cause  of 
the  change  of  the  state  of  the  brain ;  ^^  and 
psychology  is  subject  to  the  same  temptation 
if  it  expects  at  some  other  point  to  con- 
front a  psychical  phenomenon  which  has  its 
causes  in  a  'nerve  process'  or  in  'nerve 
energy. ' 

4 

Both  sides,  the  psychological  equally 
with  the  physiological,  will  still  find  their 


The  Problem  of  Consciousness        55 

own  interest  to  lie  in  getting  as  near  as  pos- 
sible to  one  another,  in  endeavoring  to  get 
back,  each  to  the  fundamental  fact  of  Being 
which  its  peculiar  phase  of  experience  pre- 
sents. 

On  the  psychological  side,  the  idea  of  will, 
taken  in  the  broadest  sense  as  the  idea  of 
psychical  activity,  will  appear  as  the  funda- 
mental idea.  This  statement  may  seem 
to  be  undermined  by  the  fact  that  of  late 
many  psychological  writers  even  attempt  to 
cast  the  idea  of  will  out  of  psychology,  not 
because  they  deny  what  in  popular  speech  is 
called  the  will,  but  because  they  think  that 
this  idea  indicates  a  point  of  view  by  no 
means  so  fundamental  as  cognition  and 
feeling,  since  the  so-called  phenomena  of 
will  can  be  traced  back  to  special  combina- 
tions of  elements  of  knowing  and  feeling. 
In  support  of  this  contention,  we  may  cite 
the  fact  that  the  will  as  such,  our  activity 
as  the  activity  of  a  conscious  being,  cannot 
be  an  object  of  immediate  self-observation 
like  ideas  and  feelings.^^    We  observe  the 


56  Philosophical  Problems 

motives  and  the  result  of  the  will,  but  not  the 
will  itself,  just  as  in  the  sphere  of  material 
nature  we  observe  the  conditions  and  phe- 
nomena of  energy,  but  not  energy  itself. 
Hume  demonstrated  this  truth  with  reference 
to  all  causahty,  psychical  as  well  as  material. 
The  idea  of  will,  like  the  idea  of  energy, 
is  created  by  means  of  a  construction,  — 
a  construction  which  we  are,  however, 
compelled  to  undertake.  If  one  defines 
a  psychical  element,  not  as  something 
that  must  be  susceptible  of  becoming 
the  object  of  direct  self-observation,  but 
so  that  it  indicates  an  essential  and  irre- 
ducible unit  of  the  conscious  life,  then  the 
will  can  quite  conceivably  be  a  psychical 
element  and  the  concept  of  the  will  a  fun- 
damental psychical  concept.  The  reason 
why  we  cannot  make  the  will  the  object  of 
self-observation  like  sensations,  ideas,  and 
feelings  may  lie  in  the  fact  that  the  will  as  a 
persistent  presupposition  envelops  all  the 
changing  states  and  forms  of  the  conscious 
life.     Consciousness  exists  only  on  account 


The  Problem  of  Consciousness        57 

of  the  uninterrupted  work  of  collecting  the 
single  elements  into  a  totahty.  Such  a  work 
of  combination  and  concentration  is  evident 
in  the  simplest  sensation  as  much  as  in  every 
ideation,  every  feeling,  every  impulse,  every 
determination.  At  every  point  an  activity 
manifests  itself,  which  is  just  as  original  a 
phase  of  conscious  life  as  the  elements 
(phases  or  attributes)  which  observation 
and  analysis  directly  light  upon.  The  real 
state  of  affairs  is  not  that  we  first  had  sen- 
sations, ideas,  and  feelings,  and  that  then 
through  combination  something  came  into 
being  that  we  might  call  the  will.  Without 
an  original  combination,  without  a  primary 
synthetic  process,  even  the  elements  which 
determine  the  will  in  the  narrower  sense 
could  not  arise.  In  the  special  manifesta- 
tions of  will  (reflex  action,  impulse,  desire, 
purpose,  determination)  the  primary  power 
of  concentration  exhibits  itself  in  a  special 
way  under  the  influence  of  certain  determi- 
nate elements  of  knowing  and  feeling.-* 
Consequently,  there  is  incessant  reciprocal 


58  Philosophical  Problems 

action  taking  place  between  the  activity- 
elements,  the  volitional  elements  proper, 
and  the  intellectual  and  emotional  elements. 
Here,  again,  we  meet  the  antinomy,  men- 
tioned above  in  Section  i,  which  prevails 
in  all  conscious  life,  and  indeed,  on  the 
whole,  in  all  life.  But  the  chief  point  is 
that  we  can  already  form,  purely  psycho- 
logically, a  concept  of  energy,  because, 
wherever  a  psychical  phenomenon  appears, 
a  psychical  operation  must  have  been  per- 
formed, since  such  a  phenomenon,  so  far 
as  we  can  fathom  it,  always  presupposes 
a  synthesis.  The  psychical  operation  in 
which  the  synthesis  consists  is  the  greater, 
the  more  the  single  elements  differ  quali- 
tatively, and  the  farther  they  are  separated 
in  time. 

We  might  now  be  decoyed  into  immedi- 
ately identifying  this  psychical  energy  with 
the  energy  working  in  the  nerve-tissue. 
But  since  not  all  neural  processes  are  con- 
nected with  conscious  phenomena,  we  must 
distinguish   between  conscious  and  uncon- 


The  Problem  of  Consciousness        59 

scious  nerve-energy,  and  consequently  the 
problem  presents  itself  anew.  Moreover, 
we  know  nothing  in  detail  about  this  so- 
called  nerve-energy  or  about  its  relation  to 
other  organic  and  inorganic  forms  of  energy. 
If  we  consider,  with  Ostwald^^  and  others, 
the  riddle  solved  by  setting  up  the  concept 
of  'nerve-energy,'  we  only  introduce  a 
qualitas  occulta  and  soothe  ourselves  with 
that.  The  natural  science  concept  of  en- 
ergy, wherever  one  meets  with  it,  is  always 
abstracted  from  phenomena  with  geomet- 
rical properties.  Natural  science  knows 
energy  only  as  the  expression  of  the  relation 
between  spatial  phenomena.  The  riddle 
would  be  solved  only  if  we  could  form  a 
concept  of  energy  from  which  both  the  psy- 
chological and  the  natural  science  concep- 
tions could  be  derived  as  special  forms; 
but  we  still  lack  the  means  of  constructing 
such  a  conception.  At  all  events,  any  attempt 
in  this  direction  would  carry  us  beyond  the 
domain  of  the  psychological  problem. 


CHAPTER   II 

THE  PROBLEM  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

I 

OT  only  psychological  under- 
standing but,  in  general,  all 
understanding  is  conditioned  by 
the  relation  between  continuity 
and  discontinuity.  The  latter  occasions 
the  fulness  and  multiplicity  of  the  content 
of  the  understanding,  the  former  its  con- 
nection and  arrangement.  Our  under- 
standing of  things  appears  under  different 
leading  forms  which  correspond  to  the 
sciences. 

I  understand  what  something  is  if  I  recall 
it;  thus  I  understand  or  know  who  is  ap- 
proaching, if  I  recall  the  person  approaching. 
Recollection  rests  on  the  connection  existing 
between  the  new  and  the  old  experiences. 
In  the   act  of   recollection,   all  intervening 

60 


The  Problem  of  Knowledge  61 

experiences  are  forced  to  one  side  and  the 
new  phenomenon  is  directly  or  indirectly, 
involuntarily  or  after  some  reflection/' 
identified  with  an  earlier  presented  phe- 
nomenon. Contrast  with  the  new  is  also 
at  work  here;  the  recognized  quality  is 
thrown  into  the  stronger  relief  the  more 
unrecognized  its  present  surroundings  are. 
Recollection  makes  description  and  classi- 
fication possible,  yet  the  idea  of  difference 
is  actually  at  work  in  both  operations.  In 
all  description  and  classification  a  certain 
type  stands  fast,  at  least  provisionally,  and 
the  new  phenomena  are  referred  back  to  it, 
either  as  fully  like  (covering  each  other),  or 
as  qualitatively  similar,  or  as  analogous  (sim- 
ilar in  their  relations).  The  positive  con- 
cepts which  we  form  embody  such  types. 
Where,  for  some  reason,  we  can  sum- 
mon no  recollection  of  similar  phenomena 
and,  consequently  can  set  up  no  type,  we 
collect  the  phenomena  for  the  time  being 
under  a  negative  concept;  that  is,  we  give 
them  the  general  mark  of  being  different 


62  Philosophical  Problems 

from  the  types  previously  defined.  In  the 
history  of  classification,  negative  concepts 
have  the  merit  of  having  made  possible 
the  collection  of  the  hitherto  undefined  into 
a  group  different  from  the  defined  group, 
leaving  it  to  later  investigation  to  find  within 
it  positive  definitions.^'' 

In  the  history  of  philosophy,  Plato's 
doctrine  of  ideas  stands  as  the  characteristic 
expression  of  the  importance  of  descriptive 
and  concept-forming  investigation.  Even 
the  possibility  of  recollection  in  the  midst 
of  the  confused  multiplicity  of  phenomena 
filled  Plato  with  emotion.  To  him,  the 
highest  power  of  the  mind  was  that  by 
which  the  different  types  underlying  recol- 
lection were  arranged  according  to  their 
mutual  likenesses  and  differences,  so  that 
a  Thought-world  reared  itself  in  which  one 
could  mount  up  and  down  upon  a  continu- 
ously serial  ladder. 

When  concepts  have  been  formed  in 
different  connections,  they  can  be  united  into 
judgments,    and  when  different  judgments 


The  Problem  of  Knowledge  63 

have  common  concepts  which  can  be  substi- 
tuted for  one  another,  conclusions  can  be 
drawn.  By  way  of  inference,  concepts  and 
judgments  can  be  formed  without  having 
to  go  back  to  the  experiences  to  which 
the  descriptive  and  classifying  sciences  are 
bound  at  every  point.  There  prevails  here 
a  continuity  of  a  higher  kind,  since  thoughts 
and  thought-series  of  extremely  different 
origin  can  be  brought  into  combination. 
While  recollection  rests  only  on  identity, 
judgment  rests  on  rationality;  here  the 
relation  between  ground  and  consequence 
rules,  and  makes  possible  a  new  kind  of 
understanding.  I  understand  that  A  =  C, 
if  I  know  that  A  =  B  and  B  =  C.  This 
kind  of  understanding  is  acquired  by  means 
of  the  formal  sciences.  It  is  peculiar  to 
these  sciences  that  it  makes  no  difference 
whence  the  first  judgments  and  conclu- 
sions sprang,  if  only  they  have  such  a  con- 
stitution that  series  of  conclusions  can  be 
built  on  them.  So  the  descriptive  sciences 
do  not  concern  themselves  about  the  origin 


64  Philosophical  Problems 

of  phenomena,  so  long  as  these  allow  them- 
selves to  be  arranged  according  to  relations 
of  likeness  and  difference. 

A  third  kind  of  understanding  is  to  be 
found,  where  one  neither  advances  merely 
from  phenomena  to  concepts,  nor  merely 
builds  new  conceptual  combinations  by  con- 
clusions from  given  conceptual  combina- 
tions; but  where,  on  the  contrary,  one 
deduces  new  phenomena  from  previously 
given  phenomena.  The  new  phenomena 
are  understood,  when  we  think  their  relation 
to  earlier  phenomena  to  be  analogous  to 
that  between  the  ground  and  the  conse- 
quence of  an  inference.  This  kind  of  un- 
derstanding characterizes  natural  science  as 
it  has  developed  especially  since  the  Re- 
naissance. In  it  the  concept  of  causality  is 
supreme.  We  combine  experiences  by  it 
according  to  their  inevitable  and  law-deter- 
mined succession. 

It  is  this  third  kind  of  understanding 
that  has  especially  concerned  the  modern 
theory  of  knowledge,  since  Hume  and  Kant 


The  Problem  of  Knowledge  65 

pointed  out  the  distinction  between  a  logical 
inference  and  a  real  causal  explanation.  The 
possibility  of  creating  and  making  use  of 
the  concept  of  causality  has  in  modern 
times  aroused  an  astonishment  like  that 
aroused  in  Plato's  time  by  the  creation  of 
general  concepts.  It  is,  however,  not  only 
the  intellectual  necessity  of  finding  a  con- 
nection between  experiences  that  has  led 
to  giving  such  prominence  to  the  concept  of 
causality,  but  also  the  necessity  of  distinguish- 
ing sharply  between  subjective  ideas  and 
objective  reality.  And  this  rests  on  the 
fact  that  the  criterion  of  reality  in  doubtful 
cases  is  always,  in  the  last  analysis,  the 
firm,  inseparable  connection  of  phenomcna.^^ 
The  world  of  dreams  and  of  thought  is  greater 
than  that  of  reality  ("  narrow  is  the  world  and 
the  mind  is  wide"),  and  man  is  under  the 
constant  and  pressing  necessity  of  so  de- 
termining and  combining  his  thoughts  that 
they  may  stand  as  manifestations  of  a  reahty, 
since  only  thus  can  he  expect  to  find  the 
means  of  realizing  his  purposes. 


66  Philosophical  Problems 

The  causal  concept  appears  under  two 
aspects:  under  a  provisional,  elementary 
form,  with  which  we  are  often  compelled 
to  be  content;  and  under  an  ideal  aspect 
which  all  research  and  all  theories  strive 
after.  The  elementary  causal  concept  pre- 
sents only  an  unconditional  succession:  if 
the  phenomenon  A  appears,  then  B  in- 
evitably follows,  and  B  only  appears  when 
A  has  preceded  it.  It  is  not  asserted  that 
the  causal  relation  holds  between  A  and 
B  themselves.  It  is  possible  that  they 
are  both  the  successively  emerging  con- 
sequences of  a  previous  cause.  The  ideal 
causal  concept  goes  a  step  farther  and 
sees  in  the  phenomenon,  which  we  call  the 
consequence,  the  continuation  of  that  phe- 
nomenon which  we  call  the  cause,  or  its 
equivalent  in  a  new  form.  The  ideal  causal 
concept  consequently  passes  over  into  the 
concept  of  development  or  evolution;  it  is, 
therefore,  no  wonder  that  the  latter  has 
played  a  r61e  in  recent  science  only  second 
to  the  concept  of  causality. 


The  Problem  of  Knowledge  67 


All  three  kinds  of  understanding  rest 
upon  certain  axioms  or  principles.  Un- 
conscious thought  —  as  it  is  exercised  by 
the  practical  intelligence  in  the  special 
sciences,  in  philosophical  speculation,  and 
in  rehgious  theory  —  does  not  feel  impelled 
to  undertake  the  investigation  of  these 
axioms,  but  the  theory  of  knowledge  over- 
hauls them  for  a  critical  examination.  The 
theory  of  knowledge  arises  when  we  ask,  in 
what  does  the  validity  or  truth  of  our  under- 
standing consist,  and  how  far  does  it  extend  ? 
Here  again  arises  the  problem  of  the  relation 
between  continuity  and  discontinuity.  The 
problem  arose,  for  Plato,  through  the  irra- 
tional relation  between  idea  and  phenomenon ; 
for  moderns,  through  the  irrational  relation 
between  formal  science  and  real  or  natural 
science,  science  of  fact.  Can  the  concept 
ever  be  an  adequate  expression  for  the  mani- 
foldness  of  phenomena,  or  the  law  for  their 
changing  combinations? 


68  Philosophical  Problems 

For  Plato,  the  solution  lay  in  the  theory 
that  the  ideas  must  have  come  down  to  man 
from  a  higher  existence,  and  here,  under  the 
influence  of  the  incomplete  imitation  pre- 
sented by  the  perceptual  world,  must  reveal 
themselves  to  thought  in  their  completeness. 
In  modern  times,  the  idea  of  the  conformity 
of  nature  to  law  has  often  been  considered 
as  an  a  priori  truth,  as  an  original  intuition, 
which  at  most  only  had  to  thank  experience 
for  being  the  occasion  of  calling  it  forth. 
The  incommensurability  between  the  prin- 
ciples (the  logical  principles  and  the  prin- 
ciple of  causality)  on  the  one  hand,  and 
experience  on  the  other,  has  begotten  this 
speculative  theory  of  knowledge.  This 
incommensurability  has  given  birth  to  what 
one  might  call  the  arbitrary  theory,  because 
it  so  strongly  emphasizes  the  arbitrariness 
of  our  original  formulation  of  the  principles, 
and  not  less  strongly  emphasizes  the  fact 
that  in  their  pure  form  they  can  obtain 
no  confirmation  through  experience,  —  that 
they  can   never   become   results,  but    only 


The  Problem  of  Knowledge  69 

remain  mere  postulates.  Hobbes,  the  most 
pronounced  champion  of  this  view,  says 
there  can  be  no  science  of  the  principles  of 
all  science;  that  these  principles  are  made 
by  constructive  art  (principia  sunt  artis  sive 
constructionis,  non  autem  scientiae  et  de- 
monstrationis),  and  we  ourselves  create  their 
truth  (rationis  prima  principia  vera  esse  faci- 
mus  nosmet  ipsi).  According  to  Fichte  the 
primary  and  unconditioned  basis  of  all 
human  cognition  is  obtained  by  means  of 
a  free  construction;  our  science  is  based 
not  upon  a  jact  but  upon  an  act;  that  is, 
upon  the  determination  of  the  thinking 
consciousness  always  to  keep  in  agreement 
with  itself:  upon  the  holding  to  the  prin- 
ciple of  identity.  S.  Kierkegaard  makes  a 
similar  abrupt  start  in  his  establishment  of 
the  principles;  and  Kroman  derives  the 
principle  of  identity  from  the  law  of  self- 
preservation,  which  seeks  to  hold  the  unity 
of  consciousness  intact;  "by  no  means 
has  it  (the  principle  of  identity)  proceeded 
from  experience."^® 


70  Philosophical  Problems 

Hence  the  speculative  and  the  arbitrary 
theories  both  aHke  acknowledge  that  there 
must  be  definite  empirical  occasions  to 
call  forth  the  intuitions  or  the  postulates. 
Empiricism  (which  passes  over  into  Evolu- 
tionism if  it  takes  account  of  the  experi- 
ences not  only  of  the  individual,  but  also 
of  the  species),  when  it  appears  in  its  abso- 
lute form,  lays  chief  emphasis  upon  these 
'occasions'  and  treats  them  as  complete 
causes.  It  has  been  set  forth  most  lucidly 
by  J.  S.  Mill  and  Herbert  Spencer.  It 
seeks  to  show  how,  under  the  long-continued 
influence  of  environment,  general  principles 
could  gradually  arise  in  consciousness ;  and 
it  energetically  asserts  that  no  principle 
can  possess  vahdity  beyond  the  empirical 
verifications  which  it  may  have  won.  There- 
fore, the  principles  have  value  only  as  results. 

What  empiricism  cannot .  explain  is  the 
fact  that  the  principles  themselves  heget  expe- 
riences for  us  through  the  questions  to  which 
they  incite.  More  auspicious  here  is  a  fourth 
theory,  which  has  recently  been  developed 


The  Problem  of  Knowledge  71 

by  Ernst  Mach  and  Richard  Avenarius,  and 
which  may  be  termed  the  economic  theory. 
It  concedes  the  rights  both  of  passive  ex- 
perience and  of  the  active  development  of 
thought,  since  it  considers  the  principles  as 
'conceptual  reactions'  intended  to  win  a 
view  and  comprehension  of  things  by  the 
shortest  possible  route.  The  reason  why 
the  principle  of  continuity  plays  such  a 
leading  role  is  said  to  lie  in  the  fact  that 
it  is  so  economical  a  principle.  The  doubt 
is  only  as  to  the  extent  of  its  application. 
A  man  creates  whatever  concepts  and  prin- 
ciples he  may  need  in  order  to  make  himself 
master  of  phenomena.  Every  practical  and 
intellectual  necessity  is  satisfied,  if  our 
thoughts  arc  able  completely  to  remind  us 
of  the  facts  of  sense.  This  reminding  is  the 
goal  and  purpose  of  physics;  and  atoms, 
forces,  and  laws  are  only  the  means  to  facili- 
tate it.  They  are  of  value  only  in  so  far  as 
they  help  us.^"  Maxwell  and  Hertz  express 
themselves  in  similar  fashion.^* 
The    four   theories,    which    conceive    the 


72  Philosophical  Problems 

principles  of  knowledge  respectively  as 
intuitions,  as  postulates,  as  generalizations, 
and  as  economic  tools  of  thought,  collec- 
tively presuppose  the  analytic  or  regressive 
theory  of  knowledge  especially  developed 
by  Kant.  For,  what  the  object  of  the 
intuition  or  of  the  postulate  or  of  the  gener- 
alization may  be,  and  what  corresponds  to 
the  economic  demand  of  the  investigation, 
can  only  be  discovered  by  the  fact  that 
one  makes  deductions  backward  from  the 
data  presented  by  experience,  and  finds 
the  presuppositions  on  which  an  under- 
standing of  them  is  based.  Such  an  analysis 
must  form  the  basis  of  every  theory  of  knowl- 
edge. But  one  will  never  be  able  to  feel 
entirely  sure  that  the  analysis  is  complete. 
The  history  of  science  shows  that  this  is 
a  task  which  must  constantly  be  under- 
taken afresh.  At  one  time  more,  at  another 
time  fewer,  principles  than  theretofore  are 
thought  to  be  necessary.  A  guaranty  that 
absolutely  the  last  presupposition  has  been 
reached  can  never  be  won.    What  the  eco- 


The  Problem  of  Knowledge  73 

nomic  theory  (on  which  I  will  particularly 
dwell)  especially  emphasizes  is,  first,  that 
no  more  principles  need  to  be  posited  than 
the  given  case  in  strict  necessity  demands 
(this  is  the  thought  of  Avenarius's  Kritik  der 
reinen  Erfahrung) ;  secondly,  that  differ- 
ent principles  may  be  necessary  at  different 
times  or  in  different  scientific  situations,  so 
that  a  principle  that  has  for  a  long  time 
furthered  investigation,  may  later  come  to  be 
recognized  as  inadmissible,  without  its  his- 
torical significance  being  thereby  ignored. 
The  economic  theory  also  emphasizes  the  law 
of  parsimony  and  the  character  of  the  princi- 
ples as  determined  by  purpose  and  utility. 
It  owes  its  being  to  two  classes  of  motives : 
first,  to  the  desire  to  reduce  to  a  minimum 
the  principles  that  cannot  be  proved, 
—  that  is,  from  an  anti-dogmatic  or  anti- 
metaphysical  motive ;  and  secondly,  it  arises 
from  experiences  in  the  history  of  science 
which  show  how  principles  and  hypotheses 
may  for  a  certain  period  be  valid  and 
fruitful,    but   later   must   be    displaced    by 


74  Philosophical  Problems 

others.  The  discussions  carried  on  of  late 
as  to  the  vaHdity  of  the  mechanical  concep- 
tion of  nature  have  directed  attention  to  this 
second  class  of  motives. 

There  are  meanwhile  two  sides  of  the  case 
which  the  special  form  assumed  by  the  ana- 
lytic theory  of  knowledge,  in  its  appearance 
as  the  economic  theory,  inadequately  empha- 
sizes; and  these  become  of  special  signifi- 
cance when  the  theory  of  knowledge  is  not 
considered  as  isolated,  but  is  connected  with 
other  philosophical  problems. 

In  the  first  place,  those  forms  through 
which  our  intellectual  demands  are  satisfied 
must  be  in  keeping  with  the  general  nature 
of  consciousness.  What  we  understand, 
and  that  we  understand  anything,  depends 
not  only  on  the  constitution  of  phenomena, 
but  also  on  our  intellectual  organization, 
just  as  the  colors  which  we  see  depend  as 
much  on  the  constitution  of  our  visual 
organs  as  on  the  external  objects.  There 
is  a  certain  type  for  all  principles  and 
hypotheses,    which    finally  refers    back    to 


T})e  Problem  of  Knowledge  75 

the  innermost  nature  of  consciousness,  and 
here,  once  more,  one  comes  back  to  the 
necessity  of  unity  and  continuity.  What 
and  how  many  fundamental  concepts  (cate- 
gories) and  presuppositions  should  be  pos- 
tulated, —  this  is  the  problem  that  must  ever 
anew  be  attacked  in  the  battle  of  knowledge, 
if  the  standard  is  to  be  carried  forward. 
Kant  was  suffering  from  an  illusion  if  he 
supposed  that  one  could  once  for  all  specify 
what  would  be  necessary  in  this  or  that 
relation;  but  the  old  Master  was  not  mis- 
taken in  declaring  that  the  demand  for 
unity  and  continuity  lies  at  the  bottom  of 
all  the  forms  through  which  we  win  or  ex- 
pect to  win  understanding.  He  himself  has 
shown  that  all  his  categories  can  be  traced 
back  to  the  concept  of  continuity;  and 
amid  all  the  changes  in  the  realm  of  prin- 
ciples this  concept  will  undoubtedly  be 
brought  into  play  again  and  again.  Logical 
principles,  the  principle  of  causality,  and 
the  fundamental  doctrines  of  natural  science, 
all  hinge  on  this  concept,  which  stands  in 


1^  Philosophical  Problems 

such  close  connection  with  the  nature  of 
consciousness.  A  purely  psychological  epis- 
temology  will  never  be  able  to  afford  satis- 
faction; because  the  fact  that  the  demand 
for  union  and  continuity  —  however  essential 
it  may  be  for  consciousness  —  is  satisfied 
by  certain  principles  by  no  means  implies 
that  these  are  objectively  valid.  That 
demand  may  attain  peace  and  satisfaction 
in  many  ways  and  under  many  forms,  — 
as  the  history  of  mythology  and  of  specula- 
tion sufficiently  demonstrates,  —  ways  and 
forms  which  as  a  rule  entirely  fail  to  satisfy 
the  demands  of  economy,  either  with  respect 
to  parsimony  or  with  respect  to  practicality. 
Schiller's  words  aptly  express  it:  "Wide 
is  the  mind  and  narrow  is  the  world."  In 
the  whole  kingdom  of  thoughts  of  which  the 
human  mind  disposes,  there  is  only  a  strait 
and  compact  series  that  are  of  any  use 
when  it  comes  to  valid  understanding.  The 
only  necessary  requirement  is,  that  the  as- 
sumptions which  the  understanding  of  the 
datum  calls  for  shall  be  psychologically  pos- 


The  Problem  of  Knowledge  77 

sible;  that  they  shall  be  in  harmony  with 
the  general  laws  of  conscious  life,  and  only 
special  and  detailed  developments  of  what 
lies  in  those  laws.  Out  of  the  thoughts  in- 
voluntarily surging  forth  there  must  be  a 
selection  made,  but  this  does  not  release 
us  from  conformity  to  general  psychologi- 
cal laws. 

Thus  it  comes  to  pass  that  a  new  disposi- 
tion of  a  special  kind  is  formed,  —  that  an 
intellectual  habit  arises,  which  puts  questions 
and  criticises  answers  in  a  stricter,  more 
definite  way  than  is  required  by  the  in- 
voluntary course  of  thought.  Every  com- 
prehensive principle  —  psychologically  con- 
sidered— is  essentially  the  expression  of  such 
a  habit,  which  may  be  more  or  less  deeply 
imbedded  in  the  nature  of  consciousness,  i.e. 
which  sometimes  has  the  nature  of  an  in- 
stinct, but  sometimes  seems  more  like  the 
influence  of  custom.  The  purely  logical 
principles  approach  most  closely  to  the  in- 
stinctive. The  necessity  of  agreement  with 
one's  self,  of  the  sequence  of  the  train  of 


78  Philosophical  Problems 

ideas,  is  not  to  be  explained  by  parsimony 
and  fitness  alone.  When  strict  induction 
from  previous  experiences  leads  to  contra- 
dictory results,  we  prefer  to  assume  that  the 
experiences  are  incomplete  rather  than  that 
Being  contradicts  itself. 

What  is  in  the  highest  degree  true  of  the 
pure  logical  principles,  is  also  true  of  the 
more  special  ones.  Thus  the  principle  of 
causality  is  an  expression  of  our  inclination, 
on  the  occurrence  of  one  event,  to  look 
round  for  other  events,  in  which  the  condi- 
tions for  the  occurrence  of  the  first  may 
be  found.  Here  also  appears  our  craving 
to  win  for  the  content  of  consciousness 
union  and  connection.  The  more  special 
and  definite  the  satisfaction  of  this  craving 
is,  the  more  powerfully  the  principle  of 
economy  operates  in  its  two  forms:  as 
parsimony,  which  follows  the  short  road 
to  the  goal;  and  as  effectiveness,  which 
takes  the  road  that  really  leads  to  under- 
standing. As  examples,  we  have  Kepler's 
and  Newton's   demand   for  a   vera   causa. 


The  Problem  of  Knowledge  79 

we  have  the  law  of  inertia  and  the  law 
of  energy,  etc.  What  appears  as  an  hy- 
pothesis from  the  purely  empirical  view, 
becomes,  epistemologically  considered,  a 
principle,  a  regulative  thought,  under  whose 
leadership  consciousness  may  satisfy  in  the 
empirical  world  its  demand  for  continuity 
and  union. 

In  the  second  place,  principles  and  fun- 
damental hypotheses  need  not  be  conceived 
as  altogether  fortuitous  or  arbitrary;  even 
though  they  should  be  ultimately  but  work- 
ing hypotheses  in  the  service  of  our  intellec- 
tual economy,  rather  than  literal  parts  of  the 
Being  that  we  wish  by  their  aid  to  under- 
stand. The  idea  of  a  working  hypothesis 
points  in  two  directions :  on  the  one  hand, 
as  already  demonstrated,  back  to  the  nature 
of  the  thinking  consciousness,  since  our  con- 
sciousness can  perform  no  function,  however 
economical,  which  is  entirely  foreign  to  its 
own  nature;  on  the  other,  to  the  reahty 
to  which  the  phenomena  to  be  understood 
belong.     A   tool  must  be  adapted  both  to 


80  Philosophical  Problems 

the  hand  that  is  to  use  it  and  to  the  object 
to  be  worked  on.  The  thing,  therefore,  must 
in  itself  present  aspects  which  correspond 
to  the  formal  tendencies  of  our  knowledge, 
however  much  these  latter  may  also  be 
conditioned  by  the  circumstances  under 
which,  or  perhaps  by  means  of  which,  the 
knowledge  works.  This  is  the  case  with  all 
valid  knowledge,  from  its  most  elementary 
to  its  highest  forms.  So  it  holds  with 
sensations,  in  spite  of  their  'subjectivity,' 
and  it  holds  with  the  highest  principles  of 
abstract  unified  thought.  Kant  remarked, 
on  the  inclination  to  presuppose  a  unity  be- 
hind the  diversities  of  natural  phenomena :  '^ 
"One  may  perhaps  believe  that  this  is 
merely  an  economical  tool  of  Reason  in  order 
to  save  one's  self  as  much  trouble  as  possi- 
ble, —  an  hypothetical  attempt  which,  if 
successful,  would  borrow  an  air  of  probability 
from  just  this  unity.  But  such  a  selfish  view 
can  very  readily  be  distinguished  from  the 
fact  that  every  one  believes  in,  that  this 
unity  of  Reason  is  congruent  with  Nature 


The  Problem  of  Knowledge  81 

herself,  and  that  Reason  here  does  not  beg 
but  commands,  although  unable  to  deter- 
mine the  limits  of  the  unity  which  she  as- 
sumes."  So  I  would  here  add:  wherever 
reason  "commands"  (or  asks,  expects,  an- 
ticipates, postulates),  she  is,  hke  all  com- 
manders, under  the  necessity  of  shaping  her 
commands  according  to  the  capacity  of  the 
obeyer  that  she  may  have  to  deal  with. 

This  last  consideration  leads  to  the  ques- 
tion of  the  connection  between  the  problem 
of  knowledge  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  prob- 
lem of  Being  on  the  other.  It  is  especially 
necessary  to  bring  this  into  prominence 
because  the  analytic  theory  of  knowledge  — 
like  the  economic  and,  in  its  way,  the  arbi- 
trary' also  —  tends  to  set  up  a  new  concept 
of  truth  in  place  of  our  ordinary,  naive 
concept.  The  significance  of  principles  is, 
that  they  may  lead  us  to  reach  a  rational 
understanding  in  our  work.  Their  truth 
consists  in  their  valid  application;  and  this 
consists  in  their  working  value.  That  a 
principle  is  true,  signifies  that  one  can  work 

G 


82  Philosophical  Problems 

with  it,  and  this  means,  if  the  remark  refer 
to  the  principles  of  knowledge,  that  one  can 
with  their  help  advance  to  understanding, 
—  firmly  ordering  and  unifying  the  phe- 
nomena. The  concept  of  truth  is  a  dynamic 
concept,  since  it  expresses  in  a  definite  fash- 
ion the  apphcation  of  mental  energy;  and 
it  is  a  symbolical  concept,  since  it  indicates, 
not  outward  likeness  or  quahtative  similarity 
to  an  absolute  object,  but  relative  similarity 
(analogy)  between  the  things  in  being  and 
in  human  thought.  The  old  naive  concept 
of  truth,  according  to  which  a  cognition 
was  true  if  it  absolutely  reproduced  or 
mirrored  'reality,'  is  untenable,  and  it 
became  so  from  the  very  moment  when 
the  subjectivity  of  sense-qualities  began  to 
be  asserted.  The  subjectivity  of  sense- 
qualities,  however,  does  not  mean  that 
they  are  invalid  and  unfit  to  guide  us  in  the 
world.  They  stand  constantly  as  tokens, 
signals,  symbols,  whose  serial  order  we 
can  point  to  as  the  expression  of  an  objec- 
tive series  of  events,  although  we  cannot 


The  Problem  of  Knowledge  83 

demonstrate  that  they  are  copies  of  the 
objective  series.  The  same  relation  ob- 
tains with  logical  principles  and  other 
fundamental  presuppositions  of  our  knowl- 
edge. The  critical  philosophy  led  to  the 
result  —  a  simple  consequence  of  its  analytic 
methods  —  that  the  truth  of  fundamental 
principles  can  only  mean  that  they  make 
intelhgible  experience  possible;  that  they 
have,  in  fact,  been  found  by  analysis  to  be 
the  necessary  presuppositions  of  such  ex- 
perience. A  comparison  of  our  thoughts 
with  an  absolute  world  of  things  is  impos- 
sible; we  can  only  compare  thoughts  and 
experiences.  Kant  himself  did  not  see  this 
consequence  as  clearly  as  some  of  his  dis- 
ciples (Maimon  and  Fries)'';  the  master 
himself  was  still  hemmed  in  by  dogma- 
tism, as  can  be  seen  in  his  doctrine  of  the 
'  thing-in- itself '  as  an  absolute  entity  out- 
side of  every  subject.  But  when  he  desig- 
nates the  law  of  causahty  as  an  'analogy 
of  experience,'  and  thereby  understands 
that  temporal  events  stand  related  in  a  way 


84  Philosophical  Problems 

analogous  to  ground  and  consequence  in  our 
thought,  then  he  is  on  the  point  of  making 
it  into  a  working  hypothesis.  In  modern 
times,  as  we  shall  soon  see,  there  is  more 
inclination  on  the  side  of  natural  science 
to  recognize  the  dynamic  and  symbolic 
concept  of  truth  than  was  the  case  so  long 
as  the  mechanical  conception  of  nature  bore 
a  certain  dogmatic  character.  This  new 
conception  of  truth,  which  works  itself  out  in 
the  realm  of  science,  exhibits  resemblances 
to  the  religious  consciousness  —  as  we  shall 
see  under  the  fourth  main  problem  —  in  that 
it  always  sets  itself  in  opposition  to  dogmas. 
In  the  religious  realm,  also,  men  are  tend- 
ing more  and  more  to  ask  for  its  prac- 
ticaHty  and  working  value.  The  static 
notion  of  truth^'^  must  everywhere  give  way 
to  the  dynamic. 

Even  after  fruitful  principles  or  working 
hypotheses  have  been  attained,  will  Being 
be  completely  rendered  by  them?  or  will 
there  always  remain  an  irrational  relation 
between  the  principles  which  may  compose 


The  Problem  of  Knowledge  85 

our  consciousness  and  the  Being  itself  from 
which  our  experiences  are  derived?  We 
shall  find  that  under  three  different  forms 
there  is  always  an  irrational  remainder,  viz. 
in  the  relation  of  quality  to  quantity,  in 
the  significance  which  the  time-relation  has 
for  the  causal  concept,  and  in  the  relation 
between  subject  and  object.  Let  us  now 
consider  each  of  these  three  points  by  itself. 

3 

In  the  attempt  to  reduce  all  given  dif- 
ferences to  identity  and  continuity,  the  es- 
pecially characteristic  thing  was  the  effort 
to  trace  back  differences  of  kind  to  differ- 
ences of  degree.  In  the  science  of  material 
nature,  this  manifests  itself  as  the  attempt 
to  explain  all  changes  as  motion  in  space. 
Motion  from  one  place  to  another  is  the 
simplest  change :  it  would  therefore  indicate 
a  great  advance  toward  clearness,  if  it  could 
be  shown  that  this  is  a  kind  of  change 
which  under  different  forms  goes  on 
in  Nature  wherever  immediate  experience 


86  Philosophical  Problems 

shows  us  qualitative  changes.  Long  ago 
Aristotle  taught  that  spatial  motion  lay  at 
the  bottom  of  all  other  changes,  of  all 
becoming  and  disappearing.  He,  however, 
held  it  impossible  —  as  the  atomists  would 
have  it  —  to  derive  all  events  in  material 
nature  from  motions.  Only  after  the  upris- 
ing of  modern  science  does  this  idea  make 
its  appearance  in  earnest.  Galileo  stands  as 
the  great  founder  of  what  we  are  accustomed 
to  call  (in  the  narrow  sense)  the  mechanical 
view  0}  nature.  Besides  the  simplicity 
hereby  attained  —  and  Galileo  was  firmly 
convinced  that  nature  strikes  out  the  sim- 
plest path  —  the  conclusion  was  also  reached 
that  we  could  operate  with  determinate 
quantities.  Hence  Gahleo  said:  measure 
everything  that  is  measurable  and  make 
measurable  what  is  not !  By  this  reduc- 
tion, on  the  one  hand,  unity  becomes  possi- 
ble, for  qualitative  differences  can  only  be 
appreciated,  not  measured ;  and  on  the  other 
hand,  exact  verification  becomes  possible.^^ 
The  principles  which  serve  as  the  basis  of 


The  Problem  of  Knowledge  87 

the  mechanical  conception  of  nature  were 
regarded  by  its  weightiest  champions  as 
absolute  truths,  as  fundamental  laws  of 
Being.  In  so  far  as  they  nevertheless  be- 
lieved that  these  principles  needed  a  basis, 
they  drew  them  directly  out  of  the  being 
and  will  of  God.  Herein  were  Cartesians 
and  Newtonians  at  one;  and  the  material- 
ists parted  with  them  only  because  they 
held  the  theological  basis  to  be  superfluous 
and  impossible.  By  a  series  of  magnificent 
discoveries  and  explanations  this  general 
view  of  nature  has  demonstrated  its  fertiHty. 
For  us,  the  question  is.  Can  it  be  considered 
a  finality  from  the  epistemological  point  of 
view? 

Now,  even  if  we  should  assume  that  every- 
thing in  material  Nature  can  be  explained 
by  the  principles  of  the  mechanical  philoso- 
phy (and  this,  as  we  shall  soon  see,  has 
recently  been  doubted  in  scientific  circles), 
it  is  in  the  first  place  clear  that  qualities  are 
not  driven  out  of  the  world  because  they 
are  '  reduced '  to  quantities,  or  because  they 


88  Philosophical  Problems 

are  attributed  to  the  sensationally  perceiving 
subject.  They  remain  as  immediate  facts 
to  be  empirically  recognized.  The  proper- 
ties of  a  chemical  product  cannot  be  derived 
from  the  properties  of  its  elements ;  and  if 
one  kind  of  psychical  energy  conserves  its 
equivalent  in  another  kind  of  psychical  en- 
ergy, yet  the  equivalent  has  new  properties 
which  cannot  be  derived  from  the  properties 
of  the  first  form  of  energy.  But  one  cannot 
make  the  sensationally  perceiving  subject 
create  these  qualities  out  of  nothing ;  in  any 
case,  we  should  then  raise  insoluble  psycho- 
logical difficulties,  as  bad  as  any  of  the 
physical  and  chemical  difficulties  which  we 
were  trying  to  get  rid  of. 

In  the  second  place,  extension  and  motion 
are,  in  the  last  analysis,  themselves  quahties ; 
actual  properties  which  in  themselves  might 
call  for  an  explanation  just  as  much  as 
the  so-called  special  sense-quaHties.  Since 
Berkeley's  and  Leibniz's  time  this  has 
often  been  asserted  on  the  philosophic  side. 
There  are  no  grounds  to  suppose  that  their 


The  Problem  of  Knowledge  89 

quantitative  properties  express  the  inner- 
most essence  of  things.  The  reason  why 
science  seeks  these  out  so  fondly  and  Hngers 
by  them  is  really  only  because  with  their 
help  one  can  give  exact  descriptions  of  mate- 
rial phenomena,  and  from  them  can  draw 
definite  conclusions.  This  doctrine  has  re- 
cently been  strongly  championed  by  investi- 
gators like  Maxwell  and  Hertz/®  by  the 
latter  as  an  exphcit  addition  to  the  above- 
mentioned  economic  theory  of  knowledge. 
"The  advance  of  the  exact  sciences,"  says 
Maxwell,  "rests  on  the  discovery  and  devel- 
opment of  appropriate  and  exact  ideas,  by 
means  of  which  we  can  form  a  mental  rep- 
resentation of  the  facts  which  shall  be  suffi- 
ciently comprehensive  to  stand  for  every 
individual  case,  but  at  the  same  time  suffi- 
ciently exact  to  warrant  the  conclusions 
which  by  means  of  mathematical  calcula- 
tions we  draw  from  them. "  And  according 
to  Hertz  ('Principles  of  Mechanics,'  Intro- 
duction), in  order  to  be  able  to  derive  the 
future  from  the  past,  we  create  images  or 


90  Philosophical  Problems 

symbols  of  such  a  kind  that  the  effects  de- 
ducible  from  the  images  by  thought  shall 
also  be  images  of  the  effects  that  follow  in 
the  course  of  Nature  from  the  imaged  ob- 
jects. The  dynamic  and  symbolic  notion 
of  truth  is  here  expressly  put  in  the  place 
of  the  naif  dogmatic  concept  to  which  the 
mechanical  conception  of  nature  formerly 
swore  fealty.  The  problem  reduces  itself 
to  finding  a  group  of  symbols  which  can  be 
employed  with  entire  consistency,  and  from 
which  conclusions  can  be  drawn  that  will 
be  confirmed  by  new  experiences  which  can 
themselves  be  again  expressed  by  the  same 
group  of  symbols.  But  by  this  method  we 
never  get  rid  of  the  possibiHty  that  an- 
other set  of  symbols  might  have  expressed 
the  actual  experiences  as  well  or  better, 
and  furnished  equally  verifiable  deductions. 
It  can  never  be  proved  of  any  set  of  sym- 
bols that  it  is  the  only  right  and  necessary 
and  possible  set. 

The  epistemological  reflections  to  which 
recent  investigators  have  thus  been  led  have 


The  Problem  of  Knowledge  91 

arisen  from  the  difficulty  either  of  subsum- 
ing electrical  phenomena  under  the  me- 
chanical conception  of  nature,  or  of  deriving 
the  principles  of  the  latter  from  the  laws 
of  electrical  phenomena.  The  latter  possi- 
bihty  has  been  defended  recently  by  Hertz, 
the  earlier  one  by  Boltzmann,^^  Of  the 
greatest  interest,  therefore,  to  epistemology 
is  Maxwell's  criticism  of  the  ordinary  no- 
tion of  matter,  according  to  which  matter 
is  considered  to  be  an  extended  mass.  Ac- 
cording to  Maxwell,  the  weakness  of  this 
concept  is  that  it  tends  to  think  of  matter  as 
inert.  But  it  is  motion  which  makes  rest 
intelligible,  not  the  reverse.  The  doctrine 
of  motion  must  therefore  precede  the  doc- 
trine of  equilibrium ;  dynamics  must  precede 
statics.  From  motion  we  attain  the  notion 
of  force  or  energy,  by  means  of  which 
equihbrium  becomes  intelligible.  But  if 
we  understand  by  matter  the  constant,  the 
unchanged  amid  all  changes,  this  can  only 
be  the  law-element  in  motion,  and  thus  the 
essence  of  'matter'  will  consist  in  motion. 


92  Philosophical  Problems 

Further,  it  is,  according  to  Maxwell,  a 
prejudice  to  regard  matter  as  extended 
and  molecules  as  hard  —  for  then  we  must 
ask  what  holds  the  parts  of  the  molecules 
together,  and  come  to  molecules  of  the 
second  degree.  But  we  must  constantly 
operate  with  geometrical  as  well  as  with 
dynamic  concepts,  whether  we  consider  the 
last  elements  as  really  extended  or  not.  It 
is  only  as  a  passive  property  that  extension 
is  attacked  by  Maxwell;  thus  if  I  draw  a 
line  on  the  table,  the  motion  is  the  essential 
thing  in  the  hne.^^  Here  there  comes  to 
the  surface  an  epistemological  point  of  view 
of  extreme  importance:  static  conditions 
always  contain  problems  which  can  only  be 
solved  by  substituting  motion  for  rest.  Po- 
tential energy  is  understood  only  through 
actual  energy,  capacities  and  tendencies  only 
through  their  results.  This  law  holds  every- 
where, in  the  psychical  as  well  as  in  the 
physical  sphere.  There  is  a  half-mystical, 
half- materialistic  inchnation  to  find  perfec- 
tion in  contemplating —  or  gazing  at — some- 


The  Problem  of  Knowledge  93 

thing  unchanging.^®  Maxwell  has  made  an 
important  contribution  toward  eradicating 
this  inclination.  But  the  great  question  is, 
whether  the  idea  of  the  continuity  of  motion 
or  activity  can  be  carried  into  all  spheres. 
Even  if  the  dynamic  asserts  its  epistemo- 
logical  priority  over  the  static,  the  static 
cannot  be  got  rid  of  as  a  fact;  it  always 
springs  up  again  before  us  with  its  problems 
for  thought,  and  Maxwell  himself  recognized 
this  in  maintaining  that  geometrical  as  well 
as  dynamic  concepts  are  indispensable  to  the 
explanation  of  nature.  In  contrast  to  the  dy- 
namic, the  geometric  denotes  simultaneity. 
In  the  realm  of  material  nature,  simultaneity 
appears  in  the  form  of  space^**;  in  the  psy- 
chical realm,  the  relation  of  simultaneity 
does  not  take  on  this  geometric  form,  but 
appears  as  a  'static'  element,  which  sets 
new  tasks  for  the  inquirer  after  he  has  by 
dint  of  hard  work  found  the  laws  of  psy- 
chical change.  After  the  continuity  of 
developmental  processes  has  been  demon- 
strated,  it  must  be  proved    that    there  is 


94  Philosophical  Problems 

continuity  between  the  processes  and  the 
static  conditions.  Here  again  we  run 
upon  the  standing  problem;  this  would 
present  itself,  even  if  quahties  had  found 
complete  explanation  by  means  of  their 
representation  by  quantities;  or  even  if  the 
physical  axioms,  with  which  science  works, 
were  not  merely  the  most  complete  and 
appropriate  set  of  symbols  which  have  yet 
been  formulated  and  employed,  but  were 
something  more.  The  possibility  of  an  irra- 
tional relation  between  Being  and  our  knowl- 
edge can  therefore  not  be  ruled  out  of  court. 

4 

The  investigation  of  the  relation  between 
the  elementary,  or  empirical,  and  the  ideal 
concept  of  causality  will  lead  to  a  similar 
result.  In  its  elementary  form,  the  notion 
of  causation  means,  as  we  saw,  only  such  a 
relation  between  two  effects  that,  after  one 
has  appeared,  the  other  also  inevitably  ap- 
pears. But  from  this  idea  of  inevitable 
sequence,  investigation  proceeds  by  observa- 


The  Problem  of  Knowledge  95 

tion,  tests,  and  hypotheses  to  demonstrate 
as  far  as  possible  such  a  continuity  in  the 
series  of  effects  that  the  differences  between 
the  members  of  the  series  are  diminished, 
until  finally  even  the  difference  in  time  is 
reduced  to  a  minimum.  From  an  external, 
although  inevitable  sequence,  thought  thus 
works  down  through  continuity  to  complete 
identity  of  cause  and  effect.  Although  the 
time-relation  plays  an  essential  role  in  the 
elementary  law  of  causation,  it  is  almost 
entirely  eliminated  in  the  ideal  concept  of 
causahty.  If  this  process  could  be  applied 
throughout,  we  should  reach  the  paradoxical 
result  that  the  complete  explanation  of  cau- 
sahty involves  the  very  aboHtion  of  the  causal 
concept :  for  the  causal  relation  is  only  dif- 
ferentiated from  the  purely  logical  relation 
of  identity  between  cause  and  effect  by  the 
temporal  difference  between  the  terms. 

The  philosophy  of  the  seventeenth  century 
(Spinoza  and  Leibniz)  made  no  distinction 
between  cause  (causa)  and  reason  (ratio); 
the  causal  relation  between  two  phenomena 


96  Philosophical  Problems 

was  to  them  the  same  as  the  relation  between 
the  premises  and  conclusion  of  a  syllogism, 
only  a  relation  of  identity.     It  appeared  to 
them  self-evident  that  in  the  effect  no  more 
could  be  contained  than  in  the  cause;   that 
the  time- relation  between  the  members  was 
a  matter  of  indifference,  and  that  time  was 
anyhow  only  at  home  in   the  dim  sphere 
of    ideas     and     imagination.     In    Hume's 
handling  of  the  problem  of  causality,  this 
is    also    involved,    since    he    declared    that 
there  was  nothing  to  warrant  the  inference 
from  past  to  future.     According  to  Hume, 
the  experiences  of  the  past  could  only  show 
that  a  thing  once,  at  a  single  moment,  pos- 
sessed a   certain  potentiahty,  but  not  that 
it    always    possesses    or    will    possess    it.^^ 
Kant,  to  be  sure,  beheved  a  rational  proof 
could  be  given  for  the  vahdity  of  the  doc- 
trine   of    causahty;    but  he    said   that    the 
causal    relation    and    the    relation   between 
reason   and    consequence  were    only    anal- 
ogous,   not    identical,    the    causal    relation 
signifying    to   him  that    events   follow   one 


The  Problem  of  Knowledge  97 

another  analogously  to  the  way  in  which 
the  conclusion  springs  from  the  premises. 
The  causal  relation  would  thus  contain  a 
rule  by  which  we  could  attain  unity  in 
our  experiences.'*^ 

In  recent  times,  the  attempt  has  been 
made  from  two  different  bases  to  ehminate 
the  time- relation ;  and  consequently,  to  cast 
overboard  not  only  the  elementary  causal 
concept,  but  ultimately  the  whole  causal 
concept. 

From  the  *  speculative '  quarter  it  has  been 
asserted  that  the  time-relation  always  in- 
dicates an  imperfection,  an  incomplete  stage 
of  development.  So  long  as  the  time-rela- 
tion determines  our  conception  of  being,  our 
conception  is  on  that  very  account  incom- 
plete, and  the  reality  of  the  time- relation 
is  irreconcilable  with  the  idea  of  complete 
knowledge,  of  absolute  truth.  Our  knowl- 
edge always  works  away  from  the  time- 
relation;  the  more  clearly  we  understand 
anything,  the  less  significance  does  the  time 
distinction    have,  —  the  more  docs  knowl- 


98  Philosophical  Problems 

edge  of  mere  fact  pass  over  into  formal 
knowledge,  that  of  causes  into  that  of  rea- 
sons. What  at  first  we  called  cause  and 
effect  will  with  the  advance  of  knowledge 
appear  as  members  of  a  totahty,  as  mem- 
bers which  stand  in  a  fixed  relation  to 
one  another,  in  a  rational  relation  to  which 
temporal  sequence  is  unessential.  The  fact 
that  we  became  aware  first  of  the  one  and 
then  of  the  other  member,  has  no  significance ; 
in  our  recognition  of  the  law  the  whole  past 
appears  to  us  as  a  unity.  Not  the  time-rela- 
tion, but  the  unity  behind  the  time-relation 
binds  what  we  call  the  cause  to  what  we  call 
the  effect.  Moreover  there  exists  no  time 
interval  between  the  end  of  the  event, 
which  we  call  cause,  and  the  beginning  of 
the  event,  which  we  call  effect.  The  Enghsh 
philosophers  Francis  Bradley  and  Bernard 
Bosanquet^^  have  given  currency  to  this 
view,  which  is  intimately  connected  with  a 
speculative  interest  in  the  idea  of  totahty, 
and  in  absolute  conclusions. 

From  an  entirely  different  basis  —  which 


The  Problem  of  Knowledge  99 

may  be  designated  that  of  *  pure  experience, ' 
and  of  which  Richard  Avenarius  and  Ernst 
Mach  are  the  chief  exponents  —  reasoning 
has  worked  in  a  similar  direction,  but  from 
other  motives.  The  attempt  here  is  to  cut 
away  from  the  immediate  datum  all  those 
associated  ideas  and  auxihary  notions  with 
which  we  involuntarily  or  methodically  sup- 
plement our  experience.  The  advance  of 
knowledge  consists  in  a  reduction  of  differ- 
ences (to  a  'heterotic  minimum')  and  in 
an  approximation  to  a  pure  description  of 
a  continuous  process.  During  this  advance, 
the  content  of  knowledge  becomes  constantly 
more  confined  to  descriptive  statements,  as 
far  as  possible  with  analytical  transitions, 
and  the  distinctions  are  reduced  from  quali- 
tative to  quantitative,  as  far  as  possible 
with  the  constant  proof  of  equivalence. 
It  is  no  longer  the  function  of  strict  sci- 
ence to  explain;  whoever  wishes  'expla- 
nations' is  referred  to  mythology  and 
metaphysics ;  it  is  the  aim  of  science  to 
give  an  exact,  methodical  description  of  all 


100  Philosophical  Problems 

relations  and  transitions.  What  specially 
concerns  the  causal  relation,  so  this  view 
asserts,  is,  first,  that  every  employment 
of  the  concept  of  cause  and  effect  cuts 
out  two  elements  arbitrarily  from  the 
context  in  which  they  stand,  and  places 
them  in  antithesis;  secondly,  that  the 
time- relation  can  readily  be  reversed  as 
soon  as  one  has  demonstrated  an  equiva- 
lence or  as  soon  as  one  ignores  the  direction 
in  which  the  change  takes  place." 

The  epistemological  views  which,  by  these 
methods,  would  from  various  motives  seek 
to  eliminate  the  elementary  causal  con- 
cept and  combat  the  chief  significance  of 
the  time- relation,  can  be  characterized  by 
saying  that  they  set  up  an  ideal  knowl- 
edge instead  of  the  real  knowledge  which 
we  can  at  any  given  time  attain.  Every 
definite  investigation  must  begin  at  a  definite 
point,  which  lies  where  the  problem  itself 
crops  out.  The  problem  crops  out  when 
two  of  the  members  in  a  series  of  events  draw 
attention  to  themselves,  and  arouse  supposi- 


The  Problem  of  Knowledge         101 

tions  as  to  their  inner  connection,  or  when  a 
single  member  appears  alone  or  suddenly, 
and  thereby  gives  rise  to  the  necessity  of 
finding  intermediates  by  which  it  can  be 
brought  into  connection  with  all  the  rest  of 
the  series.  The  point  of  departure  seized 
upon  is  in  so  far  fortuitous  and  arbitrary; 
but  in  the  nature  of  the  case  it  can  be 
nothing  else.  Our  knowledge  develops  his- 
torically, because  the  attention  of  men  is 
only  aroused  under  certain  definite  con- 
ditions. If  attention  were  at  all  times 
directed  indiscriminately  with  equal  strength 
to  all  the  members  of  the  series  of  events, 
no  knowledge  at  all  would  be  possible. 
Naturally,  it  is  of  importance  that  one 
should  be  conscious  of  the  fortuitous  or 
subjective  nature  of  the  point  of  departure 
and  of  the  bit  of  experience  cut  out,  but 
with  the  advance  of  the  process  of  knowl- 
edge, one  gets  beyond  this,  because  the 
fragmentary  experience  is  worked,  by 
understanding,  into  a  great  continuous 
whole. 


102  Philosophical  Problems 

This  historical  character  of  our  knowledge 
is  also  evident  when  we  recall  how  we  al- 
ways stand  between  the  experiences  of  the 
past  and  the  possibilities  of  the  future.  At 
every  instant  we  must  distinguish  between 
the  present  and  the  expected  datum;  that 
is  the  cause,  this  the  effect,  and  the  expecta- 
tion can  never  be  more  than  an  hypothesis. 
The  single  instant,  in  which  on  the  one  side 
stands  a  'no  more,'  on  the  other  side  a 
'not  yet,'  presents  the  problem  in  its  whole 
intensity,  an  intensity  which  only  the  numb- 
ing power  of  custom  can  lessen.  The  puz- 
zle will  not  be  wanting  with  new  problems  — 
and  so  long  as  knowledge  strides  forward, 
it  will  seek  and  find  new  problems.*^  The 
full  connection  between  events  always  ap- 
pears afterward,  and  until  it  appears,  the 
assumption  of  it  stands  as  an  hypothesis. 
Concepts  like  force,  energy,  cause,  or  possi- 
bility (which  with  different  shades  of  mean- 
ing express  one  and  the  same  relation; 
namely,  the  dependence  of  later  conditions 
on  the  preceding)  will  therefore  never  cease 


The  Problem  of  Knowledge         103 

to  be  needed;  this  dependence  is  differen- 
tiated from  the  relation  of  purely  logical 
and  mathematical  dependence  by  the  fact 
that  it  is  at  once  a  temporal  and  a  rational 
relation,  because  the  resulting  condition 
comes  ajter  as  well  as  out  of  the  preced- 
ing condition.  Even  if  continuity  should 
have  been  demonstrated  by  means  of  never 
so  many  intermediates  and  degrees  of  tran- 
sition, this  time- relation  would  nevertheless 
remain  valid  for  every  Httle  step  between 
two  of  the  graded  members. 

No  change  would  follow  here  even  if 
equivalence  had  been  proved  between  the 
separated  states.  Hume's  problem  has  by 
no  means  been  solved,  as  has  sometimes 
been  said,  by  the  discovery  of  the  conserva- 
tion of  energy.  An  equivalential  relation 
docs  not  exclude  a  qualitative  difference, 
but  directly  presupposes  it:  for  example, 
I  have  no  reason  to  set  up  the  equation 
A=B,  unless  A  and  B  appeared  different 
before  I  found  by  closer  examination  that 
they  could  be  substituted  for  one  another. 


104  Philosophical  Problems 

If  such  an  equivalence  has  been  found,  it 
will  make  no  difference  whether  we  pass 
from  A  to  B  or  from  B  to  A ;  but  when  we 
found  it,  we  began  with  A  or  B  and  pro- 
ceeded by  way  of  investigation  to  the  other 
term. 

In  a  judgment,  we  must,  therefore,  dis- 
criminate between  the^  psychological  process 
through  which  the  judgment  arises  —  and 
in  which  there  is  a  definite  difference  be- 
tween the  initial  idea  (the  subject)  and  the 
concluding  idea  (the  predicate)  —  and  the 
finished  judgment  that  can  be  formulated 
as  a  relation  of  identity,  in  which  the 
difference  between  subject  and  predicate 
loses  all  significance/®  But  in  external 
events,  the  order  of  members  has  the  same 
significance  that  it  has  in  the  movement  of 
thought.  If  I  have  recognized  that  there  is 
an  equivalence  between  heat  and  motion, 
it  is,  considered  purely  abstractly,  a  mat- 
ter of  indifference  whether  I  go  from  heat 
to  motion  or  from  motion  to  heat.  But,  in 
the  real  world,  the  'direction  of  change'  is 


The  Problem  of  Knowledge         105 

a  question  of  life  and  death.  Being,  in 
fact,  grows  different  according  as  the  pre- 
ponderant changes  tend  in  this  direction 
or  in  that.  Time,  therefore,  cannot  be 
reversed,  and  this  proves  that  equivalence 
cannot  be  the  end-all  of  our  knowledge. 
Besides  their  equivalence,  we  must  know  the 
actual  direction  of  the  transformations  of 
fact;  and  this  knowledge  can  only  be  won 
from  constantly  new  experience. 

And  here  we  come  upon  the  fact  that 
every  relation  of  equivalence,  —  as,  in  gen- 
eral, every  causal  relation  —  first  becomes 
effective  in  fact  when  certain  conditions, 
especially  forces  of  release,  are  present.  With 
respect  to  the  presence  of  these  conditions, 
there  arises  a  new  problem :  Can  one  also 
show  that  these  forces  of  detent  stand  to 
their  own  causes  in  a  relation  of  equiva- 
lence? We  light  here  upon  an  endless 
series,  in  which  definite,  concrete  answers 
give  out  long  before  the  questions  do. 
We  have  here  also  a  purely  logical 
analogy;    since    every  absolute   relation  of 


106  Philosophical  Problems 

identity  (A  =  B)  of  two  concepts  rests,  on 
nearer  inspection,  upon  definite  conditions 
(so  that  according  to  Jevons's  formula  it 
might  be  expressed  AC=BC^^),  there  arises 
the  new  question,  how  the  identity  is  related 
to  this  condition  (C) ;  and  so  thought  wan- 
ders on  indefinitely. 

There  is,  then,  no  prospect  of  freeing 
ourselves  from  the  historical  elements  of 
our  knowledge.  The  measure  of  the  de- 
velopment of  our  knowledge  consists,  first, 
in  the  extent  to  which  the  elementary  notion 
of  causation  (inevitable  succession)  can  be 
employed  rather  than  the  bare  fact  of 
occurrence  of  simultaneous  or  successive 
differences;  and  thereafter,  in  the  extent  to 
which  this  elementary  notion  can  be  re- 
placed by  the  ideal  concept  of  causality 
(equivalence  or  identity).  But  the  pro- 
cess of  knowledge  consists  at  all  times  in 
an  ascent  through  the  three  stages  here 
pointed  out,  —  an  ascending  process  that 
must  always  be  repeated  from  each  new 
starting-point.    This  necessity  is  conditioned 


The  Problem  of  Knowledge         107 

by  the  reality  of  the  time-relation.  Hence, 
absolutistic  conceptions  —  whether  they  ap- 
pear in  idealistic  or  reahstic  form  —  always 
have  a  tendency  to  sUght  the  time-relation 
or  to  consider  it  as  only  'empirical,'  if 
not  illusory/*  If  the  time-relation  is  an 
illusion,  it  is  another  illusion  of  the  second 
potency  if  we  imagine  that  we  can  lightly 
rid  ourselves  of  it.  For  us,  existence  can 
never  be  absorbed  into  thought  without 
remainder. 

5 

From  yet  a  third  point  of  view,  the 
problem  of  knowledge  reveals  itself  in  all 
its  severity,  while  at  the  same  time  a  con- 
tinual development  of  knowledge  appears  to 
be  possible.  In  every  cognition  we  can  dis- 
tinguish between  a  subjective  and  an  objective 
element,  between  the  knower  and  the  thing 
known ;  both  terms,  however,  are  only  given 
in  mutual  relation,  although  within  the  rela- 
tion either  may  be  the  more  prominent  term. 

What  part,  then,  of  our  knowledge  is  sub- 
jective and  what  objective?     Already,  from 


108  Philosophical  Problems 

our  discussion,  it  is  evident  that  this  ques- 
tion may  be  variously  answered.  In  the 
domain  of  natural  science,  there  is  a  ten- 
dency to  credit  all  qualitative  differences, 
everything  that  breaks  continuity,  and  ul- 
timately, perhaps,  everything  that  violates 
identity,  to  the  Subject.  Sense-qualities, 
space  and  time  distinctions,  are  also  only 
subjective.  Arguments  for  this  view  may  be 
found  in  the  fact  that  the  differences  which 
we  perceive  in  qualitative,  extensive,  in- 
tensive, and  protensive  (temporal)  relations 
are  due  to  our  psychic  dispositions.  Our 
sensations  are  acts  of  discrimination  whose 
results  depend  upon  the  organization  and 
previous  history  of  the  feehng  Subject. 
The  differences  discovered  have  value  only 
in  relation  to  the  point  of  view  of  the  Sub- 
ject in  his  different  relations.  To  this  must 
be  added  the  discontinuity  of  our  attention, 
which  moves  by  jerks,  now  toward,  now 
away  from,  its  object;  and  from  this  also 
arise  differences  and  interruptions  which 
cannot  be  attributed  to  the  object. 


The  Problem  of  Knowledge         109 

The  dogmatic  and  speculative  school 
of  philosophy  and  of  natural  science  has 
been  inchned  to  follow  this  line  of  thought. 
The  emancipation  from  the  merely  subjec- 
tive here  would  lead  immediately  towards 
continuity  and  identity  as  the  essence  and 
norm  of  truth. 

The  critical  philosophy  asserts  in  re- 
buttal that  the  qualitative,  extensive,  inten- 
sive, and  protensive  differences  form  the 
material  given  to  our  knowledge  and  set 
the  tasks  of  our  investigation.  As  our 
personality  endeavors  to  weld  together  its 
sporadic  elements,  to  harmonize  conflicting 
tendencies,  and  to  free  itself  from  obscurity 
and  self-contradiction,  so  our  understand- 
ing endeavors  to  transmute  the  differences 
actually  given  to  us  into  stages  of  one 
and  the  same  continuous  developmental 
process,  or  into  forms  of  one  and  the 
same  content.  The  demand  for  continuity 
and  identity  lies  in  the  depths  of  human 
consciousness;  and  man  seeks,  therefore, 
to  find  them  again  in  the  content  given  to 


110  Philosophical  Problems 

knowledge.  Furthermore,  consciousness  it- 
self cannot  give  rise  to  the  differences 
which  form  the  material  for  it  to  work  on, 
no  matter  how  much  the  shape  and  degree 
with  which  they  appear  in  consciousness  may 
have  been  determined  by  its  involuntarily 
operating  conditions.  In  the  most  recent 
discussions  of  the  epistemological  basis  of 
natural  science,  there  is  a  tendency  to 
derive  all  unifying  simplifications  mainly 
from  the  economy  of  the  knowing  Subject. 
In  reality,  we  nowhere  and  at  no  time 
possess  the  pure  Subject,  with  its  forms,  as 
an  antithesis  to  a  pure  object,  or  rather 
*  thing-in-itself, '  from  which  the  plural- 
ity of  the  content  of  knowledge  comes. 
Kant  decided  this  point  prematurely  in 
thinking  that  the  subjective  forms  of  knowl- 
edge could  be  determined  once  for  all  so 
that  the  'matter'  of  knowledge  would  be 
left  to  come  from  the  '  thing-in-itself. '  But 
in  the  special  development  of  his  episte- 
mology  he  could  not  avoid  asking  whence 
the  forms  sprang,  or  pointing  out  that  they 


The  Problem  of  Knowledge         HI 

too     are     determined     ultimately    by    the 
'  thing-in-itself, '  since  the  forms  no  less  than 
the  'matter'  are  given  and  must  be  ascer- 
tained through  psychological  analysis.     And 
since  the  'forms'  designate  the  more  constant 
element  of  our  knowledge,  the  underlying  pre- 
supposition of  Kant's  philosophy  turns  out 
to  be  something  that  he  could  not  claim  to 
verify,  namely  that  the  'thing-in-itself  works 
uniformly  —  for  forms  othenvise  could  not 
exist,  or  at  any  rate  could  not  be  appHed/" 
Kant,  consequently,   hesitated   between   the 
two  views  above  described,  although  it  was 
evidently  his  intention  to  cling  to  the  latter. 
Continuity  was  for  him  the   general  basal 
form  of  the  categories,   and  synthesis   the 
fundamental  law  of  action  of    the    know- 
ing consciousness. 

The  problem  is  more  complicated  than 
Kant  saw  it.  If  we  distinguish  in  our  knowl- 
edge between  Subject  and  Object,  we  really 
set  up  an  objectively  determined  Subject  (So) 
as  the  reverse  of  a  subjectively  determined 
Object   (Os).      The  properties  or   'forms,' 


112  Philosophical  Problems 

which  we  attribute  to  the  Subject,  cannot 
be  explained  from  the  concept  of  the  Sub- 
ject itself  (the  pure  S);  they  are  there  as 
objective  facts,  quite  as  much  as  the  other 
properties  with  which  our  knowledge  has 
to  do.  In  Hke  manner,  the  properties  or 
determinations  which  we  attribute  to  the 
Object  always  belong  to  it  only  in  relation 
to  a  Subject,  and  indeed,  upon  closer  con- 
sideration, to  a  Subject  of  a  certain  peculiar 
constitution.  Hence  the  problem  always 
repeats  itself:  Whence  does  the  Subject  get 
its  objective  content  from?  and  what  rela- 
tion obtains  between  the  subjective  deter- 
minations (quahties,  etc.)  of  the  Object  and 
its  proper  essence,  as  Subjects  of  a  different 
nature  from  ourselves  would  apprehend  it? 
Here,  again,  we  run  up  against  the  irra- 
tional, and  here  perhaps  we  see  most  clearly 
how  inexhaustible  Being  is  in  comparison 
with  our  knowledge.  The  justification  of 
Kant's  setting  up  the  notion  of  the  '  thing-in- 
itself  lay  in  the  fact  that  a  transcendent 
concept  is  needed  in  order  to  express  the 


The  Problem  of  Knowledge         II3 

irrational  relation  between  what  he  called 
the  'form'  and  the  'matter'  of  our  knowl- 
edge. Yet  if  we  wish  to  hold  to  the  notion 
of  the  'thing-in-itself,'  we  can  use  it  in  the 
spirit  of  Kant  and  still  avoid  the  contra- 
dictions which  cling  to  it  in  Kant's  phi- 
losophy. We  can  do  this  by  employing  it 
to  express  the  fact  that  the  difference 
between  Subject  and  Object  always  springs 
up  anew  whenever  we  think  we  have  found 
an  objective  explanation  of  the  character 
of  the  Subject  or  a  subjective  explanation 
of  the  character  of  the  Object.  Each  re- 
fers to  the  other  indefinitely,  and  the  irra- 
tional crops  out  in  the  fact  that  an  infinite 
series  (of  the  type :  Sj  {  Oj  { S2 1  O^---)  is  both 
possible  and  necessary.  Thought  must  con- 
stantly be  set  to  work  afresh  to  find  predicates 
for  the  determination  of  being,  because  the 
springs  which  feed  the  stream  of  thought  are 
inexhaustible.  The  'thing-in-itself  is  the 
vague  starting-point  of  thought,  which 
ever  and  anon  reappears  in  new  form  and 
calls  for  new  determination.^     It   may  be 


114  Philosophical  Problems 

that  the  true  symbol  for  the  relation  of 
our  knowledge  to  Being  should  not  be  an 
irrational  but  an  imaginary  number,  since 
being  may  possess  attributes  that  cannot 
be  comprehended  or  defined  by  means  of 
the  dimensions  in  which  our  thoughts  can 
move.  That  this  may  be  possible  can  in 
any  case  no  more  be  contradicted  than  the 
possibility  that  being  may  be  rational  only 
in  a  very  narrow  sphere,  and  that  it  might 
some  day  turn  toward  us  another  side, 
about  which  we  could  build  no  structure  of 
connected  and  practical  thought.  Then,  as 
I  have  elsewhere  shown,^^  a  logical  ice-age 
would  set  in  for  us.  The  relation  between 
Subject  and  Object  would  not  arise  at  all; 
there  could  be  neither  an  So  nor  an  Os. 

In  an  earher  connection  I  made  use  of 
Schiller's  words:  "Wide  is  the  brain  and 
narrow  is  the  world;"  and  now  the  sen- 
tence can  be  reversed:  "Wide  is  the  world, 
and  narrow  is  the  brain ! "  Knowledge,  how- 
ever rich  and  powerful  it  may  be,  is  after 
all  only  a  part  of  Being;  and  the  problem 


The  Problem  of  Knowledge         115 

of  knowledge  would  be  soluble,  only  if  Being 
as  a  totality  (in  so  far  as  we  can  conceive  it 
as  such  a  totality)  could  be  expressed  by 
means  of  a  single  one  of  its  parts.  In  any 
event,  our  expression  must  always  remain 
symbolic ;  even  when  our  knowledge  reaches 
its  cUmax,  it  gives  us  only  an  extract  from  a 
more  inclusive  whole.  Among  all  the  possi- 
bihties  of  thought,  only  a  single  one  appears 
in  the  reality  recognized  by  us.  The  reality 
which  we  recognize  is,  however,  only  a  part 
of  a  greater  whole,  —  and  here  we  are  not 
in  a  position  to  determine  the  relation  be- 
tween the  parts  and  the  whole.  An  exhaus- 
tive concept  of  reahty  is  not  given  us  to 
create. 


CHAPTER   III 
THE   PROBLEM    OF   BEING 


|HE  problem  of  consciousness  and 
the  problem  of  knowledge  both 
point  beyond  themselves:  con- 
sciousness is  a  part  of  Being,  and 
it  is  the  task  of  knowledge  to  understand 
Being.  Here  arise  quite  naturally  the  ques- 
tions, what  place  consciousness  holds  in 
Being,  and  what  picture  of  Being  knowledge 
can  give  us.  The  problem  to  which  we  are 
thus  introduced  may  be  called  the  cos- 
mological  one,  being  the  problem  as  to  how 
far  a  final  world-view  is  possible.  Cosmos 
means  Being  considered  as  a  totality,  and 
logos  means  doctrine,  or  view.  It  would  also 
be  proper  to  use  here  the  word  '  metaphysic, ' 
although  it  has  been  used  in  a  great  many 

different  senses  and  is  thus  less  exact. 

ii6 


The  Problem  of  Being  II7 

The  cardinal  difficulty  of  this  problem 
lies  in  the  fact  that  the  cosmological  prin- 
ciples —  the  principles  which  should  underhe 
our  view  of  the  world  —  cannot  be  simply 
drawn  from  some  particular  empirical  realm, 
for  the  whole  undertaking  is  to  unite  all 
empirical  realms  into  a  totality  and  to  give 
that  totality  a  positive  character. 

Any  attempt  to  treat  the  problem  of  Being 
must  bear  a  formal  as  well  as  a  real  character. 
On  the  one  hand,  it  must  be  asked  what 
demands  are  to  be  made  on  the  concept  which 
assumes  to  be  able  to  comprehend  Being  in 
its  totahty,  and  whether  it  is  possible  to 
satisfy  these  demands ;  on  the  other  hand,  it 
must  be  asked,  what  positive  characters  of 
such  a  totality  can  be  specified,  so  far  as  we 
are  able  to  conceive  it. 

The  formal  motives  of  speculation  as  to 
the  nature  of  Being  he  deep  in  the  constitu- 
tion of  consciousness  and  knowledge.  They 
are  connected  with  the  demand  for  continu- 
ity, a  demand  in  which  both  personahty 
and  science  coincide.     The  nature  of  thought 


118  Philosophical  Problems 

manifests  itself  at  all  stages  and  under  all 
forms  as  a  connection,  a  synthesis,  and  it  is 
therefore  not  to  be  expected  that  thought 
will  voluntarily  give  up  the  attempt  to 
knit  its  sporadic  data  together.  This  effort 
has  a  peculiar  and  practical  importance 
because  firm  and  continuous  connection  is 
the  only  criterion  that  we  have  in  doubtful 
cases,  if  it  comes  to  a  matter  of  distinguish- 
ing dreams  or  illusions  from  Reality.  The 
more  comprehensive  and  internally  connected 
the  concept  of  Reality  we  could  form,  the 
greater  would  be  its  trustworthiness.  Hence, 
on  both  theoretical  and  practical  grounds, 
there  will  be  an  inclination  to  go  to  the 
limit,  to  seek  out  the  continuation  and  the 
conclusion  toward  which  theoretic  and  prac- 
tical explanations  already  tend.  The  ideal 
would  be  reached  if  we  could  establish  a 
complete  harmonization  of  all  our  experi- 
ences—  a  continuous  totahty,  with  which 
all  particular  empirical  realms,  each  ac- 
cording to  its  own  laws,  would  connect 
themselves. 


The  Problem  of  Being  119 

But  the  discussion  of  the  problem  of 
knowledge  must  already  have  taught  us 
that  such  a  finished  world- view  is  impossible 
and,  to  a  certain  degree,  would  be  self- 
contradictory.  None  of  the  particular  em- 
pirical fields  Hes  before  us  all  complete  and 
closed;  there  are  always  new  experiences 
and  new  riddles;  our  coordinating  thought 
constantly  has  to  undertake  new  tasks. 
Since  our  knowledge  always  works  by  means 
of  combination  and  comparison,  every  total- 
ity —  if  it  is  to  be  the  object  of  com- 
plete knowledge  —  must  be  held  or  placed 
alongside  of  something  different  from  it- 
self: only  thus  can  it  be  given  complete 
determination;  but  if  there  were  anything 
different  from  itself,  it  would  not  be  a  total- 
ity! It  is  a  matter  of  indifference  whether 
we  hold  fast  to  the  first  empirical  totality 
which  wc  attempt  to  construct,  or  whether 
we  go  back  to  the  principle  of  such  a  totality 
and  give  to  it  the  name  'God,'  in  contrast 
with  the  totality  itself,  the  *  world  '  —  the 
antinomy  is  the  same  in  both  cascs/'^    The 


120  Philosophical  Problems 

irrational  meets  us  here  as  it  did  in  the 
problem  of  knowledge,  and  herein  we  find 
a  certain  inner  connection  between  the  two 
problems.  The  fact  that  knowledge  is  for- 
ever unfinished  may  perhaps  be  connected 
with  the  fact  that  Being  itself  is  not  ready- 
made,  but  still  incomplete,  and  rather  to  be 
conceived  as  a  continual  becoming,  like  the 
individual  personality  and  like  knowledge. 
Perhaps  Being  also  conceals  simultaneous 
discords  in  itself,  which  make  it  impossible 
to  construct  an  harmonious  whole.  If  so, 
the  analogy  between  the  different  problems 
would  be  peculiarly  plain.  In  their  dif- 
ferent systems  of  thought,  the  philosophers 
have  been  too  sure  that  Being  in  itself  was 
a  closed  and  constant  totality,  and  that  it 
was  only  our  wills  and  minds  that  had  to 
battle  incessantly  to  exist  and  to  attain 
harmony. 

A  practical  motive  of  speculation  springs 
from  the  prominent  part  which  some  one 
phenomenon,  some  one  department  of  ex- 
perience or  side  of  Being  may  assume  for 


The  Problem  of  Being  121 

us.  The  tendency  may  then  arise  to  use 
this  phenomenon  or  aspect  as  a  basis  for 
interpreting  the  meaning  of  all  Being,  and 
deriving  the  other  phenomena  from  this,  or 
tracing  them  back  to  this.  The  different 
cosmological  systems  are  just  so  many  at- 
tempts to  sound  the  depths  of  Being,  to 
test  how  wide  a  searchhght  one  thought 
can  throw  over  the  whole  of  it.  They  are 
a  series  of  thought-experiments,  by  means 
of  which  the  carrying  power  of  our  largest 
thoughts,  their  capacity  to  serve  as  the 
groundwork  of  a  comprehensive  world- 
view,  has  been  tested. 

Every  attempt  of  that  sort  necessarily 
makes  use  of  analogy,  as  Leibniz  first 
discerned  with  the  clear  eye  of  genius.  In 
all  science  analogy  may  occupy  a  significant 
place.  All  designations  of  psychical  phe- 
nomena have  originally  been  formed  on 
the  basis  of  an  analogy  with  physical 
phenomena,  and  in  psychology  we  are  con- 
stantly compelled  to  work  with  physical 
analogies.     It,    therefore,    becomes   an   im- 


122  Philosophical  Problems 

portant  question,  how  far  they  are  vahd. 
According  to  Kant,  the  doctrine  of  causahty 
expresses  the  idea  that  a  relation  exists  be- 
tween the  real  data  of  the  world,  analogous 
to  that  between  reason  and  consequence  in 
our  thought.  The  atomic  theory  and  the 
so-called  mechanical  conceptions  of  Nature 
have  very  recently  come  to  be  considered 
as  so  many  vast  analogies,  by  means  of 
which  the  qualitative  changes  of  Nature 
can  be  described  and  calculated.  Also, 
in  discoveries,  analogy  is  of  great  impor- 
tance. The  analogy  between  chemistry 
and  physics  helped  Robert  Mayer  to  his 
discovery  of  the  conservation  of  energy. 
But  if  analogy  is  employed  metaphysically 
or  cosmologically,  it  is  not  a  single  realm 
of  Being  serving  to  illuminate  another  single 
realm;  it  is  a  single  realm  that  is  used 
to  express  Being  as  a  totahty.  This  sym- 
bolism is  of  a  different  kind  and  has  different 
validity  from  that  brought  to  bear  between 
particular  fields;  it  cannot  be  carried  out 
to  its  full  consequences,  and  it  cannot  be 


The  Problem  of  Being  123 

verified.  Neither  the  justification  nor  the 
limits  of  analogy  can  here  be  strictly  shown. 
In  these  respects  cosmological  or  metaphys- 
ical symbols  are  different  from  scientific 
ones.  As  I  have  attempted  to  show  in  my 
'Philosophy  of  Religion,'  religious  symbols 
share  the  fate  of  the  metaphysical.  In 
both  cases  the  attempt  is  made  to  create 
absolutely  vaHd  final  concepts;  the  only 
difference  lies  in  the   motive. 

In  the  problem  of  knowledge,  likewise, 
we  came  upon  an  irrational  relation  between 
part  and  whole.  There  it  was  connected 
with  the  question  how  jar  the  whole  could 
express  itself  through  and  in  a  single  part. 
Here  in  the  cosmological  problem,  the  ques- 
tion is  how  far  determinations  can  be  de- 
duced from  a  single  part  which  are  true 
of  the  totality  as  such.  It  is  one  and 
the  same  question  that  meets  in  both 
problems,  only  from  different  directions. 

The  character  and  value  of  a  theory  of 
the  world  depend  not  only  on  how  clearly 
and  logically  the  analogy  is  worked  out,  but 


124  Philosophical  Problems 

also  on  where  the  analogy  is  drawn  from. 
The  phenomenon  (the  part  or  aspect  of  ex- 
perience) on  which  the  analogy  is  based  may 
be  called  the  type- phenomenon  (Urphano- 
men).  We  are  indebted  to  Gothe  for  this 
expression.  But  Gothe  understood  by  the 
word  Urphdnomen  not  only  a  phenomenon 
of  a  typical  kind  that  might  serve  to  illu- 
minate other  phenomena ;  to  him  it  signified 
a  fact  that  is  at  the  same  time  a  law ;  so  that 
one  only  needs  to  mention  it,  in  order  to  see 
through  it;  a  fact,  moreover,  that  need  not 
be  considered  as  composite,  since,  being  it- 
self, as  it  were,  the  symbol  of  everything  else, 
it  sets  bounds  to  our  view,  and  stirs  up  not 
only  deep  wonder  and  awe,  but  also  the 
feeling  that  we  stand  at  the  Hmit  of  our 
powers.^^  How  unfortunate  this  concept 
was  for  Gothe's  theory  of  colors,  is  well 
known.  By  the  very  definition  itself  he 
wanted  to  exclude  every  further  examina- 
tion and  explanation  of  the  phenomenon 
chosen  by  him  as  type.  But  this  defect 
need  not  of  necessity  chng  to  the  type-phe- 


77?^  Problem  of  Being  125 

nomenon.  The  term  may  well  denote  the 
point  of  our  experience  from  which  we  at- 
tempt to  take  our  bearings  in  all  directions, 
but  it  may  none  the  less  remain  an  object 
of  farther  investigation  and  explanation. 
The  chief  point  is  whether  the  phenome- 
non chosen  is  so  individual  and  significant 
that  it  can  possess  typical  character  for  us. 
The  interpretation  of  Being  must  always 
issue  from  a  single  place  in  experience, 
and  it  may  so  issue  without  exempting  that 
place  from  special  scientific  treatment. 

But  now  where  shall  we  look  for  the 
type-phenomenon?  Around  this  point 
the  battle  of  the  different  world-views 
revolves.  Now  lije,  now  thought,  now 
matter  is  taken,  and  made  the  basis  of 
the  interpretation.  Before  proceeding  to 
the  consideration  of  the  most  important 
of  the  type-phenomena  which  cosmological 
interpretation  has  pressed  into  its  service, 
let  us  linger  a  while  over  the  interpreta- 
tion itself. 


126  Philosophical  Problems 

2 

Metaphysics  may  become  dogmatic  and 
thereby  work  a  twofold  injury  to  science, 
—  partly  by  thus  cutting  off  every  scien- 
tific explanation  of  the  selected  'type- 
phenomenon,  '  partly  by  conceiving  her  an- 
alogical methods  as  more  scientific  than 
they  really  are,  and  consequently  forget- 
ting the  need  of  constant  empirical  confir- 
mation. She  ought  not  to  interfere  with  the 
household  management  of  the  special  sci- 
ences, —  no  more  with  that  of  mental  science 
than  with  that  of  natural  science.  Her  philo- 
sophical duty  is  at  the  outposts  of  scientific 
thought;  her  task  is  to  give  ultimate  in- 
terpretations. The  theory  of  knowledge 
led  us  to  a  transcendent  notion  {Grenz- 
begriff)  of  that  which  in  our  world-view  oc- 
casions the  unending  conflict  between  quahty 
and  quantity,  elementary  and  ideal  concepts 
of  causality,  subject  and  object.  If  we  call 
that  which  lies  at  the  basis  of  these  antitheses 
the  '  thing-in-itself, '  then  this  expression  in- 
dicates the  philosophical  place  of  meta- 
physics or  of  cosmology. 


The  Problem  of  Being  127 

The  final  interpretation  will  bear  more 
the  impress  of  art  than  of  science.  The 
transition  from  the  empirical  and  critical 
parts  of  philosophy  (psychology  and  episte- 
mology)  to  cosmology  displays  a  certain 
analogy  with  the  transition  from  historical 
criticism  to  historical  narrative.  The  his- 
torian works  his  critically  treated  material 
into  a  totahty  of  events  and  characters; 
the  fragmentary  is  rounded  out,  and  it 
is  a  rounding  out  in  which  the  personality 
of  the  narrator  will  necessarily  play  a 
part.  Cosmological  philosophy  will  give 
us,  Ukewise,  a  complete  picture  of  Being 
on  the  basis  of  our  knowledge  of  Being; 
it  will  work  together  the  scattered  features 
into  a  whole  in  which  a  single  element 
(the  type-phenomenon)  exercises  especial 
influence,  so  that  the  coloring  of  the 
whole  depends  on  it.  Into  the  choice 
of  the  type-phenomenon  and  into  the 
carrying  out  of  the  analogy,  a  distinct 
personal  element  enters.  A  great  philo- 
sophical system  is  a  work  of  art,  a  drama. 


128  Philosophical  Problems 

The  practice  of  this  art  will  become  con- 
stantly more  difficult.     For  hereafter  it  will 
not  only  presuppose  a  wealth  of  material  to 
be  arranged  and  connected   together  with 
constructive  power,  but  it  will  also  presup- 
pose the  ability  to  avoid  dogmatizing,  and 
to  preserve  to  ideas  their  significance,  and 
their  importance  to  ideal  constructions  with- 
out confounding  them  with  absolute  truths. 
It  requires  one,  as  Lessing  said,  to  think 
gymnastically,  not    dogmatically.     The   art 
will  consist  in  coupling  bold  creative  thought 
with  watchful    critical    consciousness.      In 
my  essay   on  'Philosophy  as   Art,'  I  have 
especially   emphasized    this    aspect    of    the 
matter.      The    artistic    element    in    philo- 
sophic   thought    was    early    brought    into 
prominence     by     Schopenhauer ;     but     he 
had  rather  in  mind  the  involuntary  origin 
of   the  various  systems  of  thought,   which 
displaces   the    'why'    of    science    with   the 
'what'  of  art.     When  Albert  Lange  called 
philosophic    construction    an    art,    he    was 
thinking  primarily   of    the    idealizing  ten- 


The  Problem  of  Being  129 

dency,  of  the  demand  to  see  in  ideal  images 
an  expression  of  the  highest  reahty;'^*  In 
the  rehgious  problem,  we  shall  run  upon 
a  relation  that  is  akin  to  the  just-men- 
tioned transition  from  science  to  art;  only 
it  will  in  the  case  of  religion  be  concerned 
with  the  settlement  of  a  view  of  lije,  while 
here  it  is  concerned  with  a  view  of  the 
world. 

As  the  history  of  philosophy  shows, 
the  conditions  for  the  exercise  of  the  above- 
mentioned  art  are  not  present  on  a  large 
scale  at  all  times.  Long  accumulation 
of  material  and  of  historic  points  of  view, 
intense  concentration  of  spirit,  and  an 
energy  of  thought  born  of  the  severity  of 
the  problem  are  all  demanded.  We  find 
in  the  history  of  philosophy  that  systems 
lie  closely  grouped  together,  sometimes  con- 
fined to  single  locahties.  The  fifth  and 
fourth  centuries  before  Christ  gave  birth 
to  the  great  Greek  systems,  and  Athens 
was  the  centre.  In  the  seventeenth  cen- 
tury arose    the    chief    systems   of    modern 


130  Philosophical  Problems 

times,  which  grew  up  on  the  basis  of 
the  manifoldness  of  matter,  of  the  new 
thoughts  of  the  Renaissance,  and  of  the 
sciences  of  Nature  just  begun.  In  all 
this,  Holland  held  the  central  place.  At 
the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth  century, 
the  systems  of  philosophical  idealism  were 
all  founded  in  Jena,  where  Kant's  pupils 
fell  in  with  Gothe's  disciples  and  with  the 
vanguard  of  romanticism.  At  such  epochs 
philosophy  appears  as  one  of  the  symptoms 
of  intellectual  progress;  while,  in  the  inter- 
vals, the  particular  discussions  of  psycho- 
logical, epistemological,  and  ethical  problems 
go  their  more  leisurely  gait. 

I  now  proceed  to  call  attention  to  the 
more  important  type-phenomena  which 
may  serve  as  systematic  foundations  of 
cosmology,  and  which  have  historically 
performed  such  service. 

3 

The  first  fact,  whose  consideration  as  a 
type-phenomenon  of  Being  closely  concerns 


ne  Problem  of  Being  131 

philosophy,  is  that  Being  is  to  a  great 
extent  intelligible:  we  can  recollect  phe- 
nomena, infer  from  one  phenomenon  to 
another,  and  find  continuity  between  them. 
And  if  our  hypotheses  are  proper  working 
hypotheses,  and  also  if  the  old,  naif  con- 
cept of  truth  is  compelled  to  yield  to  the 
dynamic  or  symbohc  concept  of  truth  (see 
III,  2),  then  the  very  fact  that  we  are  able 
by  our  powers  and  our  methods  to  penetrate 
to  a  certain  degree  into  Being  must  be 
connected  with  the  essence  of  Being  itself. 
The  applicability  of  a  method  always  con- 
stitutes some  evidence  as  to  the  constitu- 
tion of  the  matter  to  which  it  is  apphed. 
The  fact  that  Being  is  intelligible  to  us 
indicates  an  inner  unity  in  Being  itself, 
coming  to  light  in  the  conformity  to  law 
that  characterizes  the  course  of  phenomena. 
Our  criterion  of  reality  consists,  indeed, 
only  in  a  firm  connectedness ;  and  it  is  but 
a  natural  extension  of  this  principle  when 
we  read  into  Being  a  unifying  power  that 
binds  single  elements  and  events  together. 


132  Philosophical  Problems 

Philosophy  has  a  natural  tendency  to  as- 
cend to  such  a  principle.  Plato  and  Gior- 
dano Bruno,  Spinoza  and  Hegel,  Fechner 
and  Lotze,  worked  in  that  direction;  and 
even  Kant,  in  spite  of  his  great  critical  cir- 
cumspection, testifies  to  the  importance  of 
this  idea.  While  popular  thought  is  inclined 
to  seek  a  final  solution  by  mounting  up  the 
ladder  of  causes  until  it  ends  with  a  first 
cause,  —  a  way  which  only  leads  to  an  end- 
less series,  —  philosophic  thought  prefers 
to  seek  a  solution  in  depth  rather  than  in 
breadth,  and  to  ask  what  the  presupposi- 
tion is  on  which  a  rationally  connected  world 
can  somehow  be  built,  however  hypotheti- 
cally  this  may  be.  Here  causation  stands  as 
the  type-phenomenon,  and  not  least  on  this 
account  do  discussions  about  the  principle 
of  causality  lay  claim  to  so  large  a  place 
in  the  history  of  modern  philosophy. 

In  opposition  to  Monism,  which  suggests 
itself  to  us  in  this  way,  we  may  point  out 
that  the  essential  condition  for  the  scien- 
tific understanding    of    phenomena    is   not 


The  Problem  of  Being  I33 

only  the  assumption  of  an  inner  connection 
between  them,  but  also  the  assumption  of 
that  plurality  of  them  between  which  the 
connection  takes  place,  and  to  which  the 
laws  discovered  by  science  apply.  Why 
not  then  consider  this  plurality  as  the  type- 
phenomenon,  so  that  our  metaphysics  should 
be  pluralistic,  not  monistic? 

The  answer  to  this  question  is  given  in 
the  fact  that  we  draw  all  the  properties  or 
forces  with  which  we  endow  the  elements 
of  being  (whether  we  conceive  them  as 
material  atoms  or  as  psychical  monads) 
from  the  law-abiding  connected  whole  whose 
components  these  elements  are.  The  prop- 
erties of  things  are  the  constant  ways  by 
which  they  influence,  or  are  influenced  by, 
one  another.  'Force'  is  here  the  element 
that  for  our  mind  contains  the  reason  for 
the  change  of  one  or  more  of  the  other 
elements.  The  case  is  just  the  same  with 
the  related  concepts  of  energy,  possibility, 
and  individuality.  All  these  concepts  are 
secondary,  in  comparison  with  the  concept 


134  Philosophical  Problems 

of  law.  In  the  case  of  individuality,  for 
instance,  we  must  not  only  think  of  the  law 
defining  the  behavior  of  the  individual  phe- 
nomenon toward  its  surroundings,  but  also 
of  the  law  that  its  inner  relations  obey. 

Another  consideration  points  in  the  same 
direction.  All  knowledge  begins  with  the 
analysis  of  given  observations  (perceptions 
or  recollections).  In  order  that  such  a 
perception  may  become  the  object  of  analysis, 
it  must  first  appear  as  a  totality,  embracing  a 
sum  of  elements  (parts  or  properties).  Every 
cognition  starts  from  a  something  cut  out 
from  a  greater  whole.  Every  definition  is 
a  limitation.  Every  judgment  makes  use  of 
presuppositions  which  lie  beyond  the  act 
of  judgment.  Every  conclusion  presupposes 
several  premises  whose  vaHdity  must  often 
be  established  in  very  diverse  ways.  We 
always  move  within  a  more  inclusive  whole, 
in  which  are  to  be  sought  the  conditions 
for  the  particular  results  that  we  are  striv- 
ing after. 

Consequently,  if  in  the  world  of  reality 


The  Problem  of  Being  135 

as  well  as  in  the  world  of  pure  thought, 
the  particular  gets  its  nature  and  its  validity 
from  the  connected  whole  in  which  it 
appears,  it  would  seem  as  though  Monism 
were  a  more  fundamental  point  of  view 
than  Pluralism. 

But  the  theory  of  knowledge  shows  that 
reason  has  its  limits.  The  empiricist  and 
the  sceptic  will  always  be  able  to  check  the 
monistic  metaphysician,  because  they  can 
taunt  him  with  the  actual  limitations  of 
knowledge.  We  cannot  even  use  jact  as  a 
criterion  in  a  thoroughgoing  manner,  or 
carry  out  with  strictness  the  distinction  be- 
tween dreaming  and  reality.  With  the  same 
right  with  which  we  reason  from  the  pos- 
sibility of  rational  knowledge  to  a  unifying 
force  in  Being,  we  might,  apparently,  reason 
to  an  irrational  power  in  Being,  to  a  cos- 
mological  principle  that  prevented  the  ele- 
ments of  Being  from  standing  in  a  rationally 
determinable  relation  to  one  another. 

But  hereupon  the  monistic  party  might 
rejoin  that  the  consideration  that  the  unify- 


136  Philosophical  Problems 

ing  force  does  not  prevail  everywhere,  may 
indicate  that  Being  itself  is  to  be  conceived 
as  in  process  of  becoming,  of  evolving,  and 
that  what  appears  to  us  as  law  and  order 
and  connection,  is  the  result  of  a  develop- 
ment in  the  interior  of  the  existent  that  is 
not  yet  complete.  From  this  point  of  view, 
therefore,  it  would  be  time  that  conditions 
the  irrationality.  So  long  as  the  thought,  as 
knowledge,  is  not  completed  but  still  becom- 
ing, just  so  long  Being  as  a  whole  cannot  be 
complete.  Thought  and  knowledge  are  them- 
selves a  very  part  of  being!  And  if  they  are 
in  process  of  becoming,  there  may  well  be 
more  that  is  also  becoming.  It  is  a  strange 
contradiction  in  the  grand  rationalistic 
systems,  that,  although  they  may  be  able  to 
explain  everything  else,  yet  they  are  power- 
less to  explain  the  striving,  laboring  nature 
of  the  thought  which  produces  them.  In 
Plato  and  Spinoza,  Hegel  and  Bostrom,  this 
contradiction  appears. 

Critical  Monism,  as  I  call  it,  which  asserts 
the  reality  of  time,   and  hence  the  perma- 


The  Problem  of  Being  l}y 

nent  unfinishedness  both  of  Being  and  of 
knowledge,  can  nevertheless  still  quite  prop- 
erly make  of  causality  and  rationality  the 
type-phenomena  of  its  view  of  the  world. 
It  finds,  then,  in  Being  a  force  struggling 
towards  unification,  which,  by  progressive 
evolution,  overcomes  the  sporadic  and  hos- 
tile elements.  Perhaps  even  new  elements 
may  perpetually  arise,  which  are  only  to  be 
worked  together  in  the  same  fashion,  so  that 
the  development  must  begin  all  over  again. 
Thought's  own  work  appears  thus  in  a 
cosmic  light.  The  goal  that  thought  sets 
before  itself  (even  if  it  replace  the  static 
with  the  dynamic  concept  of  truth)  is  to 
establish  a  constant  connection  between 
our  methods  and  hypotheses  and  the  real 
processes  of  Being.  If  thought  succeeds 
in  approaching  this  goal,  then  Being  itself 
becomes  more  rational  than  it  was  before, 
because  a  new  constant  and  harmonious 
relation  has  been  wrought  out,  and  now  is 
realized.  The  thinker  to  whom  it  is  given 
to  advance  in  this  direction  can  rightly  say : 


138  Philosophical  Problems 

"From  place  to  place  we  are  inside  of 
things,"  no  matter  how  far  off  and  sublime 
the  supreme  ideal  of  thought  may  loom  up 
before  him. 

4 

Can  we  not  now  attempt  a  real,  positive 
determination  of  the  unifying  principle  which, 
according  to  the  hypotheses  thus  developed, 
holds  Being  together  in  its  innermost  nature  ? 
Every  attempt  in  this  direction  must  to  an 
especially  high  degree  bring  analogy  into 
requisition.  Here  we  have  no  fundamental 
fact  to  which  we  can  refer,  such  as  we  had 
connecting  the  problem  of  Being  with  the 
problem  of  knowledge  (p.  131).  In  attempt- 
ing to  determine  the  principle  of  Being,  our 
thought  turns  to  the  most  fundamental  dis- 
tinction which  familiar  phenomena  present, 
viz.  the  distinction  between  the  psychical 
and  the  material ;  but  here  it  seems  as  though 
every  attempt  in  a  cosmological  direction 
must  run  against  a  deadlock. 

The  position  which  I  adopt,  purely  me- 
thodically and  empirically,  for  the  problem 


The  Problem  of  Being  139 

of  mind  and  matter,  has  been  already  devel- 
oped in  Chapter  II,  section  3.  But  the  prob- 
lem comes  upon  us  now  from  another  angle. 
For,  whether  we  be,  from  the  methodical 
and  empirical  point  of  view,  dualists,  mate- 
rialists,  or  monists,  the  question  still  re- 
mains, What  do  we  think  of  the  fundamental 
essence  of  Being?  —  what  sort  of  an  attri- 
bute lies  at  the  bottom  of  the  way  we  finally 
think  —  if  we  think  our  final  thoughts  —  of 
Being. 

If  I  take  the  analogy  with  the  spatially 
extended  and  moving  as  my  basis,  not  only 
my  method  but  my  metaphysics  will  be 
materialistic.  As  an  absolute  hypothesis, 
Materialism  possesses  the  advantage  of  giv- 
ing us  the  picture  of  a  great  continuity,  and 
does  not  compel  us  to  abandon  the  imme- 
diately perceived.  But  Materialism  is  a 
childlike  and  naive  conception.  It  is  the 
first  philosophy  of  man.  The  impression 
of  the  connectedness  and  sweep  of  the 
material  world  exercises  such  overwhelm- 
ing   power,    that    ever    and    again    essays 


140  Philosophical  Problems 

are  made  in  the  materialistic  direction,  al- 
though—  since  the  advent  of  the  critical 
philosophy  —  not  with  such  dogmatic  as- 
surance as  formerly.  They  will  always  be 
shipwrecked  either  by  the  impossibility  of 
tracing  back  the  psychical  to  the  material, 
or  by  the  epistemological  reflection  that  we 
have  matter  only  as  the  object  of  con- 
sciousness, and  that,  if  materialism  were 
true,  nothing  could  exist  to  which  the 
material  object  or  phenomenon  could  be 
presented.  Hobbes,  whose  thinking  tended 
decidedly  toward  materialism,  came  to  a  halt 
before  the  consideration  that  among  all  phe- 
nomena the  most  important  is  just  this,  that 
something  can  he  a  phenomenon  to  us  at  all. 
In  contrast  with  materialism,  metaphys- 
ical Idealism  makes  analogy  with  psychical 
phenomena  its  basis.  It  may  meanwhile 
pay  homage,  empirically,  either  to  dualism 
(so  Lotze),  or  to  materialism  (so  Schopen- 
hauer), or  to  Spinozistic  monism  (so  Leibniz, 
Fechner,  and  Wundt).  The  last  word  of  all 
these  forms  of   Idealism   is  that  only  the 


The  Problem  of  Being  141 

analogy  with  mental  conditions  which  we 
find  in  ourselves  can  give  us  a  key  to  the 
understanding  of  the  innermost  nature  of 
Being.  Only  ourselves  do  we  know  from 
within,  everything  else  only  from  without ! 

Psychological  experiment  has  taught  us 
that  there  are  many  degrees  and  kinds  of 
psychical  being,  and  if  we  wish  to  utilize 
them  in  the  exegesis  of  all  Being,  we  must 
naturally  assume  that  these  series  of  degrees 
and  qualities  are  continued  indefinitely. 
Thus,  idealistic  cosmology  may  vary  greatly, 
and  historically  it  appears  under  many  forms, 
which  have  been  conditioned  by  other  mo- 
tives determining  the  world-view  (e.g.  by 
the  tendency  to  optimism  or  pessimism,  by 
the  special  emphasis  on  thought  or  on  will, 
etc.).  As  far  back  as  the  Indian  Upanishads 
it  appeared  in  the  doctrine  that  Brdhman 
(the  world-principle)  is  Atman  (soul). 

Sometimes  ideahsts  deny  that  they  are 
using  an  argument  from  analogy,  and  as- 
sert that  their  metaphysical  Idealism  (or 
idealistic  cosmology)  has  been  reached   by 


142  Philosophical  Problems 

the  straight  path  of  logical  construction, 
of  dialectical  method.  But  the  very  proud- 
est structure  of  thought  that  a  man  ever 
flattered  himself  to  have  successfully  erected, 
namely  Hegel's  system,  really  only  seeks  to 
show  that  everything  in  Being  is  connected 
just  as  thoughts  are  in  the  mind  of  man; 
in  point  of  fact,  the  human  mind  is  used 
by  Hegel  as  the  basis  of  an  analogy,  simply 
because  it  is  the  best  example  of  an  internal 
totality  which  we  possess.^^ 

The  idealistic  reasoning  by  analogy  could 
only  lead  to  a  final  solution  if  we  were  vouch- 
safed the  means  of  positively  determining 
the  different  degrees  and  kinds  of  psychical 
existence  which  must  be  met  with  in  the 
world,  so  far  as  metaphysical  idealism  holds 
good.  But,  as  I  have  shown  in  a  former 
connection  (II,  3),  we  are  not  in  a  position 
to  go  farther  than  an  indefinite  notion  of 
potential  psychical  energy.  A  verification 
of  Ideahsm  is  impossible.  Even  if  Idealism 
could  be  thoroughly  carried  out,  yet  the 
difficulty  would  remain  that  matter  could 


The  Problem  of  Being  143 

no  more  be  derived  from  the  psychical  than 
the  psychical  from  matter. 

But  it  is  by  no  means  certain  that  we  are 
forced  to  preserve  a  neutrality  between  the 
materialistic  and  the  idealistic  solutions  of 
the  problem  of  Being.  The  distinction  be- 
tween mind  and  matter  is  to  be  sure  a 
cardinal  one  in  the  content  of  our  experience ; 
but  there  is  no  proof  that  there  is  no  other 
attribute  in  being  besides  these  two.  //  the 
problem  of  Being  Jiad  to  be  solved  by  human 
experience,  then  one  of  the  two  possibilities 
would  have  to  be  chosen.  But  the  question 
is  whether  our  experience  furnishes  us  with 
sufficient  elements  for  a  real  solution.  The 
empire  of  Being  may  be  much  vaster  than 
the  possibilities  of  our  experience.  Here, 
again,  it  is  true  that  the  world  is  great,  but 
our  mind  is  small ;  again  we  come  upon  the 
irrational.  If  it  could  be  proved  that  the  dis- 
tinction between  mind  and  matter  were  a  con- 
tradictory, not  a  contrary,  that  consequently 
there  was  in  things  an  absolute  "  either  — 
or,"  then  the  problem  of  Being  would  be 


144  Philosophical  Problems 

simpler  than  it  is ;  and  yet  it  would  be  more 
complex  than  human  thought  —  inclined, 
as  that  is,  to  think  itself  fully  accoutred  for 
religious  and  metaphysical  speculation  — 
has  often  supposed.  Critical  Monism,  which 
strives  to  maintain  the  thought  of  unity 
without  dogmatizing,  must  perceive  that 
it  is  lacking  in  the  prerequisites  for  a  com- 
plete solution.  The  possibility  that  there 
are  more  forms  than  our  experience  exhibits 
may  signify  that  the  whole  problem  Hes 
deeper  than  has  been  supposed.  There 
might,  for  example,  be  a  tap-root  of  Being 
from  which  both  mind  and  matter  sprang, 
and  the  insolubility  of  the  problem  might  be 
due  to  our  ignorance  of  this  tap-root. 

5 

A  third  type-phenomenon  has  to  be  chosen 
when  we  make  our  choice  between  con- 
servation and  development  (being  and  be- 
coming). Ancient  thought  was  throughout 
inchned  to  hold  fast  to  unmoved  Being;  it 
was  a  conceptual  philosophy,  which  first  and 


The  Problem  of  Being  145 

foremost  sought  to  trace  back  phenomena  to 
fixed  generic  concepts.  Plato's  doctrine  of 
ideas  formed  the  pinnacle  of  this  attempt 
(cf.  II,  i).  This  tendency  —  or  the  same 
psychical  bent  which  it  exemplifies  —  not 
infrequently  comes  to  the  front  in  modern  re- 
search, and,  for  that  matter,  not  only  in  phi- 
losophy, but  in  science  generally  where  fixed, 
unchangeable  modes  or  types  are  striven  for. 
Even  when  ancient  thought  accepted  the  idea 
of  evolution,  it  was  still  pecuUarly  prone  to 
believe  in  a  rhythmical  process  which  would 
repeatedly  bring  around  the  same  conditions 
and  events.  Evolution  as  a  constantly  ad- 
vancing series  of  changes  is  a  modern  idea, 
for  which  we  are  indebted  to  wider  experi- 
ence in  the  realms  of  both  history  and  nature, 
but  which  has  been  formed  under  the  influ- 
ence of  the  Perso-Christian  type  of  religion.^® 
The  leading  part  played  by  the  concept 
of  evolution  in  modern  thought  is  connected 
with  the  fact  that  the  concept  of  causality 
has  been  so  prominent.  The  more  the 
elementary  concept  of  causahty  is  approxi- 


146  Philosophical  Problems 

mated,  by  continued  research,  to  the  ideal 
concept  of  causality,  the  more  will  the 
causal  relation  betoken  a  continuous  process 
in  which  the  succeeding  members  are  de- 
termined by  the  preceding.  The  concept  of 
evolution  involves,  as  soon  as  it  is  proved, 
the  idea  that  direction  is  an  essential  fact, 
so  that  successions  cannot  be  reversed  (III, 
4).  While  formal  science,  which  rests  upon 
the  principle  of  identity,  can  move  forward 
or  backward  in  its  trains  of  thought,  the 
time-relation,  that  is,  the  direction  of  time, 
has  a  different  importance  for  real  science, 
which  on  this  account  possesses  an  historical 
character.  In  it  the  concept  of  'event' 
is  a  type-phenomenon.  But  in  the  con- 
cept of  evolution  the  idea  is  involved  that 
something  not  only  happens,  but  also  that, 
through  the  series  of  events,  results  are 
reached  which  bear  a  certain  wholeness  of 
character,  because  a  multiplicity  of  ele- 
ments have  been  so  united  that,  in  spite  of 
their  differences,  they  operate  jointly  and 
with  a  certain  fmahty  upon  their  environ- 


The  Problem  of  Being  147 

ment.  Above  all  others,  Herbert  Spencer 
has  copiously  illustrated  and  analyzed  the 
idea  of  evolution,  and  has  maintained  that 
its  essential  earmark  is  the  union  of  differ- 
entiation v^ith  integration.  With  this  con- 
ception as  a  measuring  rod,  we  determine 
which  —  from  a  purely  theoretical  point  of 
view  —  are  to  be  called  '  lower '  and  which 
'higher'  states  or  forms  in  a  changing 
series. 

In  spite  of  its  connection  with  the  concept 
of  causality,  the  notion  of  evolution  is  an 
independent  concept,  underivable  from  the 
general  causal  concept,  although  it  presup- 
poses the  latter.  The  doctrine  of  causahty 
would  be  valid  even  if  there  only  took  place 
a  rhythmical  fluctuation  without  the  pro- 
gressive formation  of  new  totalities.  Evo- 
lution stands  as  an  empirical  fact  that  throws 
light  over  the  nature  of  being.  Abstractly 
considered,  it  would  be  quite  possible  that 
the  different  causal  series  of  beings  should 
cither  not  unite  with  one  another  at  all,  or 
should  only  coincide  so  as  to  bring  about 


148  Philosophical  Problems 

discordant  collisions.  But  experience  shows 
how  they  can,  under  certain  conditions,  so 
come  together  that  they  unite  in  more  com- 
posite processes  and  beget  pecuhar  totahties. 
The  formation  of  star-systems;  the  origin, 
organization,  and  unfolding  of  life,  the  exist- 
ence of  the  spiritual  life,  and  of  the  social 
and  historical  life  of  man ;  all  bear  witness  to 
an  individualizing  and  totahzing  tendency 
in  Being.  These  phenomena  set  before 
research  the  greatest  of  problems;  if  we 
point  to  them  as  type-phenomena,  we  decide 
nothing  whatever  as  to  whether  the  prob- 
lems are  soluble  or  not;  we  consider  them 
only  as  characteristics  of  Being,  given  once 
for  all.  It  is  to  be  added  here,  that  it  is 
surely  a  grave  misunderstanding  to  think, 
as  not  a  few  do  think,  that  these  phenomena 
would  be  more  worthy  of  note,  if  they  were 
not  explicable  by  laws  discoverable  by  sci- 
ence. On  the  contrary,  if  a  'natural'  ex- 
planation could  be  found,  we  could  then 
with  greater  assurance  than  before  draw 
the  inference  that  the  individuahzing  and 


The  Problem  of  Being  149 

totalizing  tendency  is  grounded  deep  in 
the  bedrock  of  being. 

But  how  deep?  Experience  often  shows 
us  not  only  a  purely  external  and  indiffer- 
ent relation  between  different  causal  series, 
but  often  collisions  or,  at  least,  inharmoni- 
ous conditions  between  such  series,  which 
hinder  the  origin  or  upbuilding  of  individu- 
ahties  and  totahties.  On  evolution  follows 
dissolution ;  and  the  question  arises,  whether 
the  rhythmic  change  of  these  processes  leaves 
traces  of  any  general  progressive  course  of 
development,  or  whether  we  must  hold  by 
the  ancient  idea  of  a  recurrent  rhythm  as 
the  last  word  on  the  problem. 

Here,  once  more,  the  irrational  crops 
out;  but  in  more  acute  form  than  at  the 
earlier  points  where  we  met  with  it.  Here 
it  indicates  arrest  and  dissolution,  the  ten- 
dency to  remain  at  the  most  elementary 
forms  of  Being,  or  to  go  back  to  them. 
Being  has  here,  the  deeper  our  investigations 
penetrate  into  it,  the  form  of  a  conflict,  of 
a  great   battle,  which  all  forms   that   bear 


150  Philosophical  Problems 

the  impress  of  individuality  or  totality 
must  fight  for  their  very  existence.  The 
battle  itself  is  two-sided:  it  may  be  a 
means  of  development,  but  it  may  also  lead 
to  death.  Which  of  the  two  possibilities  is 
predominant  ? 

With  this  we  see  more  clearly  than  at  the 
earlier  points  the  impossibility  of  forming 
an  absolutely  final  concept  of  Being  as  a 
whole.  If  conflicts  between  elements  and 
between  finite  wholes  be  an  essential  char- 
acteristic of  Being,  then  it  must  be  a  trait 
which  is  to  be  found  only  in  limited  sections 
of  Being,  but  not  in  Being  considered  as  a 
totality;  because  an  absolute  totahty  can 
encounter  no  external  opposition,  and  can 
wage  no  battle  for  existence.  So  we  must 
content  ourselves  with  saying  that  wherever 
we  find  Being,  we  also  find  within  it  such 
a  strife  going  on  between  elements  and 
totalities.  The  great  question  is  whether 
out  of  this  strife  the  elements  or  the  totalities 
(the  solar  systems,  organisms,  souls,  human 
societies)    will    come    off    victorious.     Em- 


The  Problem  of  Being  151 

pirically,  we  stand  in  the  midst  of  the  vast 
world-process  and  can  go  no  farther  than  to 
assert  that  we  apply  no  purely  subjective 
standard  when  we  designate  one  form  of 
Being  as  higher  or  lower  than  another, 
because  evolution,  which  involves  this  dis- 
tinction, is  a  phenomenon  characteristic  of 
all  the  Being  known  to  us,  —  is,  in  short, 
a  type-phenomenon. 

This  result,  with  which  we  are  now  about 
to  leave  the  problem  of  Being,  enables  us 
to  pass  naturally  to  the  last  of  our  problems, 
the  problem  of  ideal  goods. 

If  Being  were  finished,  harmoniously  and 
unchangeably.  Ethics  would  be  impossible. 
All  Ethics  demands  that  there  be  effort. 
But  there  would  be  no  room  for  effort,  if 
everything  were  in  eternal  and  actual  com- 
pleteness. The  necessity  devolving  upon  all 
individuahties  and  totahties  to  fight  for  their 
existence,  the  fact  that  there  are  always  dis- 
cords to  overcome,  discordant  tendencies  to 
unite,  —  it  is  precisely  that  that  makes  Ethics 
possible.     In   other  words,   Ethics   investi- 


152  Philosophical  Problems 

gates  the  principles  of  an  extension  of  the 
individualizing  and  totalizing  tendency  of 
Being,  of  which  experience  gives  evidence. 
Ethics  rests  upon  a  self-contradiction,  unless 
the  course  of  the  world  is,  or  "may  be,  par- 
tially conditioned  by  human  will,  just  as 
it  is,  or  may  be,  partially  conditioned  by 
human  thought  (p.  137).  So  Ethics  takes 
up  the  problem  of  continuity  where  the  first 
three  problems  laid  it  down. 

The  religious  problem  is  even  more  closely 
connected  with  the  foregoing  considerations, 
because,  as  I  shall  try  to  point  out,  it  is 
concerned  with  the  continuance  of  values 
during  the  struggles  for  existence  that  Being 
seems  to  involve. 


CHAPTER   IV 
THE   PROBLEM   OF  VALUES 

^HE  treatment  of  the  problem  of 
the  Good  as  a  special  problem 
presupposes  a  separation  be- 
tween understanding  and  evalu- 
ation, which  has  not  always  been  recog- 
nized, and  has  not  yet  been  fought  to  a 
finish.  Philosophy  has  been  inchned  to 
permit  their  intermingling.  So  Plato's 
'Ideas'  and  Spinoza's  'Substance'  express 
by  the  same  term  how  those  two  thinkers 
understood  Being  and  how  they  estimated  its 
worth.  At  least  there  has  been  a  tendency 
to  make  appreciation  only  a  consequence 
of  understanding,  while,  conversely,  mys- 
tical and  theological  schools  have  been  in- 
chned to  treat  understanding  as  dependent 
on  appreciation.  In  any  event,  they  are 
by  no  means  entirely  independent  of  one 

153 


154  Philosophical  Problems 

another.  The  understanding  has  its  value, 
and  without  value  it  would  be  non-extant, 
since  men  would  then  cease  to  strive  after 
it.  To  some  the  joy  of  knowledge  is 
indeed  the  very  highest ;  and  the  principles 
of  our  evaluation  of  goods  can  become 
an  object  for  psychological  and  historical 
understanding  because  all  worth  rests  on 
the  relation  of  events  and  of  conditions  to 
hfe  at  its  different  stages,  to  the  existence 
and  evolution  of  Hfe.  It  is  now  evident 
that  the  problem  of  values  exhibits  an 
analogy  with  the  three  earHer  theoretical 
problems.  In  the  sphere  of  value,  just 
as  in  that  of  personality,  of  knowledge,  and 
of  Being,  it  is  the  principle  of  continuity 
that  leads  to  the  momentous  problems. 

Whatever  conduces  to  satisfaction  or 
suppHes  a  need  has  worth,  or  is  a  good. 
Sometimes  it  is  through  the  arising  of  a  sat- 
isfaction that  we  first  notice  that  there  has 
been  a  lack  in  our  existence.  Sometimes 
we  notice  this  lack  in  advance,  and  it  gives 
rise  to  want,  or  breeds  impulse  and  desire. 


The  Problem  of  y alius  155 

If  the  worth-possessing  thing  cannot  be 
immediately  grasped,  we  erect  it  into  a 
purpose  and  seek  means  whereby  to  attain 
it.  Whatever  appears  to  us  as  a  means 
of  winning  a  thing  of  immediate  worth, 
possesses  mediate  worth  for  us.  In  our 
estimation  of  worth  and  our  purposes, 
the  inner  nature  of  our  feehng  and  will 
is  revealed.  As  the  concept  of  purpose  de- 
pends on  the  concept  of  worth,  so  also 
the  concept  of  the  norm  depends  on  the 
concept  of  purpose.  The  norm  is  the  rule 
for  the  activity  which  is  necessary  to  attain 
the  purpose."  It  was  a  fatal  thing  for 
the  treatment  of  the  problem  of  worth 
when  Immanuel  Kant  reversed  the  relation 
and  tried  to  derive  the  concepts  of  purpose 
and  of  worth  from  the  concept  of  the  norm 
(of  law).  This  is  a  psychological  im- 
possibiHty. 

Experience  shows  that  different  stand- 
ards of  worth  have  vaHdity  for  different 
individuals  and  for  the  same  individual 
at   different   times.     I   have   already   men- 


156  Philosophical  Problems 

tioned  the  worth  of  knowledge;  besides 
this,  we  must  especially  mention  the  worths 
which  are  bound  up  with  the  demand  for 
self-preservation  and  with  the  organiza- 
tion and  development  of  life  in  greater  or 
smaller  ways, — with  movement  and  activity, 
with  imagination  (whether  fanciful  or  of 
reality),  etc.  If  dififerent  standards  of  value 
are  to  be  compared  with  one  another,  — 
and  every  known  standard  of  value  is 
subject  to  such  a  comparison,  —  then  a 
primordial  value  must  be  presupposed,  by 
which  the  rank  of  other  values  can  be  fixed. 
A  definite  standard  must  be  laid  down  as 
an  ideal  measure  for  all  other  values,  if 
consistent  thought  and  study  in  the  realm 
of  value  are  to  be  possible.  Then,  with 
a  given  fundamental  standard  —  supposing 
we  have  sufficient  experience  —  we  can  con- 
struct a  system  for  estimating  values,  in 
which  every  particular  good  will  hold  its 
place  according  to  its  relation  to  this  funda- 
mental standard.  But  thought,  'practical 
reason,'   is   needed   in   order  to   determine 


The  Problem  of  lvalues  157 

this  relation;  and  in  order,  at  the  same 
time,  to  find  ways  and  means  of  producing 
or  discovering  particular  values  under  par- 
ticular conditions.  In  a  vacuum  no  esti- 
mation of  worth  (or  unworth)  is  possible. 
The  concept  of  the  primordial  or  ideal 
standard-good  is  in  the  problem  of  values 
(in  Ethics,  therefore,  and  in  the  philosophy 
of  rehgion)  what  the  concept  of  the  type- 
phenomenon  is  in  the  problem  of  Being 
(in  metaphysics  therefore). 

The  problem  of  estimating  values  divides 
itself  into  two  problems,  the  ethical  and  the 
rehgious.  Ethical  worth  is  concerned  with 
human  afi"airs,  property,  and  institutions; 
religious  worth  reaches  farther  and  ap- 
praises Being  according  to  the  fate  of 
values  in  the  world  of  reality.  It  will  be- 
come evident  that  in  both  problems  —  as 
in  our  earlier  problems  —  the  relation  be- 
tween continuity  and  discontinuity  is  of 
decisive  importance. 


158  Philosophical  Problems 

2 

A.    The  Ethical  Problem 
{a)  Ethical   Work 

As  the  discussion  of  the  problem  of  Being 
showed,  there  is  room  for  work  being  done 
by  means  of  which  Being  develops  itself. 
Such  work  is  done  in  all  human  culture, 
but  especially  in  ethical  endeavor.  This 
latter  may  be  designated  as  an  effort  to  pro- 
duce greater  continuity,  partly  in  the  single 
personality,  partly  among  different  per- 
sonalities. We  shall  find  that  the  measur- 
ing rod  of  ethical  endeavor,  and  the 
principle  of  ethical  good,  are  determined 
by  the  principle  of  continuity. 

Personality  presupposes  coherence,  or 
continuity;  and  this,  again,  demands  as  a 
condition  that  there  should  be  a  single  pri- 
mordial value  that  determines  the  value  of 
single  instants,  periods  of  life,  abilities,  and 
impulses.  The  development  of  true  per- 
sonality    presupposes     a     striving     to    get 


The  Problem  of  Values  159 

away  from  the  momentary  and  the  spo- 
radic, —  an  overcoming  of  the  tendency 
to  isolation  and  tyranny  on  the  part  of 
single  moments  or  demands.  It  is  a  process 
of  harmoniously  incorporating  the  single 
moments  and  elements  with  the  personal 
life  as  a  whole.  Here  is  a  task  to  per- 
form, a  battle  to  be  waged,  that  demands 
different  degrees  of  energy  in  different 
individuals. 

There  are,  it  is  true,  moral  attitudes 
which,  in  opposition  to  the  whole  of  life, 
contend  for  the  rights  of  the  single  instants 
and  impulses,  of  the  successive  and  simul- 
taneous differences.  But  that  is  not  incon- 
sistent with  the  fact  that  the  principle  of 
continuity  is  the  standard  of  measurement. 
Such  attitudes  may  be  justified  so  far  as 
they  insist  that  the  subordination  of  mo- 
ments and  particular  impulses  shall  be 
grounded.  Continuity  signifies,  not  absence 
of  distinction,  but  the  ordering  of  differ- 
ences in  a  graded  series.  Life  as  a  whole 
can  always  be  called  to  account  by  single 


160  Philosophical  Problems 

elements  in  it.  It  will  always  seem  an 
imperfection,  when  an  instant,  a  period,  a 
capacity,  or  an  impulse  is  treated  as  a  hare 
means  to  something  other,  without  inde- 
pendent value  of  its  own.  The  art  of  life 
consists  in  conferring  immediate  and  medi- 
ate worth  upon  things  at  the  same  time. 
When  the  Ethic  of  the  instant  and  the  particu- 
lar steps  out  in  absolute  form  and  proclaims 
the  sovereignty  of  the  single  moment  or 
element,  one  often  finds  at  bottom  a  pre- 
supposition that  all  life  is  represented  by 
the  single  instant  or  demand,  or  is  concen- 
trated in  it,  so  that  all  other  considera- 
tions fade  away.  This  happens  in  great 
moments  of  self-sacrifice,  when  a  man, 
as  Aristotle  says,  would  rather  perform 
a  single  great  and  noble  deed  than  many 
small  ones;  and  it  also  happens  when  a 
man  hears  the  summons  of  his  whole  hfe 
in  the  special  development  of  a  single  talent. 
Or  one  may  believe  in  such  a  harmony 
among  all  the  different  moments  of  life 
that  complete  absorption  into  one  of  them 


The  Problem  of  lvalues  161 

is  possible  without  the  satisfaction  of  that 
moment  robbing  the  other  moments  at  all. 
This  appears  to  have  been  Aristippus's  view. 
Or  the  highest  state  may  be  that  of  floating 
above  single  moments  and  employments, 
with  the  power  to  let  one's  self  down 
at  will  and  without  being  bound  for  any 
length  of  time  to  a  single  point,  as  in  the 
'aesthetic'  view  of  life  depicted  by  S.  Kier- 
kegaard in  the  first  volume  of  his  '  Either  — 
Or'  (Entweder-Oder).  All  these  views  evi- 
dently are  not  without  regard  to  the  whole 
of  life  as  their  background. 

When  an  opposition  of  the  momentary  or 
the  sporadic  to  the  demands  of  the  whole 
occurs,  there  arises  a  more  or  less  conscious 
and  energetic  striving  to  develop  the  per- 
sonality into  a  work  of  art,  such  that  every 
single  moment  and  every  power  shall  have 
its  appointed  place  and  its  due  right.  In 
such  a  personality,  no  element  is  considered 
purely  and  simply  as  a  means;  it  is  also 
at  the  same  time  an  end.  That  which 
acts  as  a  means  or  transitional  factor  in  the 


162  Philosophical  Problems 

development  of  the  personality,  must  also 
as  far  as  possible  possess  worth  in  itself. 
This  is  the  ever  memorable  basic  idea  0} 
the  Greek  (Platonic- Aristotelian)  Ethics  of 
the  harmonious  unfolding  of  the  soul  as 
the  supreme  end,  a  basic  idea  which  has 
peculiar  importance  in  view  of  the  tendency 
of  modern  culture  to  isolate  or  to  mechanize 
the  single  elements  of  hfe.  Rousseau  and 
Schiller  revived  this  ancient  doctrine  in 
opposition  to  the  modern  slavery  to  work, 
no  less  than  to  sentimentalism  and  deca- 
dence. 

But  the  problem  of  continuity  crops 
out  again,  and  in  a  very  acute  form,  in 
the  question  as  to  whether  a  single  person 
can  create  for  himself  a  rounded  and  com- 
pleted world,  and  whether,  if  so,  it  would 
be  valuable.  Not  only  must  the  individual 
always  stand  in  reciprocal  relations  with 
other  personalities  in  order  to  have  means 
for  his  own  development,  but  there  is  also  a 
need  of  devoting  oneself  that  may  appear 
under   various   forms,   and   that   may   lead 


The  Problem  of  Values  163 

one  to  attribute  immediate  worth  to  other 
personahties.  Hereby  the  individual  is 
drawn  into  the  great  kingdom  of  person- 
alities, and  as,  previously,  the  question 
was  whether  the  individual  elements  can 
coordinate  themselves  harmoniously  within 
a  single  personality,  so  now  the  wider  ques- 
tion is,  how  far  individual  personalities 
can  develop  themselves  independently  and 
yet  in  reciprocal  harmony,  so  that  there 
may  be  a  social  organism  (soziale  Lebens- 
totalitat)  analogous  to  the  individual  or- 
ganism. A  continuity  of  continuity  is  thus 
striven  after.  The  test  of  the  perfection  of 
a  human  society — by  virtue  of  the  prin- 
ciple of  continuity  which  here  clearly  shows 
its  connection  with  the  principle  of  welfare 
— is:  to  what  degree  is  every  person  so 
placed  and  treated  that  he  is  not  only  a 
mere  means,  but  also  always  at  the  same 
time  an  end?  This  is  Kant's  famous  dic- 
tum, with  another  motive  than  that  given  to 
it  by  him.^*  Stoic  and  Christian  ethics  and 
modern  social  and  political  evolution  bear  in 


164  Philosophical  Problems 

the  same  direction.  The  proclamation  of 
the  'rights  of  man'  (whether  we  consider 
them  as  a  symptom  or  as  a  programme) 
issues  from  this  assumption;  and  the  sting 
of  the  social  question  arises  from  the  fact 
that  the  assumption  has  not  been  ful- 
filled. This  principle  also  furnishes  the 
standard  for  the  discussion  of  special 
ethical  and  jurisprudential  questions.  For 
example,  this  principle  can  be  laid  at  the 
base  of  monogamy,  and  oi  the  evolution 
of  punishment. 

Ethical  work  thus  shows  itself  to  be  a 
pecuHar  continuation  of  the  great  process 
of  Being.  The  whole  course  of  thought 
by  which  I  have  sought  to  establish  this 
point  of  view  meets,  however,  unexpected 
difficulties  which  intensify  the  ethical  prob- 
lem. So  here  again  we  run  up  against  the 
irrational. 


The  Problem  of  Values  165 

3 

{h)    The  Rationality  0}  our  Ethical 
Evaluations 

Ethics  would  be  a  more  complete  science 
than  it  is  if  the  carrying  out  of  the  principle 
of  continuity  did  not  encounter  so  many 
diflficulties  as  it  does. 

Every  ethical  reasoning  has  validity  only 
so  far  as  the  disputants  recognize  a  definite 
primordial  value  which  determines  all  more 
special  goods.  One  may  take  the  stand- 
point of  the  single  instant,  or  of  the  single 
impulse,  or  the  standpoint  of  the  isolated 
personality,  or  that  of  the  family,  the  class, 
the  state,  or  of  mankind.  The  question 
is,  whether  all  such  standpoints  can  be 
brought  into  real  harmony  with  one  an- 
other, as  we  have  above  assumed;  and, 
especially  the  question  arises,  whether  it  is 
possible  by  means  of  argument  to  convert 
to  one  of  the  other  standpoints  those  who 
consistently  and  imperiously  hold  fast  to  a 
single  one  of  them. 


166  Philosophical  Problems 

Probably  a  rational  relation  might  be  de- 
monstrated between  the  standard  of  value 
and  the  special  values,  so  that  a  person  who 
recognizes  a  certain  standard  and  is  suffi- 
ciently acquainted  with  the  actual  conditions 
under  which  it  holds  good,  could  also  be  logi- 
cally compelled  to  grant  whatever  conclu- 
sions might  be  deduced  from  that  standard. 
Thus  self-assertion  and  abnegation  have 
each  its  logic,  as  well  as  family-feeling  and 
national  feeling.  But  how  about  the  transi- 
tion from  one  standard  to  another?  Here 
inner  consistency  does  not  suffice ;  for  con- 
sistency can  only  unfold  and  bring  to 
consciousness  what,  under  given  actual  con- 
ditions, should  follow  from  the  standard. 
Socrates  became  the  founder  of  Ethics  by 
his  demand  for  self-knowledge,  which,  in 
fact,  was  only  a  demand  for  a  clear  under- 
standing of  one's  own  standard  of  good 
and  of  the  results  consistently  flowing  from 
it.  But  he  did  not  closely  examine  how 
the  standard  is  obtained,  or  whether 
there    are    not     really    several     standards 


The  Problem  of  lvalues  167 

which    might    each    lay    claim    to    be    the 
fundamental  one. 

A  standard  of  value  grows  up  by  means 
of  psychological  and  historical  processes  that 
involve  other  factors  than  logical  consistency 
and  knowledge  of  facts.  Through  experi- 
ence and  association,  motives  and  values 
get  supplanted  and  displaced,  so  that  one 
standard  may  pass  over  into  another;  but 
while  the  change  in  the  feelings  and  will 
is  going  on,  it  will  be  useless  to  argue  from 
principles  which  will  appear  to  be  such  only 
at  the  end  of  the  process.  In  education, 
one  cannot  argue  with  a  child  on  the  pre- 
suppositions of  an  adult ;  the  child  must  first 
have  worked  out  those  presuppositions.  And 
so  it  is  in  the  great  educational  process  tak- 
ing place  in  history.  During  education  and 
evolution,  there  are  naturally  other  vital 
motives  at  work  than  those  which  come 
out  as  the  result  of  the  whole  process.  The 
pupil  will  therefore  never  rationally  under- 
stand the  system  according  to  which  he  is 
being  educated.     "Who   can    speak   of    its 


168  Philosophical  Problems 

future  food  to  the  caterpillar  crawling   in 
the  dust?" 

In  history  there  is  no  gently  advancing 
education  from  primitive  to  higher  stand- 
ards of  worth,  i.e.  to  standards  which  will 
he  called  higher  by  those  who  shall  have 
attained  to  them.  History  is  the  great 
voting  place  for  standards  of  value.  In 
it,  individual  stands  against  individual,  the 
individual  against  society,  and  one  society 
against  another;  and  a  new  standard  often 
establishes  itself  in  the  hearts  of  men  only 
after  fierce  struggles.  A  pertinent  example 
is  afforded  by  the  way  in  which  the  conquests 
of  Alexander  the  Great  and  of  the  Romans 
paved  the  way  for  the  advance  of  a  more  uni- 
versal humane  feeling.  During  great  con- 
flicts, ethical  reflection  can  only  indirectly 
take  a  hand,  by  drawing  the  distinctive  con- 
sequences of  each  point  of  view,  and  illustrat- 
ing their  meaning  by  as  many  experiences 
as  possible,  —  in  a  word,  by  furthering  self- 
knowledge  in  the  Socratic  sense.  In  war 
or  in  education,  we  have  to  do  with  art; 


The  Problem  of  lvalues  169 

science  is  not  enough,  however  important 
its  contributions  may  often  prove  to  be. 

Because  we  reach  the  boundary  where 
scientific  ethics  stop,  still  we  by  no  means 
on  that  account  abandon  the  principle  of 
continuity.  Where  it  is  not  possible  to 
follow  continuity  farther  in  its  purely 
ethical  form,  we  attempt  to  track  it  down 
in  its  psychological  and  historical  form. 
Ethics  at  this  point  passes  over  into  psy- 
chology and  sociology. 

In  my  own  *  Ethics '  I  have  sought  to 
show  that  justice,  conceived  as  an  inward 
harmonious  relation  between  self-assertion 
and  self-surrender,  and  also  between  feeling 
and  thought,  is  the  highest  trait  of  character. 
But  this  has  been  contested  by  philosophical 
thinkers  on  the  ground  that  self-assertion 
and  self-surrender  are  such  opposite  tenden- 
cies (or,  as  I  should  say,  primordial  values), 
that  it  is  impossible  to  combine  them  in  any 
one  unifying  conception.^"  And  in  popular 
literature  self-surrender  (altruism)  has  been 
as  uncompromisingly  proclaimed  by  Tolstoy 


170  Philosophical  Problems 

as  self-assertion  has  been  by  Friedrich 
Nietzsche.  This  is  an  example  of  a  con- 
flict between  standards  of  worth  which  are 
both  urged  simultaneously.  In  our  actual 
human  life,  there  is  apparently  a  con- 
stant oscillation  going  on  between  these 
two  antagonistic  poles.  In  the  species  as  a 
whole,  self-assertion  no  less  than  altruism 
has  its  function  to  perform.  The  worth 
of  the  single  oscillation  toward  the  one 
direction  or  the  other  will  always  depend 
upon  whether  it  conduces  to  an  order  of 
life  in  which  every  personality  can  develop 
as  characteristically  and  independently  as 
possible,  so  as  to  thereby  render  the  most 
aid  in  the  similar  evolution  of  other  men. 
In  single  individuals,  self-assertion  and 
altruism  stand  in  the  most  various  relations 
to  each  other,  and  their  harmonization  — 
in  which,  in  my  opinion.  Justice  consists  — 
will  therefore  present  the  most  divergent 
shades  and  tones  in  different  men  and  at 
different  times.  But  this  variety  also  belongs 
to  the  richness  of  life  —  and   to   its   con- 


The  Problem  of  Values  171 

tinuity.  The  multiplicity  of  shades  of  dif- 
ference is  a  condition  of  relation  and  connect- 
edness, and  distinguishes  the  system  in  which 
these  prevail  from  that  dead  uniformity 
which  neither  from  an  ethical  nor  from  any 
other  standpoint  possesses  any  worth  what- 
ever. 

4 
Another  difficulty  bound  up  with  dis- 
continuity springs  out  of  the  fact  that  the 
conclusions,  which  under  certain  conditions 
are  deduced  from  a  standard  of  worth, 
must  be  applied  to  individuals  who  present 
the  most  diverse  inner  and  outer  facilities 
for  the  fulfilment  of  demands  based  upon 
such  deductions.  Endowment  and  im- 
pulse are  not  the  same  in  all  individuals, 
either  in  kind  or  in  degree.  One  and  the 
same  demand  apphed  to  different  indi- 
viduals may  enjoin  upon  each  of  them  an 
entirely  different  ethical  task.  The  start- 
ing point  and  initial  velocity  are  different. 
Some  individuals  may  be  well  on  the  way 
to   the   involuntary   fulfilment   of    the   de- 


172  Philosophical  Problems 

mand,  before  they  are  even  conscious  of 
its  existence;  while  others  must  laboriously 
struggle  in  order  barely  to  start.  The 
law,  the  demand,  must  therefore  be  differ- 
entiated according  to  the  different  indi- 
viduals, if  it  is  really  to  be  identical  for  all. 
Each  one  should  be  taxed  according  to 
his  abihty.  There  must  be  a  thorough- 
going individualizing  of  the  ethical  demand, 
lest  Ethics  itself  transgress  the  dictum 
that  personality  is  always  an  end,  never  a 
mere  means.  The  ethical  demand  must 
be  no  abstract  or  external  command,  but 
should  correspond  to  the  ethical  possi- 
bilities of  the  individual  person,  and  be 
adapted  to  develop  them.  Legislation  and 
pedagogics  cannot  at  this  point  be  abso- 
lutely sundered.  But  in  individual  cases 
this  makes  ethical  decisions  difficult."*  Here 
again  the  world  —  the  world  of  personalities 
—  is  great,  and  our  mind  is  small.  Ethical 
thought  can  formulate  no  law  that  could 
be  applied  offhand  to  all  the  manifold 
emergencies  of  life.     Nevertheless,  we  must 


The  Problem  of  yalnes  173 

assume  that  in  every  individual  case  only 
a  single  decision  can  be  the  completely 
right  one.  "  Wide  is  the  world  and  narrow 
is  our  brain :  "  our  ethical  thought  courses 
along  the  narrow  path  which  leads  to  ethi- 
cal truth,  and  presses  toward  it  amid  con- 
tinual battles  with  the  irrationahty  that 
we  seek  to  outflank  and  elude  by  ever 
nearer  approaches  to  our  goal.  Here,  as  in 
the  problem  of  knowledge,  we  end  with  no 
absolute  conclusion,  but  we  hear  still  an 
*  excelsior ! '  —  even  after  our  thought  has 
strained  itself  to  the  utmost. 

B.    The  Religious  Problem 

5 

The  very  fact  that  a  religious  problem 
exists  shows  the  importance  of  conti- 
nuity. For  the  fact  that  religion  has  be- 
come a  problem  is  connected  with  the 
fact  that  a  division  of  labor,  a  differentia- 
tion, has  taken  place  in  the  realm  of  the 
psychic  life.  During  its  classic  times 
religion  appears  as  the  sole,   concentrated 


174  Philosophical  Problems 

form  under  which  all  demands  of  the 
mental  life  find  satisfaction;  rehgion  as 
such  is  not  only  succor  and  consolation, 
but  also  poetry,  morals,  and  science,  or  at 
any  rate,  it  is  in  a  position  to  take  these 
interests  organically  into  itself.  Since 
these  different  interests  have  emancipated 
themselves  and  have  developed  accord- 
ing to  their  own  laws,  the  question  has 
arisen,  whether  the  mental  life  —  as  far 
as  it  has  to  do  with  values  —  has  preserved 
its  continuity  during  this  passage  from 
concentration  to  differentiation.  We  have 
no  reason  to  doubt  that  there  is  in  the 
process  a  psychological  and  historical  con- 
tinuity; but  by  the  transition  has  not 
some  value  been  lost  out  of  human  hfe? 
The  replies  to  this  question  are  extremely 
varied.  Some  are  satisfied  with  the  fact 
that  the  same  dogmas  are  taught  now  as 
in  former  times.  In  other  circles  it  is  re- 
torted that  this  dogmatic  continuity  signifies 
nothing;  the  essential  thing  is  whether  life 
is  lived  in  the  same  way,  whether  there  is 


The  Problem  of  Values  175 

an  ethical  continuity,  whether  'the  Chris- 
tianity of  the  New  Testament'  still  exists. 
Finally,  some  think  that  with  the  cultural- 
historical  division  of  labor  the  times  of  re- 
ligion have  been  left  behind,  and  that,  far 
from  indicating  a  loss  of  worth,  this  is  a  real 
gain  for  our  inner  hfe.  In  addition  to 
these  opinions,  which  again  may  take  on 
various  shadings,  there  is  a  series  of  still 
other  points  of  view. 

The  answer  to  the  question  naturally  de- 
pends on  what  we  hold  to  be  the  essential 
thing  in  religion.  Continuity  cannot  con- 
sort with  traits  that  divide  the  various  re- 
ligions and  rehgious  attitudes  from  one 
another.  One  must  search  out  the  deepest 
underlying  tendencies,  which  may  reveal 
themselves  under  extremely  different  forms, 
and  which  perhaps  are  able  to  operate  even 
after  the  cultural-historical  division  of  labor 
has  come  into  force.  This  is  the  task  of  the 
philosophy  of  religion;  and  it  seeks  to  dis- 
charge it  chiefly  in  two  ways.  First,  it 
institutes    a    comparison    between    religion 


176  Philosophical  Problems 

and  the  other  sides  of  our  mental  hfe,  in 
order  to  find  out  in  which  region  of 
life  religion  makes  its  home;  it  seeks  to 
determine  the  psychological  location  of  re- 
ligion. Secondly,  it  institutes  a  comparison 
between  the  most  important  historical  forms 
of  religion,  in  order  to  find  out  whether  the 
ascertained  psychological  definition  is  con- 
firmed by  experienced^ 

In  both  comparisons  we  shall  have  occa- 
sion to  see,  not  only  that  the  principle  of 
continuity  is  concerned  with  setting  the  reli- 
gious problem,  but  also  that  the  notion  of 
rehgion  itself  is  very  intimately  bound  up 
with  this  principle. 


Religious  feeling  can  be  brought  into  a 
simple  enough  relation  to  other  feelings,  if  one 
conceives  it  as  determined  by  the  experiences 
which  man  has  as  to  the  jate  of  values, 
of  the  various  things  that  he  regards  as  hav- 
ing worth,  in  the  world  of  reahty.  By  thus 
considering  it,  its  difference  from,   and  at 


The  Problem  of  Values  \77 

the  same  time  its  connection  with,  the  other 
feehngs  are  set  in  relief.  Every  one  of  our 
feehngs  answers  to  some  value.  Thus  the 
feeUng  of  life,  the  intellectual,  the  aesthetic, 
and  the  ethical  feelings  express  the  worth  of 
different  kinds  of  things.  The  conservation 
and  development  of  life,  truth,  beauty,  and 
goodness  are  realms  of  value  in  which  man 
can  participate  without  religious  feeling. 
But  if  it  becomes  evident  that  life,  truth, 
beauty,  and  goodness  must  fight  in  order  to 
maintain  themselves  in  the  world,  then  there 
arises  a  peculiar  feeling,  no  longer  deter- 
mined by  these  ideals  per  se,  but  by  the 
more  general  question  of  whether  these  and 
similar  ideals  are  destined  to  be  preserved 
and  cared  for,  or  are  doomed  to  decay.  The 
experiences  which  man  has  in  this  regard 
may  create  a  desire  to  believe  that  the  val- 
ues remain,  even  when  they  no  longer  dis- 
close themselves  in  the  world  visible  to  man, 
or  even  if  they  no  longer  appear  under  the 
same  forms  as  hitherto. 

Man  will  at  first  be  most  inclined  to  sup- 


178  Philosophical  Problems 

pose  that  the  enduring  thing  of  worth  is  the 
same  which  he  has  hitherto  enjoyed;  but 
in  his  evolution  he  may  come  to  the  convic- 
tion that  some  of  the  goods  of  his  experience 
must  go  under,  in  order  that  a  higher  and 
more  comprehensive  system  of  goods  may 
be  secured.  From  the  ideas  of  men  about 
a  world  of  Gods  and  about  a  future  Hfe, 
we  ascertain  which  goods  have  been  most 
valued  by  them,  and  to  what  degree  they 
have  reconciled  themselves  to  the  thought 
that  particular  values  must  undergo  a  meta- 
morphosis in  order  that  a  general  preser- 
vation of  value  itself  may  be  attained. 
Finally,  what  is  supposed  to  persist  and  be 
preserved  may  take  a  form  that  no  eye  hath 
seen  nor  ear  heard.  Religious  faith  as- 
serts a  continuity  in  the  realm  of  ideals 
that  may  go  beyond  any  and  every  possible 
experience.  The  continuity  thus  asserted 
may  be  of  diverse  content  and  compass. 
But  there  will  be  a  tendency  in  us  to  ex- 
tend its  sway  beyond  the  human  world  and 
to  treat  our  mundane  existence  as  a  nursery 


The  Problem  of  Malices  179 

for  the  evolution  and  the  conservation  of 
ideals.  This  rehgious  doctrine  of  continuity 
is  formed  analogously  to  the  intellectualist 
presupposition  of  the  rationahty  of  Being 
(Chapter  III),  and  has  similar  difficulties  to 
encounter. 

Religious  faith  will  especially  display  a 
certain  similarity  (and  a  certain  sympathy) 
with  metaphysical  ideahsm  (IV,  4).  But 
they  do  not  stand  or  fall  together.  The 
essence  of  rehgious  faith  is  not  the  intel- 
lectual satisfaction  which  it  may  bestow. 
The  ideas  by  means  of  which  rehgion  ex- 
presses itself  do  not  belong  to  its  innermost 
psychological  nature.  If  our  psychological 
definition  is  correct,  the  core  of  religion  is 
an  interest  of  feeling  and  will.  Intellectu- 
ally, we  only  ask  about  the  classification  of 
things,  their  mutual  consecutiveness  or  ration- 
ality, and  their  causal  hnkagc  (III,  i).  Faith 
is  only  an  object  of  science,  is  not  itself  science. 
It  arises  from  the  harmonious  or  inharmoni- 
ous relation  between  the  realities  which  our 
understanding  shows  us  to  be  actually  given 


180  Philosophical  Problems 

and  the  goods  which  appear  to  man  to  be 
the  highest. 

Possibly  the  distinction  which  we  are  com- 
pelled to  make  between  the  real  and  the 
good,  only  holds  from  a  human  point  of 
view.  But,  for  the  present,  we  can  take  no 
other  point  of  view. 

The  faith  in  the  conservation  of  values 
may  itself  acquire  a  value,  both  because  it 
braces  the  spirit  of  man  during  the  strug- 
gle for  life,  and  because  it  spurs  him  on  to 
find  new  goods  as  equivalents  of  vanishing 
ones.  Even  one  who  is  of  the  opinion 
that  the  times  of  religion  have  gone  by  — 
an  opinion  which  must  be  epistemologically, 
psychologically,  and  ethically  grounded,  if 
it  is  to  be  more  than  an  assertion  or  a 
wish  —  will  still  feel  the  necessity  of  find- 
ing equivalents  for  the  loss  of  behef  in  those 
goods  which  the  vanishing  of  religion  en- 
tails. In  this  sense  there  exists  a  religious 
problem  even  for  one  who  thinks  that  the 
kernel  of  religion  disappears  along  with  its 
shell.     Religion,    in   other    words,   because 


The  Problem  of  lvalues  181 

it  maintains  the  conservation  of  values,  has 
a  value  itself,  a  value  of  the  second  order. 
It  is  one  of  the  most  concentrated  forms 
of  psychic  life  which  experience  exhibits. 
Where  it  is  genuine  and  original,  it  appears 
as  the  combined  result  of  human  feeling 
and  will;  and  it  bodies  itself  forth  by 
means  of  the  most  powerful  and  exalted 
forms  of  imagination  of  which  the  mind  of 
man  disposes.  Probably  this  concentrated 
vital  process  will  always  be  reveahng  itself 
in  new  forms,  —  one  may  then  continue  to 
use  the  name  religion  for  them,  or  not,  as 
one  pleases. 

7 
A  confirmation  of  the  characteristics  of 
the  essence  of  religion,  as  depicted  above, 
is  to  be  sought  in  the  fact  that  the  differences 
of  religions  or  of  religious  points  of  view  can 
be  simply  and  readily  explained  by  those 
characteristics.  These  differences,  in  fact, 
rest  in  part  on  differences  in  the  ideal 
goods  whose  consers^ation  is  believed  in; 
in  part  on  differences  in  the  underlying  con- 


182  Philosophical  Problems 

ception  of  reality ;  and  in  part  on  differences 
of  experience  as  to  the  relation  between  the 
ideal  goods  and  reality. 

The  differences  respecting  ideal  goods 
show  themselves  in  historical  religions  in 
what  is  considered  to  be  the  task  of  the  Gods, 
—  in  what  they  are  thought  of  as  battling 
against;  or  else,  to  use  a  saying  of  Plato, 
in  that  which  makes  God  godlike.^^  This 
may  be  the  purely  physical  preservation  of 
life  along  with  its  accompanying  enjoyments 
or  it  may  be  the  Good,  the  Beautiful, 
and  the  True.  The  historian  of  religion 
holds  up  the  transition  from  natural  re- 
ligion to  ethical  religion  as  the  most 
important  step  in  the  history  of  religion. 
This  transition,  however,  rests  directly 
upon  a  transition  from  the  more  element- 
ary to  the  more  ideal  standards  of  worth, 
as  what  we  suppose  particularly  to  underlie 
our  relation  to  the  gods,  —  what  the  gods 
protect  and  what  gives  to  them  their  very 
divinity.  At  the  same  time,  the  more  ex- 
ternal relation  between  man  and  the  powers 


The  Problem  of  yalnes  183 

which,  as  he  believes,  protect  him,  gives 
way,  and  the  gods  themselves  become  im- 
mediate representatives  of  the  goods  placed 
under  their  surveillance,  —  become,  indeed, 
one  with  them.  In  the  evolution  of  reli- 
gion, there  can  be  traced  an  even  more 
intimate  connection  of  religion  with  Ethics, 
and  rehgion  consequently  tends  to  be- 
come increasingly  a  projection  of  our 
ethical  ideals. 

When  advancing  knowledge  entails  changes 
in  our  beliefs  concerning  reality,  there  must 
also  be  changes  in  the  character  of  rehgion 
no  less  marked  than  when  the  funda- 
mental standards  of  value  change.  The 
most  striking  religious  crises  proceed  from 
new  conceptions  of  reality.  Religion  has  in 
these  cases  usually  held  herself  aloof  from 
knowledge  developed  in  other  ways,  but 
has  afterward  sought  to  absorb  it  and  use 
it  for  her  own  symboHc  purposes.  Thus, 
little  by  little,  animism,  astronomy,  the 
doctrine  of  the  transmigration  of  souls,  the 
Indian  and  Greek  philosophies,  Copernican- 


184  Philosophical  Problems 

ism,  and  modern  natural  science  and  phi- 
losophy have  each  in  turn  been  seized,  now 
as  welcome  forms  of  religious  thought,  now 
as  expansive  impulses,  or,  again,  as  hostile 
tendencies. 

But  the  decisive  point  will  always  be 
the  relation  between  the  ideal  goods  and 
reality.  According  as  this  relation  is  har- 
moniously or  inharmoniously  adjusted  in 
the  experience  of  man,  religion  assumes  a 
different  character;  in  the  highest  religions 
the  discords  as  well  as  the  harmonies  of 
life  find  place;  in  these  religions,  the  reli- 
gious sentiment  attains  sublimity  and  firm- 
ness only  if  it  has  worked  up  through 
struggle  and  suffering  to  blessedness.  The 
strength  of  the  discords  accordingly  only 
measures  the  strength  of  the  triumphant 
harmony.  And  here  yet  another  considera- 
tion enters.  Religion  possesses  a  different 
character  according  as  that  which  possesses 
highest  worth  is  thought  of  as  eternal  and 
exalted  above  all  becoming  and  all  change, 
so  that  the  temporal  life  is  in  the  end  only 


The  Problem  of  Values  185 

an  illusion;  or  as  that  which  possesses  su- 
preme worth  is  itself  held  to  evolve  in  the 
course  of  ages  and  to  battle  for  its  own 
preservation  during  the  changes  which  take 
place.  On  this  distinction  rests  the  antith- 
esis between  the  Indo-Grecian  and  Perso- 
Christian  types  of  religion. 

Thus  it  appears  to  be  no  external  stand- 
ard which  we  apply  when  we  character- 
ize and  appraise  religions  according  to  the 
manner  and  the  degree  in  which  the  prin- 
ciple of  the  conservation  of  values  appears 
in  them.  Such  a  standard  naturally  emerges 
from  a  comparative  consideration  of  the 
history  of  religions  and  of  religious  points 
of  view. 

The  second  of  the  two  religious  types 
named  has  come  off  victorious  in  history. 
But  assuredly  it  has  not  yet  reached  its  defin- 
itive form.  If  it  is  to  take  on  new  forms, 
then  in  the  future,  as  in  olden  times,  we  shall 
be  indebted  to  prophetic  personalities;  only 
such  as  they  can  weave  a  new  garment  for 
Deity. 


186  Philosophical  Problems 

To  the  philosopher,  it  is  of  the  greatest 
interest  that  the  rehgious  problem,  so  long 
as  it  exists,  stands  in  such  close  connection 
with  the  demand  for  continuity,  with  the 
notion  of  time,  and  with  the  question  of 
ideal  goods.  The  affinity  and  intimate 
connection  with  each  other  of  the  great 
problems  of  the  human  soul,  practical  no 
less  than  theoretical,  stand  out  here  in 
bold  relief. 

In  all  our  problems,  we  end  —  if  we  view 
the  antithesis  in  its  acutest  form — with  an 
interminable  conflict  into  which  the  mental 
powers  of  man  must  ever  plunge  anew.  But 
while  we  cannot  solve  definitively  these  great 
problems,  still  we  can  descry  the  road  th'at 
leads  onward  and  forward,  so  that  the  rights 
of  both  our  thought  and  our  life  are  safe- 
guarded. The  insolubility  of  the  problems 
really  only  means  that,  no  matter  how  far 
we  may  penetrate  in  our  research  and 
thought,  new  horizons,  new  goals,  and  new 
tasks  always  rise  before  us. 


NOTES 

1.  Page  4.  Ch.  Renouvier,  Les  dilemmes  de  la  nteta- 
physique  pure.     Paris,  1901.     P.  202. 

2.  Page  5.  These  four  problems  include  the  triple 
division  emanating  from  the  Platonic  school  (according 
to  Sexlus  Empiricus:  Adv.  matlienuxticos,  VII,  16  by 
Xenokratos)  into  logic,  physics  {i.e.  cosmology),  and 
ethics,  with  the  addition  of  the  psychological  problem, 
which  has  in  modern  times  pressed  forward  to  an  inde- 
pendent point  of  departure. 

3.  Page  9.  Cf.,  in  addition  to  the  work  by  Renou- 
vier named  in  note  I,  Einile  Boutroux' interesting  works: 
De  la  contingence  des  lots  de  la  nature,  2d  ed.,  Paris,  1895, 
and  De  I' idee  de  loi  naturelle  dans  la  science  et  la philoso- 
phie  contemporaines.  Paris,  1895.  A  kindred  point  of 
view  is  taken  by  Rudolph  Eucken  in  Der  Kampf  um 
einen  geistigen  Lebensinhalt.     Leipzig,  1896. 

4.  Page  12.  Th.  Lipps,  Psychologie,  Wissenschaft 
und  Leben.  Munchen,  1891.  As  to  Fries  and  Beneke 
see  my  History  of  Modern  Philosophy,  II,  pp.  241,  259. 

5.  Page  16.     See  my  Psychology,  V,  A,  2. 

6.  Page  19.  Cf.  my  paper:  I. a  base psychologiqiie  des 
jugements  (^Revue  philosophique,  Oct.-Nov.,  1901),  §  8 
and  §  33. 

7.  Page  21.  For  the  point  of  view  of  modern  posi- 
tivism regarding  (his  problem  in  contrast  to  the  point  of 
view  taken  by  Comte  and  Stuart  Mill,  interest  attaches 

187 


188  Notes 

to  Roberto   Ardigo's  essay:    Z'    unita   della   coscienza. 
Padova,  1898. 

8.  Page  22.     Cf.  my  Psychology,  I,  8  d. 

9.  Page  23.  Munsterberg,  Psychology  and  Life. 
Boston,  1899.  Munsterberg  adheres  to  the  view  made 
current  by  Windelband  and  Rickert,  according  to  which 
there  is  a  chasm  between  natural  sciences  (in  which 
psychology  is  ranked)  and  the  cultural  sciences.  On 
this  view  see  the  excellent  remarks  by  Wundt,  Introduc- 
tion to  Philosophy,  Leipzig,  1901,  pp.  65-74,  and  by  Guido 
Villa,  Psychology  and  History  {^The  Monist,  Jan.,  1902). 

10.  Page  24.  Munsterberg,  I.e.  p.  282 :  "  If  we  force 
the  system  of  science  upon  the  real  life,  claiming  that 
our  life  is  really  a  psychophysical  phenomenon,  we  are 
under  the  illusion  of  psychologism.  If,  on  the  other 
hand,  we  force  the  views  of  the  real  life,  the  personal 
categories,  upon  the  scientific  psychophysical  phenomena, 
we  are  under  the  illusion  of  mysticism.  The  results  on 
both  are  the  same.  We  lose  the  truth  of  life  and  the 
truth  of  science." 

11.  Page  27.  Descartes  {Synopsis  meditationuni) 
teaches  that  all  substances  are  unchangeable  ;  only  body 
taken  in  general  is  substantial,  not,  e.g.  the  human 
body.  Every  soul,  on  the  contrary,  is  pure  substance, 
does  not  change,  however  much  its  single  accidents 
(thoughts,  feelings,  and  will-manifestations)  may  change. 
In  his  work  Cogitata  metaphysica  (II,  c.  Ii)  Spinoza 
says  (from  the  Cartesian  point  of  view,  which  he  essen- 
tially adopts  in  this  work)  :  Si  ad  totam  Naturam 
materiae  attendamus,  illi  nihil  novi  accedit  ;  at  respectu 
rerum  particularium  aliquo  modo  potest  dici,  illi  aliquid 
novi  accedere.  Quod  an  etiam  locum  habet  in  rebus 
spiritualibus,  non  videtur :  nam  ilia  \^sc.  spiritualia]  ab 
invicem  ita  dependere  non  apparet   [souls  are  not   so 


Notes  189 

dependent  on  one  another  as  bodies].     Later,  Spinoza 
reached  another  conception. 

12.  Page  27.  Availing  himself  of  an  exposition  of 
the  'active  reason'  of  Aristotle,  Averroes  taught  (see 
on  this  point  Renan's  Averroes  et  PAverrotstne.  Paris, 
1852),  that  while  the  individual  souls  arise  and  pass 
away,  the  intellectus  universalis  remains,  the  world- 
thought,  which  operates  in  the  thought  of  single  souls. 
In  the  middle  ages  this  doctrine  was  revived,  among 
others,  by  Siger  von  Brabant  in  his  Quaesiiones  de  ani»ia 
intellectiva,  recently  edited  by  Mandonnet.  (Mandon- 
net :  Siger  de  Brabant  et  P Averroisme  latin  au  ij'  siecle. 
Fribourg,  1899.)  The  whole  doctrine  of  the  conserva- 
tion of  mind  goes  back  to  Neoplatonism  (see  Plotinus, 
Ennead,  V,  9,  6).  On  Spinoza's  doctrine  of  the  infinite 
intellect  and  the  idea  of  God,  see  History  of  Modern 
Philosophy,  I,  p.  312  ff. ;   on  Hegel,  ibid.  II,  p.  174. 

13.  Page  29.  Maxwell,  Scientific  Papers,  Cam- 
bridge, 1890.  Vol.  II,  p.  759.  A  little  above  the  ex- 
tract cited.  Maxwell  remarks  that,  while  men  to-day  have 
generally  given  up  the  idea  that  the  soul  can  be  located 
anatomically  somewhere  in  the  brain,  the  idea  has  held 
sway  longer,  that  if  we  could  follow  back  the  material 
processes  far  enough,  we  could  arrive  at  a  material  process 
which  was  worked  by  the  soul.  Against  this  possibility 
the  citation  is  directed.  Cf.  Spinoza,  Ethics,  III,  2,  Schol. 
—  Maxwell's  conception  of  the  law  of  inertia  in  his  Mat- 
ter and  Motion,  §  41,  leads  to  a  similar  result  as  his  con- 
ception of  the  law  of  energy.    Cf.  my  Psychology,  II,  8. 

14.  Page  30.  Carl  Lange,  Nydelsernes  Fysiologi. 
Kjcibenhavn,  1899.     P.  45. 

15.  Page  32.  Miinsterberg,  Psychology  and  Life, 
p.  127:  "  Mental  facts,  as  they  are  not  quantitative,  can- 
not enter  into  any  causal  equation." 


190  Notes 

1 6.  Page  34.  Flechsig,  Gehirn  und  Seele^.  Leip- 
zig, 1896.     P.  24  f. 

17.  Page  35.  Cf.  the  criticism  of  the  theory  of 
Flechsig  by  O.  Vogt,  Flechsigs  Associatiotizentrenlehre, 
ihre  Anh'dnger  und  Gegner,  Zeitschrift fur  Hypnotismus, 
V,  6  ;  and  Alb.  Adamkiewicz,  Die  Grosshirnsrinde  ah 
Organ  der  Seek.     Wiesbaden,  1902.     P.  75  f. 

18.  Page  37.  Miinsterberg,  Psychology  and  Life, 
p.  162:  "The  reality  of  the  will  and  feeling  and  judg- 
ment do  not  belong  to  the  describable  world."  —  P.  208 : 
"The  subjective  attitude  is  never  object;  it  is  never 
perceived." 

19.  Page  42.     History  of  Modern  Philosophy,  I,  p. 

356  ff. 

20.  Page  44.     Cf.  my  Psychology,  V,  B.  6. 

21.  Page  51.  See  the  interesting  discussion  of  Le 
parallelisme  psychophysique  et  la  Metaphysique  positive, 
in  the  Bulletin  de  la  societe  fran?aise  de  Philosophic, 
Juin,  1901.  Bergson  remarked  during  this  discussion 
and  elsewhere  (p.  51)  :  "  Etant  donne  un  etat  pyscholo- 
gique,  la  partie  jouable  de  cet  etat,  celle  qui  se  traduirait 
par  une  attitude  du  corps  ou  par  des  actions  du  corps, 
est  representee  dans  le  cerveau :  le  reste  en  est  indepen- 
dant  et  n'a  pas  d'equivalent  cerebral.  De  sorte  qu'a  un 
meme  etat  cerebral  donne  peuvent  correspondre  bien  des 
etats  psychologiques  differents,  mais  non  pas  des  etats 
quelconques.  Ce  sont  des  etats  psychologiques  qui  ont 
tons  en  commun  le  meme  schema  moteur." 

22.  Page  54.  I  have  introduced  an  example  of  this 
in  my  Psychology,  3d  German  edition,  p.  80,  note. 

23.  Page  55.  Cf.  ra^  Psychology,  VII,  6,4. —  Uber 
Wiederkennen  (  Vierteljahrsschr.  fiir  wissenschaftl,  Phi- 
tosophie,  XIV,  pp.  293-316).  —  Soren  Kierkegaard  som 
Filosof  pp.  74-81.  —  Ebbinghaus,  GrundzUge  der  Psy- 


Notes  191 

chologie,  I,  p.  168  (cf.  also  his  article  in  the  Zeitschrift 
fur  Psychologic,  XI,  p.  201),  and  Ehrenfels,  Werttheorie, 
I,  pp.  245-249,  argue  from  the  imperceptibility  of  the 
will,  that  the  will  is  no  particular  psychical  element. 
Cf.  my  criticism  of  the  last  work,  in  the  Gottinger  gel. 
Anzeigen,  1900,  p.  742  f. 

24.  Page  57.  See  fuller  treatment  of  this  point  in 
my  Psychology,  II;  IV,  7  ^ ;  V,  B,  5  ;   VII,  A,  i ;   B,  4-5. 

25.  Page  59.  Ostwald  attempts  in  his  Naturphilo- 
Sophie  (Leipzig,  1902)  to  show  that  the  concept  of  energy 
is  the  fundamental  concept  of  natural  science,  and  since 
manifestations  of  consciousness  are  also  (after  Kant)  to 
be  conceived  as  activities,  energy  also  becomes  the  fun- 
damental psychological  concept.  On  the  relation  of  the 
two  kinds  of  energy  to  one  another  he  does  not  express 
himself  clearly.  In  one  place  the  processes  of  conscious- 
ness themselves  are  called  'energetic'  (p,  394),  at  an- 
other he  says  that  consciousness  is  conditioned  by  the 
energy  of  the  nervous  system  (p.  396),  and  again  men- 
tal energy  is  defined  as  '  conscious  or  unconscious  nerve 
energy'  (p.  398). 

26.  Page  61.  On  the  different  kinds  of  recognition 
see  my  paper  Uber  Wiederkemien  (  Vierteljahrsschr.  /. 
wiss.  Phil.  XIV,  p.  38  f.), 

27.  Page  62.  See  La  base  psychologiqiie  du  jugement 
{Revue philos,,  Oct.-Nov.,  1901),  §  20. 

28.  Page  65.     See  ibid.  chap.  VI. 

29.  Page  69.  Hobbes,  Logic,  chap,  3,  §§  8-9; 
Physics,  chap.  25,  §  i.  (Nevertheless  Hobbes  teaches 
in  another  place  that  it  is  analysis  of  the  given  data  that 
leads  us  to  principles :  Analytica  est  ars  ratiocinandi  a 
supposito  ad  principia,  id  est  ad  propositiones  primas  vel 
ex  primis  demonstrandam.  De  rationihus  inotuutn  et 
magnitudinum,  chap.  20,  §  6.)  —  Fichte,   Grundlage  d. 


192  Notes 

gesamten  Wissenschaftslehre,  §  I.  —  S.  Kierkegaard, 
Uvidenskabelig  Efierskrift,  p.  83.  See  my  work :  S'oren 
Kierkegaard  als  Philosoph.  (Frommann's  Klassiker  der 
Pkilosophie),  2d  ed.,  p.  67.  —  Kroman,  Vor  Naturerkjen- 
delse,  p.  270  ff, 

30.  Page  71.  Ernst  Mach,  Beitr'dge  zur  Analyse  der 
Empfindungen,  p.  144. 

31.  Page  71.  Maxwell,  Scientific  Papers,  II,  p.  360. 
—  H.  Hertz,  Einleitmtg  {IVerke,  III,  p.  i  f.).  —  Cf.  an 
interesting  discussion  De  la  valeur  des  lois  physiques,  in 
the  Bulletin  de  la  societe  franfaise  de  philosophie,  Mai, 
1901. 

32.  Page  80,     Kritik  der  reinen  Vernunft,  p.  653. 

33.  Page  83.  History  of  Modern  Philosophy,  II, 
pp.  125  f.,  245-6. 

34.  Page  84.  The  expression  '  static  concept  of 
truth' was  used  —  with  a  somewhat  different  motive  — 
by  Louis  Weber  in  the  philosophical  congress  at  Paris 
in  1900. 

35.  Page  86.  History  of  Modern  Philosophy,  I, 
pp.  177  f. 

36.  Page  89.     See  note  31. 

37.  Page  91.  H.  Hertz,  Uber  die  Beziehungen 
zwischen  Licht  und  Elektrizitat,  1889,  p.  29.  —  Boltz- 
mann's  Address  before  the  meeting  of  German  scientists, 
1900  (translated  in  The  Monist,  Jan.  1901 :  The  recent 
development  of  method  in  theoretical  physics),  and  his 
paper  in  the  Ubersichten  der  Wiener  Akademie,  chap. 
V,  8  (translated  in  The  Monist,  Oct.  1901 :  On  the 
necessity  of  atomic  theories  in  physics).  —  Cf.  on  this 
whole  question  also  C.  Christiansen,  Den  elektromagne- 
tiske  Lysteori  {Det  danske  Vid.  Selskis  Oversigter,  1889), 
and  the  same  author  in  Fysisk  Tidsskrift,  I,  pp.  4-5. 

38.  Page  92.    Maxwell,  Scientific  Papers,  II,  pp.  26- 


Notes  193 

33,  302-305  (where  he  shows  for  what  he  is  indebted  to 
Faraday  and  Lord  Kelvin),  326,  777  f, 

39.  Page  93.    Cf.  Uber  Wiederkennen  (  Vierteljahrs- 
schr.  f.  wiss.  Phil.  XIV). 

40.  Page  93.  On  this  point  we  cannot  grant  the 
case  to  Ostwald  when  he  tries  to  trace  back  everything 
in  Nature  to  '  energy,'  Mass  as  well  as  space,  weight, 
and  chemical  properties  are  to  be  derived  from  the  con- 
cept of  energy.  It  is  quite  correct  that  all  these  concepts 
presuppose  the  concept  of  energy ;  but  is  it  the  only  fun- 
damental concept  in  natural  philosophy  ?  Then  one 
ought  also  to  be  able  to  derive  '  geometrical '  properties 
from  dynamic ;  but  Ostwald  does  not  attempt  this.  In 
his  volume  on  Die  Uberwindung  des  wissenschafllichen 
Materialismus  (1895)  he  defines  matter  as  "a  spatially 
{sic)  ordered  group  of  different  energies"  (p.  28).  This 
spatial  order,  which  is  here  recognized  as  of  special 
moment,  he  seems  to  me  to  push  a  httle  to  one  side  in  his 
Naturphilosophie  (1902),  in  which  the  'energetic  world 
idea '  is  developed.  The  chief  doctrine  on  which  he 
builds  his  system  is,  however,  as  follows :  "  Every  process 
without  exception  can  be  exactly  and  exhaustively 
expounded  and  described,  by  declaring  which  energies 
experience  temporal  and  spatial  (^sic)  changes"  (p.  152). 
That  the  concepts  of  energy  and  of  time  cannot  be 
separated  from  one  another  is  self-evident,  because 
energy  means  the  capacity  to  overcome  opposition,  and 
all  overcoming  lays  claim  to  time.  The  connection 
of  the  concept  of  energy  with  spatial  changes  is  not 
so  self-evident.  This  connection  is  derived  by  Ostwald 
simply  because  he  has  taken  the  concept  of  energy 
from  spatial  phenomena  by  investigations  as  to  the 
changes  in  definite  parts  of  space.  Only  the  fact  that 
he    leaves    this   geometrical   element   heedlessly   in    his 

o 


194  Notes 

concept  of  energy  makes  it  possible  for  him  to  believe 
that  this  concept  is  to  be  accepted  at  face  value  as  the 
same  for  psychical  phenomena  as  for  physical,  so  that 
the  problem  of  'souls  and  bodies'  would  be  solved 
by  setting  up  the  concept  of  energy.  See  above, 
note  25. 

41.  Page  96,  Hume,  Treatise  on  Human  Nature, 
I,  3,  6 :  "  Your  appeal  to  past  experience  decides  nothing 
in  the  present  case,  and  at  the  utmost  can  only  prove, 
that  that  very  object,  which  produc'd  any  other,  was 
ai  thai  very  instant  endow'd  with  such  a  power." 

42.  Page  97.  Critique  of  Pure  Reason,  p.  181 : 
"By  this  basal  doctrine  [the  doctrine  of  causality  and 
the  related  principle  of  the  conservation  of  '  substance ' 
and  of  the  reciprocal  action  of  everything  that  exists]  we 
shall  be  justified  in  putting  together  phenomena  only 
according  to  the  analogy  of  the  logical  and  general  unity 
of  concepts"  —  P.  180:  "An  analogy  of  experience  will 
thus  only  be  a  rule,  according  to  which  unity  of  experi- 
ence shall  come  out  of  perceptions,  and  as  the  principle 
of  events  (phenomena)  be  vaUd  not  constitutively  but 
merely  regulatively." 

43.  Page  98.  F.  H.  Bradley,  Appearance  and 
Reality,  London,  1893,  chap.  4-7,  18.  —  Bernard  Bosan- 
quet,  Logic,  or  the  Morphology  of  Knowledge,  Oxford, 
1888,  Book  I,  chap.  6, 

44.  Page  100.  Rich.  Avenarius,  Kritik  der  reinen 
Erfahrung,  II,  pp.  332-339.  —  Ernst  Mach,  Zur  Analyse 
der  Empfindungen,  p.  168:  "The  fact  of  the  irreversibil- 
ity of  time  reduces  itself  to  the  fact  that  the  changes 
of  value  of  physical  magnitudes  take  place  in  a  definite 
direction.  Of  the  two  analytical  possibilities  only  one  is 
real.  We  need  not  see  in  this  a  metaphysical  problem." 
Cf.  on  these  theories  Heinrich  Griinbaum,  Zur  Kritik 


Notes  195 

der  modernen  Kausalanschauungen  (Arckiv  fur  syste- 
matische  Philosophie,  1899,  pp.  392-409). 

45.  Page  102.  Bosanquet  also  concedes  this:  "At 
any  given  moment  ^^  have  no  choice  but  to  say,  that  the 
future  is  conditioned  by  the  past,  .  .  .  effect  by  cause." 
Logic,  I,  p.  272. 

46.  Page   104.     La  base  psyckologique  du  jugement, 

§27. 

47.  Page  106.  Jevons,  Principles  of  Science,  2d  ed., 
London,  1877,  p.  43.  (De  Morgan  had  already  pointed 
out,  as  Jevons  remarks,  that  we  customarily  think  and 
argue  within  a  limited  world  or  sphere  of  ideas,  even 
though  this  is  not  expressly  declared.) 

48.  Page  107.  Francis  Bradley  has  clearly  discerned 
the  opposition  between  time  and  'the  Absolute,'  when 
he  declares :  "  If  time  is  not  unreal,  I  admit  that  our 
Absolute  is  a  delusion  "  (^Appearance  and  Reality,  p.  206). 
"The  Absolute  has  no  seasons"  {ibid.  p.  500).  —  The 
criticism  of  a  speculative  theory  and  the  reaction  against 
it  consequently  often  utilizes  the  reality  of  time  as  a 
main  argument.  Cf.  C.  H.  Weisse's  and  S.  Kierkegaard's 
relation  to  Hegel.  {History  of  Modern  Philosophy,  II, 
pp.  267,  286-7.)  I"^  ^  brilliant  volume,  Tidsexistensens 
Apologi  Et  sty  eke  relationsteorie  (Upsala,  1888),  Pontus 
Wilner  has  attempted  to  shatter  the  '  Either — Or '  here  ex- 
hibited. He  tries  to  show  that  the  highest  completeness 
can  only  be  reached  by  the  successive  unfolding  of  quali- 
ties which  would  mutually  exclude  one  another  if  simul- 
taneous. But  the  question  of  the  limitation  which  inheres 
in  the  very  succession  is  thus  not  raised  ! 

49.  Page  III.  See  my  paper:  Die  Kontinuitdt  im 
philosophischen  Entwicklungsgange  Kants  {Archiv  fiir 
Geschichte  der  Philosophie,  VII). 

50.  Page    113.     Cf.   La   base  psychologique  du  juge- 


196  Notes 

ment,  §§24   and  27,  and,  with   reference   to   religious 
conclusions,  my  Religionsphilosophie,  pp.  64-68, 

51.  Page  114.  See  my  paper:  Philosophy  and  Life 
(^International  Jotirnal  of  Ethics,  XII,  p.  146).  —  On 
the  imaginary  in  the  epistemological  sense,  see  Wundt, 
System  der  Philosophie,  pp.  195-199. 

52.  Page  119.  a.  on  i\\\%  Y>o^r\i  my  Religionsphiloso- 
phie, pp.  54-63.  —  In  the  epistemological  section  of  the 
Religionsphilosophie  I  have  already  expounded  my  con- 
ception of  the  problem  of  Being  and  its  treatment. 

53.  Page  124.  Goethe,  Farbenlehre,  pp.  124,  175- 
177.  Cf,  Conversations  with  Eckermann,  18  Feb.  1829, 
21  Dec.  1 83 1.  —  Goethe  apphed  this  idea  not  only  in  the 
realm  of  the  theory  of  colors,  but  also  to  magnetism  and 
botany.  See  Spriiche  in  Prosa  (On  Natural  Science)  and 
Conversations  with  Eckermann,  27  Jan.  1830. — From 
his  Nachtr'dgen  zur  Farbenlehre  it  is  evident  that  Hegel 
took  up  with  avidity  the  idea  of  type-phenomenon  as 
Goethe  had  expounded  it. 

54.  Page  129,  S&Q  xnypz.^QX :  Philosophie  als  Kunst 
{Ethische  Ktiltur,  1894).  On  Schopenhauer  and  Lange, 
see  History  of  Modern  Philosophy,  II,  pp.  233  f.,  547  f. 

55.  Page  142.  See  History  of  Modern  Philosophy, 
II,  p.  180  f.  It  is  characteristic  of  the  English  thinkers 
who  have  most  recently  dealt  with  some  of  Hegel's  fun- 
damental ideas,  to  concede  that  the  argument  here  is 
much  more  of  an  analogy  than  a  proof.  Francis  Bradley 
never  considers  the  analogy  as  permissible ;  according 
to  him,  the  highest  reality  cannot  be  called  either  soul 
or  body,  although  the  soul  more  than  the  body  possesses 
that  combination  of  extent  and  unity,  that  '  self-consist- 
ency' which  is  the  mark  of  true  reality  {Appearance 
and  Reality,  pp.  307,  359).  — In  his  article  on  HegePs 
treatment  of  the  categories  of  the   idea    {Mind,    1900, 


Notes  197 

p.  149  f.)  McTaggart  concedes  that  we  only  have  a  sin- 
gle example  of  the  category  '  Geist,'  which  according  to 
Hegel  possesses  theological  or  cosmological  significance, 
—  If  a  distinction  is  made  (as  by  A.  E.  Taylor  in  Mind, 
1900,  p.  245)  between  two  idealistic  schools,  the  one 
standing  near  Leibniz  and  Lotze,  and  the  other  holding 
by  Hegel,  then  I  must  emphasize  the  fact  that  it  is  the 
first  of  these  two  schools  that  has  most  clearly  discerned 
the  real  philosophical  basis  of  metaphysical  idealism. 
(Taylor  himself  even  acknowledges  that  in  both  schools 
an  analogy  with  the  mind  of  man  is  fundamental  when 
he  says  that  both  are  agreed  in  "  the  main  principle  that 
it  is  in  mind,  and  nowhere  else,  that  we  are  face  to  face 
with  the  central  reality  of  the  universe,"  ibid.') 

56.  Page  145.  Compare  on  this  type  my  Rdigions- 
philosophie,  pp.  47  f.,  1 18  f.,  277  f. 

57.  Page  155.  In  my  Ethik  (2d  ed.,  p.  27  f.)  I  went 
no  deeper  into  the  relation  of  the  notions  of  worth,  of 
purpose,  and  of  the  norm.  But  see,  on  the  other  hand, 
La  base  psychologique  du  jugement,  §  27  (cf.  §  37),  and 
my  Keligionsphilosophie,  p.  10  f. 

58.  Page  163.     Cf.  my  Ethik,  2d  ed.,  p.  164  f. 

59.  Page  167.  Qi.xD.-^ Psychology, '^\t^,i-^  Eihik\ 
XIII,  4. 

60.  Page  169.  Francis  Bradley,  Appearance  and 
Reality,  pp.  414-418.  —  A.  E.  Taylor,  The  Problem  of 
Conduct,  London,  1901,  p.  201. 

61.  Page  172,     Cf.  my  Etliik"^,  p.  69  f. 

62.  Page  176.  In  my  Keligionsphilosophie,  for  the 
sake  of  a  more  comprehensive  illumination  of  the  prob- 
lem, I  introduce  beside  the  psychological-historical  in- 
quiry also  an  epistemological  and  an  ethical  inquiry.  In 
this  shorter  exposition  I  dwell  especially  on  the  psy- 
chological-historical inquiry,  pointing  out  only  casually 


198  Notes 

and  very  briefly  the  epistemological  and  ethical  points 
of  view. 

63.  Page  182.  Plato,  Phaidros,  S.  249  C.  (7rp6s  ohirep 
Qehs  &v  eei6s  icTTi).  Literally  rendered,  "that,  to  live 
in  which  is  the  divinity  of  God." 


INDEX 


Altruism,  170. 

Analogy,  its  place  in  philo- 
sophical theory,  121  f. 

Antinomy,  of  parts  and  whole 
in  consciousness,  19-22, 
40;  in  knowledge  of  Be- 
ing, 119;  in  Ethics,  162  f., 
170, 

Aristippas,  161. 

Aristotle,  160. 

Art,  psychology  as  an,  23 ; 
metaphysics  as  an,  127. 

Association-psychology,      18, 

34  f. 
Atomism,  psychic,  18. 
AVENARIUS,   31,  38,  71,  73, 

99. 

Being,  the  problem  ot.  Chap- 
ter III  ;  possiblyunfinished, 
120,  136  f. ;  intelligible, 
131 ;  contains  a  unifying 
principle,  131 ;  its  essence, 
139;  may  be  an  unfolding 
story,  150. 

Bergson,  51. 

boltzmann,  9i. 

bosanquet,98. 

Bradley,  98. 

Brain,  and  mind,  37-59. 


Causality,  64 ;  elementary 
and  ideal,  66,  78,  94;  and 
time,  97 ;  and  identity,  30, 
95  f.,  103 ;  and  under- 
standing, 132. 

Cause,  and  reason,  95,  98. 

Change,  direction  of,  104, 
146;  of  values,  167. 

Conflict  of  values,  169 ;  of  our 
thought  with  reality,  186. 

Consciousness,  the  problem 
of,  Chapter  I ;  as  a  contin- 
uum or  as  a  sum,  14; 
its  '  irrationality,"  20. 

Continuity,  8  f. ;  in  conscious- 
ness, 16,  40  f. ;  and  iden- 
tity, 30,  46  f. ;  in  brain 
action,  49;  in  knowledge, 
60  f. ;  in  ethics,  162  f. ;  in 
religion,  178,  186;  and  dis- 
continuity, 67;  and  under- 
standing, 75,  109,  117;  and 
reality,  140  f. 

Cosmology,  127. 

Degree,  differences  of,  85. 
Development,  J<r If '  Evolution.' 
Differences,  of  kind  and  de- 
gree, 86 ;  of  duty,  171  ff. 
Direction,  of  change,  104, 146. 

99 


200 


Index 


Discontinuity,  in  general,  8  f. ; 
in  mental  life,  26,  33,  37, 39 ; 
in  qualities,  85;  in  Being, 

136  f. 
Duties,  their  relativity,  171  f. 
Dynamic,  vs.   static  view  of 

world,  93 ;  concept  of  truth, 

82. 

Economic  theory  of  science, 
71,  80. 

Empiricism,  vi,  70. 

Energy,  88 ;  potential  psychi- 
cal, 44,  142 ;  neural,  58. 

Epiphenomenalism,  45. 

Ethics,  xii,  151 ;  problem  of, 
158  f. ;  Greek,  162 ;  the  au- 
thor's, 169. 

Evolution,  66,  145  f.;  inde- 
pendent of  causal  concept, 
147;  universal,  150. 

Extension,  91  f. 

Faith,  religious,  179. 
Final  causes,  20,  43. 
Flechsig,  34  f. 

Galileo,  86. 
Gods,  178,  182. 
Good,  see '  Value.' 

Hegel,  142. 
Hertz,  71,  91. 

HOBBES,  140. 
Hume,  56,  96. 
Hypotheses,  79. 

Idealism,  140  f. 
Ideals,  see  '  Value.' 
Identity,  46  f. ;  and  causality, 
30,  95  f.,  103. 


Individuality,  in  Ethics,  171. 

Irrational,  the,  in  psychology, 
19-21 ;  in  knowledge,  67, 
84  f. ;  in  Being,  120, 135, 143, 
149;  in  Ethics,  173. 

Justice,  169. 

Kant,  75,  80,  83, 96,  no,  155, 
163. 

Kierkegaard,  161. 

Knowledge,  the  problem  of, 
Chapter  II;  the  four  the- 
ories of,  71  f.;  is  it  subjec- 
tive or  objective  ?  74, 80, 107, 
110-115;  apart  of  Being,  114. 

Lange,  a.,  128. 
Lange,  K.,  30. 
Leibnitz,  40, 42, 121. 

Mach,  71,  99. 
Materialism,  139. 
Matter,  92. 
Maxwell,  71,  91. 
Mechanical  philosophy,  87. 
Mill,  70. 

Mind,  see  '  Consciousness.' 
Mind  and  brain,  37-59. 
Monism,   132;    critical,    viii, 

X,  136,  144- 
munsterberg,  23,  37. 

Nietzsche,  170. 

Objectivity,  see '  Knowledge.' 
OSTWALD,  59. 

Parallelism     of    brain    and 

mind,  51  f. 
Personality,  4, 20, 109, 158, 163. 


hidex 


201 


Philosophy,  professors  of,  vi. 
Physiology   and   psychology. 

Pluralism,  133.  See  'Dis- 
continuities.' 

Possibility,  44. 

Potential  energy,  44. 

Psychology  and  philosophy, 
12,  37,  59 ;  and  physiology, 
31  f. ;  and  epistemology, 
100;  and  logic,  77  f. 

Psychophysical  relation,  37- 

59- 
Purpose,  20,  43. 

Quality  vs.  quantity,  87  f. 

Rationalism,  vi. 

Rationality,  see  '  Continuity ' ; 
see  '  Irrational,  the.' 

Reality,  tests  of,  118;  and 
ideal  goods,  184. 

Reason,  80  f. ;  and  cause,  95, 
98  f.      • 

Recollection,  65. 

Relativity,  of  knowledge,  of 
duties,  171. 

Religion,  xii ;  its  problem, 
173 ;  its  development,  174 ; 
its  essence,  175,  179;  de- 
fined, 176 ;  its  permanence, 
180;  differences  in,  181; 
their  estimation,  185. 

Rhythmic  recurrence,  149. 

Schiller,  76,  114, 162. 
Schopenhauer,  128. 
Self-assertion     vs.    altruism, 
170. 

Socrates,  166. 


Soul,  34. 
Spencer,  70. 

Static  view  of  world,  92  f.,  145. 
Subconscious  facts,  39  f. 
Subjectivity  of  knowledge,  74, 
80,  107,  no. 

Thing-in-itself,  no,  126. 

Time,  and  causality,  97 ;  and 
reality,  ix,  98-106;  and  ir- 
rationality, 136. 

Tolstoy,  169. 

Totality,  see  '  Whole." 

Truth,  67,  81;  dynamic  and 
static  concepts  of,  ix  f.,  82, 
84,  90. 

'Type-phenomenon,'  124. 

Understanding,  67,  74f.,  108, 

132. 
Unifying  principle  in  Being, 

131.  138- 

Value,  the  problem  of.  Chap- 
ter IV;  defined,  154  f. ; 
relativity  of,  155  ;  standards 
of,  155-165 ;  educational 
and  historical  changes  in, 
166  f. ;  conservation  of, 
177  f. 

Whole,  119 ;  and  parts,  x,  xii, 

123,   133  f . ;  in  ethics,  160, 

168-171. 
Will,  55  f. 
Work,  ethical,  158. 
Working  value  of  hypotheses, 

x,  81. 
World    is     still    unfinished, 

xiii,  136,  185. 


